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ABSTRACT 
This research dissertation explores the firm strategy of coopetition, a neologism denoting 
simultaneous cooperation and competition. Coopetition as a phenomenon has accrued 
prominence in practice, with economic actors placing a higher emphasis on constructing 
“positive sum” scenarios with competing partners. However, strategic management 
scholarship lacks clarity in explaining how the tensions and tradeoffs associated with 
coopetition may influence the formulation and the implication of coopetition.  
 
With a theoretical and empirical focus on the benefits and caveats of coopetition, this 
dissertation elucidates coopetition from three angles. First, I theorize the socio-cognitive 
aspects in balancing competition and cooperation between firms. Second, I investigate firm 
learning experience in strategic alliances and patent searches as the antecedents to 
coopetition. Third, I examine the contingency effects of multiple network embeddedness 
on the relation between coopetition pursuits and innovation performance. 
 
The empirical setting of my dissertation research is technology-driven industries, because 
firms in this setting show high heterogeneity in the key theoretical foci (i.e. coopetition, 
learning, interorganizational relations, and innovation). The firm sample includes U.S. 
public firms in multiple high-tech industries (i.e. pharmaceuticals, computers and 
peripheral equipment, electronics and electronic components, aerospace and aircraft, 
telecommunication, and medical devices). I construct a panel data with firm-year 
observations of financial records, alliance and M&A records, and patent records from 1987 
to 2006 to test my hypotheses. 
 
Key findings are summarized below. 
Balancing (Chapter 2): 
• Clarifying the interplay between emotionality and rationality in competitive 
dynamics hybridism 
• Explaining interfirm interaction modes with different degrees of competition and 
cooperation 
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• Informing managers about the confounding effect of emotion-driven action 
proclivities 
• Recalibrating strategic focus on value-based interdependence with competitors 
 
Learning (Chapter 3): 
• Explaining the effects of firm learning experiences on strategic decisions regarding 
coopetition 
• Identifying a motivating effect of past strategic alliances and a hindering effect of 
firm patent searches on its coopetition pursuit  
• Depicting path dependency in organization learning and relationship building 
• Informing managers about the connection between learning experiences, firm 
capabilities, and coopetition tradeoff 
• Providing guidance to strategize firm relationships with competitors by evaluating 
firm learning proficiency and coopetition as a competency development 
opportunity 
 
Innovating (Chapter 4):  
• Teasing out the contingency effects of alliance network and knowledge network 
embeddedness on the relation between coopetition and innovation 
• Clarifying the logic behind network-based augmenting and dampening effects on 
the impact of horizontal integration on firm innovation performance 
• Demonstrating the differential impacts of firm positions in multiple networks to 
inform managerial decision regarding leveraging coopetition to improve innovation 
• When strategizing coopetition, innovation-driven firm managers should consider 
interfirm social power interdependence and firm knowledge base influence 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 RESEARCH TOPIC 
The topic of investigation in this dissertation is coopetition, a portmanteau combining 
cooperation and competition. Coopetition refers to the partnership between competing 
entities to gain higher payoffs in a positive-sum game (Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 2011). 
In such a game, the opportunities of synergy exist, in which entities can create higher public 
value through a partnership than going it alone in the field; subsequently, each entity 
internalizes a portion of the synergistic value, leading to private value gains for all players 
(Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 1995). In other words, coopetition is a strategy to increase 
individual payoff (i.e. private value) by first enhancing the total game payoff (i.e. public 
value).  
Coopetition is deployed on levels ranging from persons, organizations, to national 
sovereignties: workers vying for the same promotion opportunity in a group benefit from 
good team performance when they maintain a collegial relationship; firms racing to gain 
more market share may achieve greater profits when they collaborate to expand the market 
size; countries negotiate trade deals to boost their own economic growths while facilitating 
the development of their competitors (e.g. the U.S.A and China). 
Here, I focus on coopetition as a firm strategy to gain competitive advantage. While 
paradoxical at first glance, there can be strong incentives for the firm to pursue coopetition. 
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Competing firms operating in the same market space often accrue a common set of strategic 
factors, and they are distinguished by the degrees to which each firm develops these factors 
(Hamel, Doz, & Prahalad, 1989). In other words, competing firms need to develop 
strengths along similar dimensions, and they may recognize complementarities between 
their weaknesses and a competitor’s strengths. 
For example, Apple and Microsoft compete in the consumer electronics industry 
and develop expertise in similar technological areas but to different extents: while Apple 
out-competes Microsoft in functional integration amongst different devices within the 
Apple ecosystem, Microsoft claims leadership in the market by its operating systems that 
are developed to complement most products offered by other companies in the field. Hence, 
an opportunity of synergy is present between Apple and Microsoft to form a strategic 
alliance: Apple may leverage Microsoft’s market presence to capture more users by 
developing integration between the iOS and Windows operating systems; Microsoft may 
learn from Apple’s expertise in functional designs for different devices, such as mobile 
tablets and smart phones. 
Upon his return as Apple’s CEO, Steve Jobs declared at the Boston Macworld 
Conference in 1997:  
“Apple needs help from other partners … and relationships that are destructive are 
no help to anybody in this industry today… We have to let go of the notion that for 
Apple to win, Microsoft has to lose.”  
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In a similar tone, Jobs’s successor Tim Cook noted in his speech at the 2015 BoxWorks 
event regarding Apple’s strategic pursuit of coopetition with Microsoft in the enterprise 
platform market:  
“Apple and Microsoft can partner on more things than we can compete on, and 
that is what the customer wants… Office on the Mac is a force. Partnering with 
Microsoft is great for our customers and that’s why we do it.” 
Firms pursue coopetition to leverage complementary resources and capabilities in 
gaining synergy (Lado, Boyd, & Hanlon, 1997). Through coopetition, competitors may 
share critical resources to increase the efficiency of innovation, production, and value 
creation. Furthermore, firms can learn from their competitors to develop capabilities crucial 
for success in the field. However, firms need to overcome major barriers to benefit from 
coopetition. Opportunism is the first obstacle, since partnering with rivals leads to the 
possibility of misappropriation (Conner & Prahalad, 1996). The focal firm must place a 
certain level of trust in its partner to facilitate the collaboration, because no enforceable 
contract can exhaustively preempt all misappropriation threats (Chen & Miller, 2015; Tsai, 
Su, & Chen, 2011). With trust, the firm becomes susceptible to undercutting by an 
opportunistic opponent. 
Tunnel vision is another caveat. In coopetition, firms inevitably become hyper-
focused on their opponents’ actions, since close contacts and interactions in the partnership 
draw attention from the firms onto each other (Chen & Miller, 2015). With the partners 
being competitors in the same business field, firms become ever more vigilant and devote 
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high cognitive efforts to noting, analyzing, and strategizing vis-à-vis their opponents’ 
behaviors, since miscalculation can manifest into costly losses. Consequently, the firms 
can lose sight of better opportunities, or worse, blinded by the threats outside the 
coopetitive relationship. In summary, coopetition can yield competitive advantage to the 
firm, yet it may cause dangerous pitfalls. Given the co-existence of benefits and harms, 
how do firms strategize coopetition to enhance their competitiveness?  
1.2 LITERATURE OVERVIEW 
The phenomenon of cooperation between competitors (i.e. coopetition) has attracted 
growing interests from management scholars (Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 2011; Chen & 
Miller, 2015; Gnyawali & Madhavan, 2001). Firms strategically forge cooperation with 
certain rivals to create value by collaborative learning and joint innovation (Hamel, 1991). 
Anecdotal examples of value-creating coopetition abound. Apple and IBM compete in the 
integrated computer system market, while concurrently cooperating to develop and refine 
technological knowledge (Hagedoorn, Carayannis, & Alexander, 2001). Samsung and 
Sony are direct rivals in the consumer electronics market, and they simultaneously 
collaborate on research and development (R&D) (Gnyawali & Park, 2011).  
Value-creating coopetition can provide significant competitive advantage for 
innovation-driven firms. However, theoretical understanding of this strategy remains 
elusive. On a related front, research on value-creating cooperation in strategic management 
has yielded fruitful results. The alliance literature demonstrates that inter-connected firms 
gain competitive advantage from resource sharing and rent creation (Lavie, 2006), 
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knowledge complementarity (Makri, Hitt, & Lane, 2010), and organizational learning 
(Phene & Tallman, 2014). Furthermore, strategic alliances between competitors often lead 
to horizontal integration. For example, strategic alliances between competitors increase the 
likelihood of consolidation through mergers and acquisitions (M&A) (Angwin, 2007), as 
synergy becomes more tangible over the course of the partnership.   
Synergy through coopetition exists because competing firms often share common 
grounds in resource development, knowledge implementation, and learning goals 
(Browning, Beyer, & Shetler, 1995). Due to such commonalities, cooperation with 
competitors can yield greater competitive advantage to the firm through learning 
opportunities and innovation enhancement than functional partnerships, such as a supplier-
buyer alliance (Chen & Miller, 2015). On the other hand, competitive tension exerts non-
trivial impacts on the decision and the outcome of inter-firm cooperation, because value 
erosion instead of value creation is plausible when rivalrous firms behave opportunistically 
(Chen & Miller, 2015). For instance, knowledge exchange between competitors may result 
in “learning race”, in which a firm unilaterally absorbs the core knowledge from its partner 
(Khanna, Gulati, & Nohria, 1998; Yang, Zheng, & Zaheer, 2015).  
Therefore, coopetition stands as a unique managerial phenomenon, which requires 
distinct theoretical treatments than non-competitive collaboration. Although coopetition 
research continues to accrue momentum, it remains in a fragmented state and has yet to be 
integrated into the main strategic management literature. Few studies emphasize the 
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tension and tradeoff associated with coopetition, leaving a theoretical gap in strategic 
management literature.  
 
1.3 RESEARCH DESIGN 
1.3.1 Structural Framework 
The overarching theme of my dissertation is to examine the tension and tradeoff associated 
with coopetition. Shedding light on the positive and negative externalities of coopetition, 
the research here contributes to theoretical understanding on how firms reach and leverage 
friendships with their foes to gain competitive advantage. My dissertation is structured in 
three interconnected research streams, illustrated in Figure 1.1. Focusing on the balancing, 
learning, and innovating facets in coopetition, the three streams explain the tension in firm 
incentives to pursue coopetition, and the tradeoff in the impacts of coopetition on firm 
competitive advantage. 
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Figure 1.1 Structural Framework of Three Research Streams  
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In Balancing (Chapter 2), I address the socio-cognitive aspects of the firm in 
balancing competition and cooperation, leading to the emergence of competitive dynamics 
hybridism, in which coopetition stands central in inter-firm interactions. The focal concepts 
in this chapter are social perceptions, emotions, and actions of the firm in the context of 
interactions with competitors. The theoretical development in this chapter explains the 
tension in firm incentives to pursue coopetition by examining competitive dynamics 
hybridism in a socio-cognitive lens. In theorizing the causal links between the above 
concepts, this chapter answers the research question:  
RQ 1. How do firms balance competition and cooperation? 
In Learning (Chapter 3), I examine the impacts of firm learning mechanisms on 
firm propensities to pursue coopetition in the technology-driven industries. Coopetition 
provides competitive advantage through firm learning opportunities, yet it exacerbates 
learning race pitfalls. Therefore, understanding how firm learning influences firm decisions 
to pursue coopetition will yield insights on how the firm can build competency through 
coopetition while avoiding commitment to unnecessary exploration. The empirical work 
here complements the conceptual development in Chapter 3 to explain the tension in firm 
incentives to pursue coopetition from an organization learning perspective. Conceptual and 
empirical analysis answers the research question:  
RQ 2. How does firm learning influence the decision to pursue coopetition? 
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In Innovating (Chapter 4), I investigate factors that alter the positive and negative 
externalities of coopetition on firm innovation in the technology-driven industries. Starting 
from horizontal integration to represent deepened coopetition, I tease out the moderation 
effects of multiple network embeddedness on the impact of horizontal integration on firm 
innovation value. The focal concepts in this chapter are horizontal integration, value 
creation by innovation, knowledge and collaboration network embeddedness. By 
elucidating the moderation effects of multiple networks in which a focal firm is placed, the 
conceptual and empirical analysis in this chapter explains the tradeoff in the impacts of 
coopetition on firm competitive advantage. The research question guiding the investigation 
here is:  
RQ 3. How do network positions moderate the impacts of coopetition on firm 
innovation? 
1.3.2 Empirical Setting 
The empirical setting for Chapters 3 – 4 is technology-driven industries in the United 
States. My goals in these two research streams are two-fold: first, to explain the variance 
in firm incentives to pursue coopetition from an organization learning perspective; and 
second, to tease out the network contingency effects regulating the impacts of coopetition 
on firm innovation. Therefore, the firm sample must contain variance in coopetition 
pursuits, learning and innovative activities. 
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In technology-driven industries, learning and innovation are critical for firm 
competitive advantage. Depending on the focal firm’s strategic positioning, it may engage 
in R&D, exploration and experimentation to various degrees. Moreover, firms in these 
industries pursue coopetition at higher frequencies than sectors with low technological 
intensities. Similarly, strategic positioning alters how much firms engage in strategic 
alliances, joint ventures, and/or M&As with other players in the same industry. 
Technology-driven industries thus provide a suitable empirical setting to analyze the 
correlations between firm learning, coopetition, and innovation.  
According to the Science, Technology and Innovation (STI) Scoreboard2 reports 
on international comparison of firm innovation intensities, firms in the United States 
engage in vigorous learning and innovation, measured in R&D investments, scientific 
research and technological invention. Figure 1.2 and Figure 1.33 below show the 
comparison between selected developed and developing countries in their historic R&D 
investments. Figure 1.2 demonstrates the changes of business R&D expenditure in the U.S., 
Japan, and EU from 1991 to 2003. The U.S. leads in the developed economy in terms of 
overall R&D expenditure in the private sector. 
Figure 1.3 illustrates the 2003 strategic mapping in R&D investment, which 
indicates that the U.S. ranks high internationally in innovation human capital (measured in 
                                                 
2 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) conducts biennial studies to 
monitor innovation activities in different countries. All reports and data are published with free access from 
the OECD iLibrary. 
3 Figure 1.2 and Figure 1.3 are adapted from the 2005 report of OECD Science, Technology and Industry 
Scoreboard (OECD, 2005: pp21-23). 
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the number of researchers per 1,000 employees) and R&D intensity (measured in R&D 
expenses as % GDP). Furthermore, public firms in the U.S. report standardized financial 
records to the Securities and Exchange Commission regularly, thus providing reliable data 
to gauge critical variables such as firm assets, strategic activities, and performances. 
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Figure 1.2 Changes of Business R&D Expenditure in 1991-2003 
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Figure 1.3 R&D Expenditure and Innovation Human Capital in Selected Countries 
(2003) 
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To identify technology-driven industries, I rely on the Business Research and 
Development and Innovation Survey (BRDIS) by the National Science Foundation (NSF). 
Table 1.1 and Figure 1.4 (collated from the BRDIS data) show a snapshot of private R&D 
investments in different industries from 2002 to 2006, highlighting high innovation 
intensities in the technology-driven industries. The aggregate private R&D investment in 
pharmaceuticals and medicines, computer and electronic products, aerospace products and 
parts, medical equipment and supplies manufacturing, and telecommunications takes up 
between 31% (in 2002) and 47% (in 2006) of the total private R&D investment across all 
industries. Moreover, these industries demonstrated a consistent upward trend in R&D 
intensities throughout the observation timeframe. 
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Table 1.1 Private R&D Investment and Industrial Size in the United States from 2002 to 2006 
 
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
 
Industrial 
Size 
(Firm 
Count) 
Private 
R&D 
Investment 
(US$) 
Industrial 
Size 
(Firm 
Count) 
Private 
R&D 
Investment 
(US$) 
Industrial 
Size 
(Firm 
Count) 
Private 
R&D 
Investment 
(US$) 
Industrial 
Size 
(Firm 
Count) 
Private 
R&D 
Investment 
(US$) 
Industrial 
Size 
(Firm 
Count) 
Private 
R&D 
Investment 
(US$) 
All industries 29,001 $174,408 37,843 $183,305 41,029 $188,035 43,880 $204,250 44,266 $223,365 
Pharmaceuticals 
and medicines 
313 $14,186 299 $15,949 394 $31,444 445 $34,798 483 $38,813 
Computer and 
electronic products 
666 $2,087 2,434 $32,495 3,226 $40,691 3,425 $42,463 2,795 $48,251 
Aerospace products 
and parts 
951 $1,508 170 $8,203 160 $9,224 254 $10,928 132 $11,995 
Medical equipment 
and supplies 
2,808 $30,307 713 $6,370 661 $3,313 869 $4,343 923 $3,998 
Telecommunications 84 $5,349 122 $1,625 214 $2,052 108 $2,539 162 $2,135 
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Figure 1.4 Industrial R&D Intensity Snapshot from 2002 to 2006 in the United States 
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Therefore, I gather firm data from the following industries in my dissertation: 
• Pharmaceuticals (SIC 2833-2836) 
• Computers and peripheral equipment (SIC 3571-3579) 
• Electronics and electronic components (SIC 3671-3679) 
• Aerospace and aircraft (SIC 3721-3769) 
• Telecommunications (4812-4813, 4822, 4899) 
• Medical devices (3841-3845)  
My sample includes all public firms in the above industries per company primary 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes obtained from SEC filings. Data for the 
empirical research include financial statements, strategic alliance and M&A records, and 
patent archives for listed firms in the U.S. from 1987 to 2006. The primary sources for 
these records are SEC (accessed through COMPUSTAT), United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO), Thomson Reuters Securities Data Company (SDC) Platinum 
TM, and Factiva. 
1.4 SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS 
Combining the three research streams on balancing, learning, and innovating in 
coopetition, this dissertation sheds light on how firms reach and leverage a strategically 
poised position to gain competitive advantage. Theoretical knowledge of the tension and 
tradeoff of coopetition informs managerial practitioners how to strategize partnerships with 
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competitors. I summarize the key findings, in terms of theoretical contributions and 
managerial implications, from each chapter below.  
Chapter 2 conceptualizes the coupling between emotionality and rationality of 
strategic decisions in the social context of inter-firm interactions, and explains how such 
interplay manifests in competitive dynamics hybridism. The balance between cooperation 
and competition emerges from the managerial cognitive reactions driven by firm-level 
perceptions and emotions, in addition to rational planning driven by resources and 
capabilities.  
When dealing with social interactions with competitors, the strategic pitfalls caused 
by perceptive distortion and emotive escalation are often amplified. Managers should be 
cognizant about their perceptive interpretation and emotive reaction regarding a 
competitor’s action and motive. Acknowledging the confounding effect from emotion-
driven action motives, managers will gain a clear vision as they evaluate value-based 
interdependence with competitors when strategizing the interfirm interaction mode. 
Chapter 3 teases out the impacts of firm learning experiences on coopetition pursuit 
propensities. I report the empirical findings from the technology-driven industries in the 
U.S. from 1987 to 2006 to demonstrate how firm strategic decision to pursue coopetition 
is influenced by their capability-building experiences through patent-based and alliance-
based learning. Firms with more experiences in strategic alliances showed increased 
propensities to engage in coopetition, whereas firms with more experiences in patent 
searches were less likely to pursue coopetition.  
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Taking a path-dependent lens, the conceptual development and empirical findings 
here yield knowledge about how organization learning impacts strategic decision in the 
context of coopetition. Successful learning through coopetition depends on a firm’s 
capabilities to learn, and this chapter teases out what type of past learning experiences can 
enhance coopetition as a competency development opportunity. Managers may use the 
insights from this chapter to evaluate the tradeoff in coopetition (e.g. providing knowledge 
access yet posing learning race threats) based on the firm’s learning proficiency in different 
mechanisms. 
Chapter 4 reports the moderation effects of alliance and knowledge network 
embeddedness in regulating the main impact of coopetition on innovation performance of 
the firm. With different positions in the alliance network, firms face distinct social power 
constraints. Similarly, knowledge network position of a firm reflects the influence and 
information recombination of its knowledge base. These network constraints of the firm 
may influence how effective coopetition manifests as a strategy to improve innovation 
performance. I identify augmenting effects from alliance and knowledge network centrality 
(i.e. reflecting a firm’s social connectiveness and knowledge influence, respectively), and 
a dampening effect from alliance network structural hole (i.e. reflecting a firm’s ability to 
access resources from different sources).  
These findings imply that when a focal firm controls a central and influential 
network position in the competition field, it can harness coopetition more effectively as a 
mechanism to boost innovation; in contrast, when a firm gains resource access from diverse 
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sources, the impact of coopetition on its innovation performance tends to be smaller. From 
the insights here, managers at innovation-driven firms may strategize from a network 
perspective, noting the differential impacts of multiple networks when they consider 
leveraging coopetition to improve innovation. 
Table 1.2 summarizes the key findings from the three chapters in terms of 
theoretical contributions and managerial implications. Taken together, this dissertation 
sheds a light on the antecedents and implications of coopetition as a firm strategy. My work 
contributes to the strategic management literature with insights on the balance between 
competition and cooperation, the path dependence in firm learning and coopetition 
strategy, and the network-based contingency effects in the results of coopetition. 
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Table 1.2 Summary of Key Findings 
 
Chapter Theoretical Contributions Managerial Implications 
Balancing 
• Clarifying the interplay 
between emotionality and 
rationality in competitive 
dynamics hybridism 
• Explaining interfirm 
interaction modes with 
different degrees of 
competition and 
cooperation 
• Informing managers about the 
confounding effect of 
emotion-driven action 
proclivities 
• Recalibrating strategic focus 
on value-based 
interdependence with 
competitors 
Learning 
• Explaining the effects of 
firm learning experiences 
on strategic decisions 
regarding coopetition 
• Identifying a motivating 
effect of past strategic 
alliances and a hindering 
effect of firm patent 
searches on its coopetition 
pursuit  
• Depicting path dependency 
in organization learning and 
relationship building 
• Informing managers about the 
connection between learning 
experiences, firm capabilities, 
and coopetition tradeoff 
• Providing guidance to 
strategize firm relationships 
with competitors by evaluating 
firm learning proficiency and 
coopetition as a competency 
development opportunity 
Innovating 
• Teasing out the 
contingency effects of 
alliance network and 
knowledge network 
embeddedness on the 
relation between 
coopetition and innovation 
• Clarifying the logic behind 
network-based augmenting 
and dampening effects on 
the impact of horizontal 
integration on firm 
innovation performance 
• Demonstrating the differential 
impacts of firm positions in 
multiple networks to inform 
managerial decision regarding 
leveraging coopetition to 
improve innovation 
• When strategizing coopetition, 
innovation-driven firm 
managers should consider 
interfirm social power 
interdependence and firm 
knowledge base influence 
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2 BALANCING COMPETITION AND COOPERATION: 
SOCIAL COGNITION OF THE FIRM AND 
COMPETITIVE DYNAMICS HYBRIDISM 
 
2.1 ABSTRACT 
I address how firms balance competition and cooperation from a sociocognitive 
perspective. The competitive dynamics literature posits a hybrid view of interfirm relations, 
which conceptualizes a continuum of rivalrous, competitive-cooperative, and relational 
modes of firm interactions. I theorize the sociocognitive antecedents to firm decisions on 
mode shifts by clarifying the interdependence between emotionality and rationality in 
competitive dynamics. Focusing on firm perception, emotion, and actions, I develop 
propositions to explain how social cognition within interfirm relations lead to interaction 
modes with different degrees of competitiveness and cooperativeness. My analysis makes 
theoretical contributions to competitive dynamics and behavioral theory of the firm. 
 
2.2 INTRODUCTION 
A central theme in strategic management research focuses on firm decisions to balance 
competition and cooperation (Chen & Miller, 2012) and how these firm-level strategic 
decisions influence dyad-level interfirm interactions, including competitive attacks and 
rivalry (Baum & Silverman, 2002), alliances and other cooperative relations (e.g. Baum, 
Calabrese, & Silverman, 2000; Dussauge, Garrette, & Mitchell, 2000; Gnyawali & 
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Madhavan, 2001). To shed light on the balance between interfirm competition and 
cooperation, it is critical to apply the sociocognitive theoretical lens to analyze how firm 
social cognition (e.g. firm perceptions of competitor actions and attributes) influence firm 
social behaviors (e.g. rivalrous attacks and/or relational building) (Chen & Miller, 2015).  
A key stream of research in the competitive dynamics paradigm has provided 
influential knowledge on how interfirm interactions take form as firms strategize 
competition and cooperation from a sociocognitive perspective. Extant investigations 
delineate an array of firm-level sociocognitive elements that are influential on dyad-level 
interactions, including firm awareness, motivations, and comparative capabilities (i.e. the 
AMC framework) (Chen & Miller, 2015), competitive domain identities (Livengood & 
Reger, 2010), interfirm social comparison (Kim & Tsai, 2012), and firm competitive 
perceptions (e.g. Gao, Yu, & Cannella, 2017; Trapido, 2012; Tsai, Su, & Chen, 2011). 
Interestingly, growing research illustrates that firms become aware of the opportunities to 
gain competitive advantage through relational contacts with competitors, and concurrently 
perceive the competitors as partners instead of rivals (Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 2011). 
It is especially critical to tease out the role of firm social cognition in firm 
behavioral decisions (i.e. elicit competitive attack vs pursue relational contacts) when 
competitive tension is palpable between the interacting firms (Chen & Miller, 2015; Chen, 
Su, & Tsai, 2007), because competitive perceptions can arouse strong emotions in the focal 
firm, which yield significant impacts on firm behaviors (Hodgkinson & Healey, 2011). For 
example, a focal firm may experience tangible negative feelings towards a competitor when 
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it sees the competitor as a rival and the competitor action as an attack (Chen, 1996). 
Similarly, firms emotionally respond in a negative manner when they perceive organization 
identity threats from competitors in proximal competitive domains (Livengood & Reger, 
2010). Although it has been noted that emotions can impact competitive and cooperative 
behaviors on the firm-level, current understanding on interfirm competition-cooperation 
balance is limited by a deficiency in theoretical development of firm emotions and their 
behavioral implications in the social context of interfirm interactions (Ashkanasy, 
Humphrey, & Huy, 2017; Huy, 2012; Menges & Kilduff, 2015).  
In their seminal work, Chen and Miller (2012; 2015) put forth a hybrid view of 
competitive dynamics by synthesizing critical insights from extant research on interfirm 
rivalry, co-opetition, and alliances. The hybrid view of competitive dynamics 
conceptualizes interfirm relations as modes of interactions (i.e. firm actions and reactions), 
including the rivalrous, competitive-cooperative, and relational modes, along a continuous 
spectrum with mixed competition and cooperation (Chen and Miller, 2015). This hybrid 
view has led to an intellectual curiosity: given that interfirm interactions vary in the degrees 
of competition and cooperation, how do firms “transcend the divides and dichotomies 
between competition and cooperation” (Chen & Miller, 2015: p771); or more broadly, 
“under what conditions must the balance shift between competitive-cooperative, rivalrous, 
and relational modes” (Chen & Miller, 2015: p771)?  
To answer the above question regarding the shift of interfirm hybrid interaction 
mode along the competition-cooperation spectrum, I need to understand the interlace 
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between rationality and emotionality throughout the cognitive-behavioral cascade of firm 
decisions regarding interfirm actions/reactions. Although it has been noted that the role of 
emotions is critical in the manifestation of bounded rationality in the decision-making 
process (Simon, 1967; 1983), firm strategy research largely focuses on the cognitive and 
situational constraints of rational decisions, leaving firm emotions in a black box (Gavetti, 
2011; Powell, Lovallo, & Fox, 2011). The deficiency in conceptualization on firm 
emotions has hindered theoretical progress in competitive dynamics, and more broadly, 
behavioral strategy (Ashkanasy et al., 2017; Huy, 2012; Menges & Kilduff, 2015).  
In this analysis, I fill the above knowledge gap in strategic management using a 
sociocognitive theoretical lens. Specifically, I integrate formative insights from the 
organizational group emotions literature into competitive dynamics to unpack its 
hybridism. I introduce firm-level emotionality into the current AMC framework to explain 
the impacts of firm social cognition (e.g. competitive perceptions) on firm behavioral 
decisions regarding the competitive-cooperative, rivalrous, and relational interaction 
modes. I delineate the types of firm emotions aroused by the perceptions of competitor 
motivations and capabilities as the focal firm becomes aware of the competitor, and I 
continue to elucidate the behavioral implications of these firm emotions. Overall, my 
analysis teases out how variations in firm competitive perceptions lead to positive or 
negative emotions, and how different firm-level emotional responses towards a competitor 
cause the firm-dyad interaction mode to shift. 
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My conceptual framework advances the sociocognitive perspectives of strategic 
management in the following ways. First, I contribute to the hybrid view of competitive 
dynamics by examining “under what conditions must the balance shift between 
competitive-cooperative, rivalrous, and relational modes” (Chen & Miller, 2015: p771) 
through the sociocognitive theoretical lens. My conceptual framework highlights the role 
of firm-level emotionality in the sociocognitive-behavioral cascade (i.e. competitive 
perceptions, social emotions, and interfirm actions/reactions) that leads to the shifts of 
hybrid interaction mode on the firm-dyad level. Second, I contribute to burgeoning 
research on organizational group emotions. I delineate the firm-level, collective emotional 
responses to competitor actions and attributes by clarifying how variations in a focal firm’s 
competitive perceptions can cause positive or negative emotions of the firm. Furthermore, 
my theoretical development of firm emotions sheds a light on the missing link that mediates 
the impacts of firm social cognition on firm behavioral decisions regarding interfirm 
competition and cooperation.  
In doing so, my analysis contributes to behavioral strategy and behavioral theory 
of the firm. I highlight emotionality on the firm level as the “bounds” in “bounded 
rationality” (Simon, 1983) that governs firm strategic decisions regarding interfirm 
relationships. My conceptual model explains how emotional responses lead to competitive 
and cooperative behaviors of the firm that may align with or deviate from the results of 
rational thinking. Overall, I construct a sociocognitive perspective of competitive dynamics 
hybridism focusing on the role of emotionality. The conceptual framework developed here 
yields complementary insights to extant economic perspectives of co-opetition that follow 
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the rationality logic, such as cooperative game and strategic network (Brandenburger & 
Nalebuff, 2011; Brandenburger & Stuart, 1996), syncretic rents (Lado, Boyd, & Hanlon, 
1997), and resource-based view (Barney, 1991; Barney, Ketchen, & Wright, 2011). 
 
2.3 HYBRID VIEW OF COMPETITIVE DYNAMICS 
Competitive dynamics (CD) research focuses on the firm-dyad competitive 
actions/reactions to develop theoretical insights on interfirm relationships (Chen & Miller, 
2012, 2015). A central premise in the CD paradigm posits that firm competitive and 
cooperative strategies are the consequences of the firm cognitive-behavioral cascade that 
conveys the impacts of a focal firm’s social perceptions about the opponent and their 
dyadic relationship ex ante onto the focal firm’s social behaviors (i.e. actions/reactions 
towards the opponent) (Chen & Miller, 2012). Stated differently, the focal firm’s strategic 
decisions on how to act upon (or react to) a competitor (i.e. competitively vs cooperatively) 
are influenced by its sociocognitive depictions of the competitor actions and attributes (i.e. 
competitive perceptions).  
Competitive perceptions of the firm become manifest when the focal firm gains 
awareness of the competitor, for example, when the focal firm directs its attention to 
analyze competitor actions (i.e. competitor analysis) (Chen, 1996), and socially compares 
its performances and capabilities against those of the competitor (Kim & Tsai, 2012). 
Competitive perceptions of the firm can yield differentiated behavioral consequences. For 
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example, if the focal firm interprets organizational identity threats from a competitor 
occupying a proximal competitive domain, it tends to develop negative emotions and reacts 
defensively towards the proximal competitor, often by eliciting competitive attacks; in 
contrast, the focal firm behaves in a more subdued manner when it perceives a competitor’s 
domain identity to be dissimilar from its own (Livengood & Reger, 2010). Variations in 
the focal firm’s social cognitions and social behaviors with respect to a competitor thus 
alter the competitiveness of the dyadic relationship (Chen & Miller, 2012). 
Most prior CD studies have taken for granted that competing firms primarily take 
on a rivalrous stand and perceive the external firm counterparts as enemies when 
interacting with one another (e.g. Baum & Korn, 1996; Ferrier, 2001; Ferrier, Smith, & 
Grimm, 1999). However, recent investigations demonstrate that firms can often gain 
strategic advantages by maintaining relational contacts with their competitors (Chen & 
Miller, 2012; 2015). For instance, firms may leverage complementary resources for value 
creation through strategic alliances and joint ventures with their competitors (e.g. Baum et 
al., 2000; Hill & Rothaermel, 2003; Makri, Hitt, & Lane, 2010), establish mutual 
forbearance to reduce competitive threats in multiple markets (e.g. Markman, Gianiodis, 
& Buchholtz, 2009; Tieying, Subramaniam, & Cannella, 2009), form a strategic network 
that includes relational ties with competitors to gain bargaining power over 
complementors, suppliers, and buyers (Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 2011), and utilize the 
network ties with competitors as critical resource conduits (Gnyawali & Madhavan, 2001).  
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Moreover, firms often develop new competence efficiently when they learn from 
competitors in the same industry by gaining knowledge access through relational contacts 
(Grant & Baden-Fuller, 2004; Hamel, Doz, & Prahalad, 1989). In innovation-driven 
industries, competing firms often conduct joint exploration in new technological spaces to 
share the risks, and reduce costs associated with the innovation learning curve (Browning, 
Beyer, & Shetler, 1995; Gnyawali & Park, 2011; Irwin & Klenow, 1996).  
Considering the ubiquity of relational contacts between rivalrous firms, strategy 
scholars have recognized the theoretical limitations in conceptualizing competition and 
cooperation as discrete interaction modes between firms (Chen & Miller, 2012; 2015). To 
capture the coexistence of competition and cooperation on the firm-dyad level, Chen and 
Miller (2015) put forth the hybrid view of interfirm competitive dynamics. The hybrid view 
depicts a spectrum of varying degrees of competition and cooperation on the firm-dyad 
level, which encompasses the rivalrous, competitive-cooperative, and relational interaction 
modes as key demarcations (Chen & Miller, 2015). When adopting the rivalrous mode, a 
focal firm perceives an interaction counterpart as a competitor (i.e. rival), and pursues 
competitive actions such as attack, retaliation, or avoidance (Chen & Miller, 2015).  
However, when opportunities for value creation present in the relational contacts 
between competing firms, they often shift away from the rivalrous mode of interactions, 
and move towards the competitive-cooperative mode, or the relational mode. When 
adopting the competitive-cooperative mode, the focal firm perceives a competitor 
simultaneously as an alliance partner, and pursues cooperative or co-opetitive actions with 
30 
  
the aim to obtain competitive advantages; as cooperation deepens, the mode of interactions 
becomes relational, the interacting firms perceive each other as a stakeholder and pursue 
cooperative actions to “raise all boats” (Chen & Miller, 2015).  
In the hybrid view framework, how the actors (i.e. a focal firm and its interaction 
counterpart) perceive each other can influence the strategic aims, modes, toolkits, and time 
horizons of their interactions (Chen & Miller, 2015). It can thus be expected that firm-level 
social cognitions are instrumental to how hybrid interactions become manifested on the 
firm-dyad level (e.g. degrees of competition vs cooperation). 
More generally, CD research hinges on the behavioral implications of firm social 
cognition in the context of interfirm competition (Chen & Miller, 2012). Scholars have 
devoted effort to tease out how firm perceptions of competitors and competitive relations 
(i.e. competitive perceptions) can impact interfirm interactions. Chen, Su, and Tsai (2007) 
bring scholarly attention to the implications of competitive tension perceived by the firms 
on their interactions. Livengood and Reger (2010) point out how organizational identities 
and competitive domains are perceived by the firm can yield significant impacts on how 
the firm acts and reacts to its competitors. Kim and Tsai (2012) clarify how firms perceive 
the comparison between themselves against their competitors can influence their 
competitive actions. Gao et al. (2017) identify different firm reactions to competitors, 
depending on how firm managers perceive the magnitude and complexity of the 
competitive attacks.  
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These studies, among others in the CD literature, have produced formative 
knowledge on interfirm competition from a sociocognitive perspective by establishing 
significance in the behavioral implications of firm-level social perceptions about 
competitors and ex ante competitive relationships (i.e. competitive perceptions). The 
behavioral implications of firm competitive perceptions stand even more conspicuous 
when competition and cooperation are both present in hybrid interactions, such as 
coopetition and relational competition (Chen & Miller, 2012, 2015).  
For example, when two competing firms form a strategic alliance, they come in 
close, often repeated, social contacts (i.e. high interfirm interaction intensity), and firm 
strategic managers devote heightened attention to the actions of the competitive partners 
(M. Chen, 1996; Johnson & Hoopes, 2003; Tsai et al., 2011). Due to the increased interfirm 
interaction intensity and heightened managerial attention, competitive perceptions between 
these firms can elicit strong cognitive-behavioral effects (“hot cognition”) driven by 
tangible negative emotional responses in the focal firm, which can deviate from the value-
driven logic (Hodgkinson & Healey, 2011). Therefore, understanding how firms 
emotionally respond to competitive perceptions stands at the crux of unpacking the 
hybridism in competitive dynamics. 
However, current theories on the interplay between competition and cooperation 
largely rely on the value-driven rationale, for example, strategic network and cooperative 
game theory (Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 1995), relational and syncretic rents (Dyer & 
Singh, 1998; Lado et al., 1997), resource-based view and dynamic capabilities (Barney et 
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al., 2011; Sirmon, Hitt, & Ireland, 2007; Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997), and firm learning 
perspectives (Hitt, Dacin, Levitas, Arregle, & Borza, 2000; Lane & Lubatkin, 1998; Phene 
& Tallman, 2014).  
While the economic, rational aspects of cooperation between competitors are 
succinctly captured in the value-driven conceptualization, the sociocognitive, emotional 
aspects have been excluded from the boundary conditions of the abovementioned theories. 
Since emotionality can yield highly efficacious impacts on firm strategies (Huy, 2012; 
Menges & Kilduff, 2015), it is unsurprising that firms can fail to follow the rationality-
based (e.g. value-driven) logic when partnering with competitors (e.g. Park & Russo, 1996; 
Toh & Polidoro, 2013). It is thus essential to incorporate conceptualization of firm 
emotions to clarify “under what conditions must the balance shift between competitive-
cooperative, rivalrous, and relational modes” (Chen & Miller, 2015: p771). 
 
2.4 FIRM EMOTIONS IN HYBRID COMPETITIVE DYNAMICS 
2.4.1 Firm-Level Aggregation of Competitive Emotions 
Recent research in organizational group emotions illustrates the importance of collective 
group emotions that converge from individual emotions elicited by group-relevant events 
in various organizational and strategic contexts, including interfirm competition and 
cooperation (Ashkanasy et al., 2017; Huy, 2012; Menges & Kilduff, 2015). It has been 
demonstrated that individuals may experience emotional responses to external stimuli 
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oriented to their social group(s) (i.e. group-relevant events) (Smith, Seger, & Mackie, 
2007). Individuals respond emotionally to a group-relevant events because they self-
identify as members of the social group; these individual-level emotions aroused by group-
relevant events are labeled “group-based emotions” (Menges & Kilduff, 2015). Group-
based emotions are privately experienced by individual group members (i.e. individual-
level affect states).  
Group-based emotions tend to display commonality among individual members, 
since these individuals share similar emotional predisposition to group-relevant events 
(Watson & Tellegen, 2002) and socially identify with the same group (Smith et al., 2007). 
Furthermore, group-based emotions can converge to the collective emotions commonly 
experienced by all individuals of the group through social interactions between group 
members (i.e. a phenomenon colloquially known as “emotional contagion”) (e.g. Barger & 
Grandey, 2006; Barsade, 2002). Furthermore, individuals in the same group are subject to 
the same social norms and rules that influence their cognitive responses, and thus tend to 
experience similar emotional responses to group-relevant events (Clark, 1990).  
Menges and Kilduff (2015) summarize the above processes by which the 
individual-level group-based emotions converge to the aggregate-level “group-shared 
emotions”: “inclination” (i.e. group members display similar emotional dispositions), 
“identification” (i.e. emotions attributed to the group social identity), “interaction” (i.e. 
communications and socialization between group members), and “institutionalization” (i.e. 
common emotional responses attributed to group norms and rules). My theoretical 
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treatment of the construct of firm emotions focuses on the collective group-shared 
emotions attributed to the firm’s aggregated perception of an external firm (i.e. the focal 
firm’s interaction counterpart). Specifically, I hone in on the strategic context of hybrid 
interactions between two firms in which competition and cooperation intersect, and tease 
out how firm emotions resulting from firm perceptions with respect to a competitor will 
influence the interaction modes of hybrid competitive dynamics between the firm dyad 
(Huy, 2012). 
Extant research on the psychology of competition (i.e. including rivalry) illustrates 
that a focal social actor may form competitive perceptions about the action motives of a 
competitor from historic interactions between the actor dyad (Kilduff, Elfenbein, & Staw, 
2010). The social actor’s perception of benevolent (or malicious) motivations behind the 
competitor action(s) will elicit positive (or negative) emotions towards the opponent, which 
can influence the social actor’ competitive (or cooperative) behaviors in parallel to rational 
decision formulation (Kilduff, Elfenbein, & Staw, 2010). Additionally, social comparison 
is a commonly involved in competition (Garcia, Tor, & Schiff, 2013). Social actors 
compare the attributes (typically performance or capability indicators) of their competitors 
against their own (Garcia et al., 2013; Kim & Tsai, 2012), which gives rise to the focal 
actor’s perception of the competitor’s competence compared to the actor’s self-concept 
(Garcia et al., 2013). The perception of a competitor’s capabilities in comparison to those 
of the focal actor can elicit either positive or negative emotions, leading to distinct 
competitive/cooperative behaviors.   
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Combining the logic underpinning cross-level aggregation of emotions in a large 
group (e.g. firm) and the insights from psychology of competition, I posit that in the 
strategic context of hybrid competitive dynamics (i.e. interfirm interactions), firm 
perceptions of the motivations behind a competitor’s action(s) and firm perceptions of 
competitor capabilities formed during social comparison in firm capabilities can elicit 
positive or negative emotions commonly experienced by the firm individuals (i.e. 
collective firm-level emotions).  
These firm emotions can impact the focal firm’s behavioral decisions on how to 
interact with the competitor (e.g. attack/retaliation, or collaboration), thus altering the firm-
dyad balance point between competition and cooperation and shifting the interaction mode 
along the hybrid competitive dynamics spectrum (i.e. encompassing interfirm rivalry, co-
opetition, and relations) (Chen & Miller, 2015). In the following sections, I tease out the 
positive and negative firm emotions attributed to perceived motivations of competitor 
actions, and those attributed to perceived capabilities of competitors. I develop testable 
propositions to elucidate the cognitive-behavioral relay that connects firm perceptions, 
firm emotions, and interfirm competition/cooperation (i.e. interaction mode shifts in hybrid 
competitive dynamics). I depict my conceptual model constructed from these propositions 
in Figure 2.1. 
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Figure 2.1 The Perceptive-Emotive Framework of Firm Social Cognition in Hybrid 
Competitive Dynamics 
 
2.4.2 Firm Emotions Attributed to Perceived Motivations of Competitor Actions 
First and foremost, firms pay close attention to their competitors’ actions as a critical 
information source for strategic planning (Chen & Miller, 2012). When formulating firm 
strategies, decision makers rely on competitive analysis focusing on the actions elicited by 
the competitors (Porac & Thomas, 1990; Porac, Thomas, Wilson, Paton, & Kanfer, 1995), 
especially those actions directly targeted at the focal firm and its key partners in the value 
network (e.g. suppliers, buyers, complementors) (Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 2011). It is 
strategically vital for firm survival to quickly process information regarding potential 
rivalrous attacks, and respond in a timely manner to eliminate the value appropriation 
threats to itself and its network partners (Tsai et al., 2011). It is equally important for firm 
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success to take notice of the competitor actions motivated to build relational contacts to 
leverage the value creation opportunities, including competitive cooperation (i.e. co-
opetition) and relational competition (Jiang, Tan, & Thursby, 2011; Roy & Sarkar, 2016). 
Since the information on competitor actions is crucial for firm survival and success, 
strategic decision makers heighten their attention towards these actions, and devote a 
significant amount of mental effort to process relevant information cues to decipher the 
competitor’s motivations behind these actions (Tsai et al., 2011). Due to such heightened 
attention and dedicated mental effort, the focal firm’s cognitive responses to competitor 
actions tend to be tangible and can induce salient effects on firm behaviors (i.e. “hot 
cognition”) (Hodgkinson & Healey, 2011).  
Furthermore, when two firms start from the opposing stands, there is inherent 
competitive tension between these firms, which tends to augment the negative cognitive 
responses to each other’s actions (Chen, 1996; Chen et al., 2007). For example, heightened 
tension between two competitors due to historic attacks often leads to mutual contempt and 
animosity, irrational attacks and retaliation (i.e. rivalry) (G. Kilduff et al., 2010). In 
summary, competitor actions can elicit tangible cognitive responses in the focal firm, 
which subsequently influence the focal firm’s strategic decisions and behaviors with 
respect to the competitor (Hodgkinson & Healey, 2011).  
I conceptualize two key components of firm cognitive responses to competitor 
actions that are influential to hybrid interactions between firms, namely, firm perception of 
the competitor’s action motive (i.e. competitor motivation), and the collective emotional 
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response (i.e. firm emotion) aroused by the firm perception of competitor motivation. In 
the social psychology literature, research investing competitive cognition illustrates 
variations in the social actor’s perceptions of a competitor’s action motive (Brewer, 1979; 
Tajfel, 1982). Specifically, it is shown that social perceptions of competitor motivations 
are coupled with positive or negative affective tones (Nicholls, 1984). For instance, when 
a focal actor perceives good intentions in the competitor’s action(s), the focal actor will 
develop a disposition of positive social emotions (e.g. feeling friendly, collaborative, or 
altruistic) towards the competitor; to the contrary, when a focal actor perceives an ill-willed 
action motive from a competitor, negative social emotions (e.g. feeling hostile) emerge as 
their inherent competitive tension intensifies (Kilduff et al., 2010; Tjosvold, Johnson, 
Johnson, & Sun, 2006). 
In sum, social psychology research in competitive cognition demonstrates that 
social actors can form different perceptions about a competitor’s action motive (e.g. 
perceiving a competitor action to be benevolent or malicious), and these perceptive 
variations in the focal actor can arouse positive or negative emotions (e.g. feeling friendly 
or hostile) towards the competitor (Smith et al., 2007; Tajfel, 1982). It is well established 
that emotions yield salient effects on the behavioral decisions of social actors (Leary, 2007; 
Simon, 1967), for example, the feeling of friendliness can facilitate cooperation and 
mitigate subsequent competition; whereas the feeling of hostility can trigger irrational 
competitive attacks (Kilduff & Brass, 2010; Leary, 2007; Marcel, Barr, & Duhaime, 2011). 
Therefore, social emotion is a critical link in the cognitive-behavioral cascade that conveys 
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the impacts of a focal actor’s perceptions on subsequent social behaviors (i.e. competitive 
and cooperative actions) towards a competitor.  
During the formulation of interfirm interaction (competition and cooperation) 
strategies, relevant firm individuals (e.g. strategic managers, competitive analysts, joint 
venture participants, etc.) engage in a group-based decision making process, in which firm 
individuals communicate and discuss their thoughts and feelings (Huy, 2012). Therefore, 
the focal firm forms social perceptions and experience social emotions with respect to a 
competitor’s action on the collective, firm-level.  
These firm-level cognitive responses (i.e. firm perceptions and firm emotions) to 
competitor actions can alter the focal firm’s decision to compete (e.g. competitive attacks 
and retaliation) or to cooperate (e.g. co-opetition or relational competition) (Eggers & 
Kaplan, 2013a; Felin, Foss, & Ployhart, 2015; Gavetti & Rivkin, 2007; Johnson & Hoopes, 
2003). Upon observing a competitor action, the focal firm conducts competitor analysis to 
decipher the motivations behind these actions to decide how to react (Chen, 1996). Simply 
put, the focal firm tends to retaliate when perceiving ill intentions of the competitor, or 
reduces competition intensity when perceiving goodwill (Chen, 1996). Following this 
logical vein, I conceptualize firm emotions aroused by the perception of a competitor’s 
motivation behind the observed action(s), and how these firm emotions will impact hybrid 
interactions. 
The overarching logic of hybrid competitive dynamics posits that competition and 
cooperation can co-exist on the firm-dyad level, thus a competitor may simultaneously be 
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a partner of the focal firm (Chen & Miller, 2015). This central thesis of the hybrid view 
echoes the insights from existing studies on the competition-cooperation intersection, 
which delineate the motivations behind interfirm competition and cooperation strategies, 
namely, value appropriation and value creation (Chen & Miller, 2015). Integrating seminal 
insights from prior research on the interplay between competition and cooperation, the 
hybrid view of competitive dynamics challenges the received wisdom in strategic 
management: the fundamental firm goal to gain competitive advantage solely manifests in 
a destructive manner, provoking the focal firm to appropriate as much value as possible 
and to eliminate competition (i.e. zero-sum game mentality) (M. Chen, 1996; Ferrier et al., 
1999; Porac et al., 1995). Instead, firms often seek collaborative opportunities to co-create 
value with competitors by building a multi-firm value net (Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 
2011), leveraging complementary assets (Dyer & Singh, 1998) and sharing syncretic rents 
(Lado et al., 1997), lowering exploration costs and enhancing firm learning (Lavie, 2006; 
Link, Teece, & Finan, 1996).  
Furthermore, the firm motivation to achieve value creation underscores the 
strategic goal to maximize firm community profits (i.e. “raise all boats” mentality), which 
is foundational in the stakeholder perspective of interfirm relations (Chen & Miller, 2015). 
Competing firms rely on similar sets of strategic factors to produce goods and services that 
are valued by overlapping customer bases (Asmussen, 2015), they thus occupy similar 
spaces in both the strategic factor market and the product/service market. The stakeholder 
perspective of interfirm relations posits that a market functions as a community, where all 
the firms sharing the market space contribute to and depend on a common set of governing 
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institutions (e.g. industrial best-practices and norms) (Hannan & Freeman, 1977; Miller & 
Chen, 1996) and functional mechanisms (e.g. technological standards) (Anderson & 
Tushman, 1990; Ranganathan & Rosenkopf, 2014).  
The community-based view of the market highlights that competing firms can gain 
competitive advantage not only from private value creation (e.g. focal firm profit 
maximization), but also from public value creation (e.g. added value accessible to and 
shared by all firms in the same market spaces) (Donaldson & Preston, 1995). In competitor-
dyad hybrid interactions, a focal firm may form different perceptions about the 
competitor’s action motives (i.e. value-appropriation vs value-creation motivations), and 
thus emotionally respond to the observed competitor action(s) either negatively or 
positively. 
Perceived value appropriation and firm hostility. When the focal firm considers 
an observed competitor action to be an attack, such as disruption and dethronement (Ferrier 
et al., 1999), market-share war (Chen & Macmillan, 1992), identity domain challenge 
(Livengood & Reger, 2010), the focal firm perceives the competitor’s motivation as value 
appropriation (Chen & Miller, 2015). Firm perception of the value-appropriating 
motivation in a competitor (Chen & Miller, 2015) arouses negative emotional responses 
from individuals of the focal firm, who, most saliently, feel hostile towards the competitor 
(Ming Jer Chen et al., 2007). The feeling of hostility is caused by firm-based event (i.e. a 
competitive attack), and is strategically relevant to the firm’s decision on subsequent 
reaction. Therefore, firm individuals communicate their feelings in the group-based 
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strategizing process, resulting in the convergence of collective, firm-level emotion of 
hostility.  
Negative emotions such as hostility can cause a strong impact on firm behavioral 
decisions regarding interfirm interactions (Hodgkinson & Healey, 2011). Firm hostility 
exacerbates the competitive tension between the firm dyad as the focal firm becomes 
motivated to retaliate and to eliminate the enemy (e.g. Baum & Korn, 1996; Chen, 1996; 
Chen et al., 2007). Hostility on the firm level thus contributes to the consolidation of dyadic 
rivalry. When experiencing the negative emotion of hostility towards a competitor, firm 
behaviors often deviate from rational thinking (Hodgkinson & Healey, 2011; Livengood 
& Reger, 2010). For example, the focal firm may attack the competitor when competitive 
actions do not lead to competitive advantage or even harms firm profits (e.g. when the focal 
firm lacks necessary capabilities to win). Consequently, the hybrid interactions on the firm-
dyad level move towards the rivalrous mode.  
P1. The firm perception of value-appropriating motivation of a competitor action 
arouses the negative firm emotional state of hostility towards the competitor, 
shifting firm-dyad hybrid interactions to the rivalrous mode. 
Perceived value creation and firm friendliness. On the other hand, a focal firm 
may interpret a competitor action as a signal to build a relationship. For example, when the 
competitor elicits an attack against a common enemy in favour of the focal firm, or when 
the competitor forms a strategic alliance with the focal firm’s existing partner, the focal 
firm may infer relation-building intentions of the competitor (Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 
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2011). If the focal firm considers a competitor action to be a relation-building signal, its 
cognitive frame of the competitor as an opponent (or enemy) becomes weakened, and 
eventually switched to positioning the competitor as a potential partner (Kilduff et al., 
2010; Marcel et al., 2011). With the switch in the focal firm’s cognitive frame with respect 
to the competitor (i.e. from an opponent/enemy to a potential partner), the focal firm directs 
its attention to evaluate the opportunity for mutual benefits through partnership; in other 
words, the focal firm develops the motivation to create value in collaboration with the 
competitor (Chen & Miller, 2015). 
Concurrently, the focal firm often projects onto the competitor its goals to co-create 
value (i.e. expecting the social interaction counterpart to have the same subjective 
experiences as oneself) (Robbins & Krueger, 2005). Thus, the focal firm perceives value-
creating motivations of the competitor. In the reverse direction, the focal firm’s perception 
of value-creating motivations of the competitor enhances its cognitive frame of the 
competitor as a potential partner, and reinforces its motivation to co-create value with the 
competitor. Consequently, the focal firm develops the positive firm emotion of friendliness 
towards the competitor. Feeling friendly towards the competitor, the focal firm subjectively 
experiences less competitive tension and relaxes its defensive stand; its subsequent actions 
thus become less destructive (e.g. attacks and retaliation) and more constructive (e.g. 
collaboration) (Li, Eden, Hitt, & Ireland, 2008; Trapido, 2012). Therefore, the firm-dyad 
interactions evolve from animosity- to friendship-oriented, in other words, moving away 
from the rivalrous mode and towards the relational mode. 
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P2. The firm perception of value-creating motivation of a competitor action arouses 
the positive firm emotional state of friendliness towards the competitor, shifting 
firm-dyad hybrid interactions to the relational mode. 
2.4.3 Firm Emotions Attributed to Perceived Capabilities of Competitors 
CD research illustrates the interdependence between firm awareness of its competitor(s), 
firm motivations to act/react, and firm capabilities to carry out a competitive (cooperative) 
action (i.e. the AMC framework) (Chen & Miller, 2012; Chen et al., 2007). The AMC 
framework captures the sociocognitive aspects of firm strategies on competition and 
cooperation. When a firm becomes aware of a competitor upon observing its action(s), the 
focal firm makes sense of the competitor’s action aim, consolidating the firm perception of 
its competitor’s motivation (Chang & Chen, 2012; Smircich & Stubbart, 1985); 
concurrently, the perception of the competitor’s motivation held by the focal firm 
influences its motivation to react to the competitor (Smircich & Stubbart, 1985). 
Furthermore, the focal firm evaluates its capabilities when deciding if and how to act in 
reference to the competitor (Chen, 1996; Hsieh, Tsai, & Chen, 2015). When strategizing 
how to act/react to external firms (e.g. competitors), strategic decision makers of the focal 
firm often make social comparison in firm capabilities between the competitor and itself 
(Kim & Tsai, 2012). Stated differently, social comparison in firm capabilities constitutes a 
key facet of competitive analysis for firm competition/cooperation strategy formulation.  
Current research has demonstrated that the directionality of social comparison 
contributes to variations in the cognitive responses of the focal actor, which yield 
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significant effects on social behaviors (e.g. competition and cooperation) (Festinger, 1954). 
Directional (i.e. upward or downward) social comparison determines how a focal actor 
perceives its counterpart relative to itself (i.e. superior or inferior) (Festinger, 1954; 
Nickerson & Zenger, 2008). When a focal actor socially compares upward with a 
counterpart (e.g. the counterpart has a higher status, richer resources, or greater capabilities 
than the focal actor), the focal actor perceives the counterpart as superior; and when a focal 
actor socially compares downward with a counterpart, the focal actor views the counterpart 
as inferior (Garcia et al., 2013; Nickerson & Zenger, 2008). The social perception of 
superiority or inferiority about an interaction counterpart influences the focal actor’s 
decisions about social interactions, because perception can affect the focal actor’s 
behavioral motivations, including the rational and the emotional aspects of motivations 
(Lerner, Li, Valdesolo, & Kassam, 2015; Simon, 1986; 1967).  
For example, the perception of a superior counterpart formed in upward social 
comparison may prompt the focal actor to build a close relationship with the counterpart, 
driven by a rational aim to leverage the counterpart’s superiority (e.g. high status, 
munificent resources, robust capabilities), and/or an emotional motive to assimilate to an 
inspirational figure (Festinger, 1954; Tjosvold et al., 2006). On the other hand, the 
perception of superiority about the interaction counterpart may invoke negative emotions 
in the focal actor such as inequality and envy, promoting an array of destructive actions 
towards the referent counterpart (Nickerson & Zenger, 2008), such as deliberate sabotage 
and attacks. When an actor perceives inferiority in a referent counterpart during downward 
social comparison, she may recognize the potential dependence of the inferior counterpart 
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on herself and pursue a relationship to leverage the power imbalance for value gains 
(Emerson, 1962) (i.e. a rational motive in the socioeconomic sense).  
From the emotional perspective, the focal actor may empathize with the weaker 
counterpart and builds social relations out of compassion (Melwani, Mueller, & Overbeck, 
2012). Alternatively, social perception of inferiority in the referent counterpart can trigger 
the negative emotion of contempt, and the focal actor will avoid social interactions, or even 
elicit attacks against the inferior counterpart (Melwani et al., 2012). 
When firms strategize competitive actions/reactions and relational interactions, 
social comparison is conducted on the level of the firm (Chen, 1996). When a focal firm 
conducts social comparison in firm capabilities with a competitor, it forms firm-level 
perceptions of superior (inferior) capabilities of the competitor. Social comparison in firm 
capabilities contributes to cognitive responses in the focal firm that determine its 
competitive (cooperative) actions and reactions towards the competitors (Kim & Tsai, 
2012). The cornerstone of firm cognitive responses attributed to social comparison lies in 
the focal firm’s perceptions of a competitor’s capabilities relative to its own, and how these 
firm-level perceptions affect firm motivations to interact with the competitor. The focal 
firm’s perceptions of competitor capabilities alter its motivations to act/react competitively 
and/or cooperatively in two distinct cognitive processes, namely, the rationality-driven 
decision making process and the emotionality-driven cognitive-behavioral cascade (Garcia 
et al., 2013; Kilduff et al., 2010; Simon, 1986).  
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If the focal firm perceives a competitor’s capabilities to be superior to its own, it 
may decide rationally to utilize the learning opportunity to develop firm competence by 
building or maintaining relational contacts with the superior competitor (Dussauge et al., 
2000). The focal firm may also arrive at the rational decision to avoid direct competition 
against a superior competitor, and instead to accumulate resources and develop capabilities 
(Chen & Miller, 2012; Chen et al., 2007). 
 Similarly, if the focal firm perceives a competitor’s capabilities to be inferior, it 
may deploy the rational strategy to offer knowledge access to the inferior competitor in 
exchange for the competitor’s complementary assets (e.g. by engaging in strategic alliances 
and/or establishing joint ventures) (Baum et al., 2000; Rothaermel & Boeker, 2008). The 
focal firm may also decide to not expend firm resources to compete against the inferior 
competitor, since the competitor is unlikely threatening to the focal firm’s competitive 
advantage. The abovementioned strategic formulation results from the firm-level, 
rationality-driven decisions during social comparison in firm capabilities. 
Additionally, the perceptions of a competitor’s capabilities formed in interfirm 
social comparison can arouse tangible emotional responses in the firm strategic decision 
makers (Hodgkinson & Healey, 2011; Marcel et al., 2011), which can converge to the firm 
level, and collectively alter firm motivations to interact with the referent competitor 
(Ashkanasy et al., 2017; Huy, 2012). The effects of firm emotions on firm motivations are 
manifested in an instantaneous, automatic cognitive-behavioral cascade, which unfolds in 
parallel to the slow, rationality-driven process (Evans, 2008; Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 
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2011). Legion of research is present in social psychology and decision science that 
demonstrates the interactions between the fast, emotionality-driven and the slow, 
rationality-driven cognitive mechanisms in determining the effects of social perceptions on 
the motivations to engage in different modes of social interactions (Gigerenzer & 
Gaissmaier, 2011; Tajfel, 1982; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). In a different research stream, 
organization and management scholars investigate the aggregation of individual emotions 
to the level of large groups, such as firm-level collective emotions (see Menges & Kilduff, 
2015 for a review). 
Combining these two lines of logic, I posit that the firm emotions emerging from 
the individual-to-firm cognitive aggregation mechanisms elicited by firm perceptions of 
superior (inferior) competitor capabilities formed when the focal firm makes social 
comparison in firm capabilities will affect the firm motivations to choose different 
competitive/cooperative actions towards the referent competitor, which are distinct from 
the rationality-driven cognitive responses in the same regard (Lerner et al., 2015). 
Furthermore, the emotionality-driven effects of social comparison perceptions on social 
interaction motivations influence decisions and behaviors in conjunction with the 
rationality-driven effects (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011). Therefore, predictions on the 
hybrid competitive dynamics interaction modes (e.g. degree of competition vs cooperation) 
hinge on not only the focal firm’s rational calculation in the comparison of firm 
capabilities, but also firm emotions aroused by the perception of superior (inferior) 
competitor capabilities. 
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Positive firm emotions in social comparison. Firms may experience positive 
emotions attributed to firm perceptions of competitor capabilities formed in social 
comparison (Garcia et al., 2013). The perception of superior competitor capabilities can 
elicit the sense of admiration (i.e. positive emotion) if the focal firm frames the competitor 
as a reference point when setting its capability development goals (van de Ven, 2015). 
From the rationality-based perspective, firms have economic incentives to learn from their 
competitors with superior capabilities by establishing relational contacts, because they can 
reduce exploration costs to obtain similar strategic factors (e.g. resources) that their 
competitors have already accumulated (Baum et al., 2000).  
Extant research suggests that firms can develop new capabilities effectively by 
cooperating with superior competitors to lower the learning curve barrier because 
competitors tend to share common exploration and innovation targets (Rothaermel & 
Deeds, 2004). If the focal firm considers the competitor with superior capabilities as a 
viable knowledge source (e.g. potential partner), it will often set firm learning goals to 
assimilate the superior competitor (van de Ven, 2015). When the focal firm sets a superior 
competitor as the reference point for its capability development aspiration, it will likely 
experience the positive emotion of admiration towards the superior competitor (van de 
Ven, 2015).  
Stated differently, the rational motivations to learn from the more competent 
competitor via relational contacts contribute to the predisposition in the focal firm to feel 
admiration when it forms the firm perception of superior competitor capabilities. On the 
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flip side, the positive feeling of admiration fuels the focal firm’s aspiration to assimilate to 
the more competent competitor, since admiration is an adaptive social emotion that invokes 
the desire to improve one’s self-concept (e.g. self-perception of competence) (Leary, 2007; 
van de Ven, 2015). When the focal firm experiences admiration attributed to its perception 
of superior competitor capabilities, it is emotionally motivated to improve its firm 
competence. 
Relational interactions with superior competitors are effective mechanisms for the 
focal firm to gain knowledge access to improve firm competence (Leary, 2007). Therefore, 
admiration can augment the rationality-based, learning motivations to pursue relational 
contacts with competitors, such as strategic alliances and joint ventures (e.g. co-opetition) 
(Baum & Silverman, 2002). On the firm-dyad level, these sociocognitive responses (i.e. 
perceptions, emotions, and motivations attributed to upward social comparison in firm 
capabilities) of the focal firm will mitigate interfirm rivalry, and facilitates relational 
interactions between competing firms (e.g. competition-cooperation/co-opetition, 
relational competition) ( Melwani et al., 2012; Tajfel, 1982). The firm-dyad hybrid 
interactions are thus likely to shift away from the rivalrous mode and towards the relational 
mode. 
P3. The firm perception of superior capabilities in a competitor may arouse the 
positive emotional state of admiration towards the competitor, shifting firm-dyad 
hybrid interactions to the relational mode. 
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The perception of inferior competitor capabilities can result in a positive emotional 
state of compassion towards the weaker firm  if the focal firm consider the competitor as 
part of a common stakeholder community (Goetz, Keltner, & Simon-Thomas, 2010). In 
this case, the focal firm’s motivations for interfirm interactions follow a positive-sum logic, 
which guides the firm to seek syncretic rents (i.e. value creation achieved by collaborative 
relations between firms) (Chen & Miller, 2012; Lado et al., 1997) that enhances the 
competitiveness of all firms in the same stakeholder community (i.e. the aim to “raise all 
boats”) (Chen & Miller, 2015). In other words, from the rational perspective, the focal firm 
may strategize relational contacts with an inferior competitor to co-create value if it views 
the competitor as a stakeholder community member, and recognizes the potential syncretic 
rents.  
Concurrently, the focal firm’s mindset of syncretic rent pursuit with a competitor 
in the same stakeholder community can prompt an emotional sense of compassion, since 
the underlying logic of the firm motivation is to achieve mutual benefits for the focal firm 
and its competitor (Chen & Miller, 2015). Therefore, the focal firm is primed to be 
cognizant about the limitations that an inferior competitor faces, and the comparative 
strengths in the focal firm itself to ameliorate these limitations (Goetz et al., 2010; Melwani 
et al., 2012).  
Furthermore, when the focal firm socially identifies the competitor with inferior 
capabilities to be in the same stakeholder community, it recognizes the alignment between 
its own organizational identity and that of the competitor (Scott & Lane, 2000). The 
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alignment of social identities often lead actors to empathize with one another (Hogg & 
Terry, 2000). Therefore, the focal firm is likely to think in the shoes of its competitor in 
the same stakeholder community, and feels compassionate towards the competitor with 
inferior capabilities. 
In summary, if the focal firm identifies a competitor as a member of the same 
stakeholder community, it becomes rationally motivated to seek syncretic rents with the 
competitor; concurrently, the firm perception of inferior competitor capabilities will likely 
trigger the firm emotion of compassion. The feeling of compassion motivates the pursuit 
of a mutually beneficial relation with the inferior competitor, the focal firm is thus more 
likely to interact with the competitor cooperatively than competitively. Firm compassion 
and syncretic rent pursuit thus act in synergy to motivate the focal firm to reduce 
confrontation and deepen relational contacts with an inferior competitor. On the firm-dyad 
level, the hybrid interactions between the focal firm and the competitor will likely shift 
away from the rivalrous mode and towards the relational mode. 
P4. The firm perception of inferior capabilities in a competitor may arouse the 
positive emotional state of compassion, shifting firm-dyad hybrid interactions to 
the relational mode. 
Negative firm emotions in social comparison. On the other hand, negative 
emotions can be aroused during social comparison in firm capabilities (Nickerson & 
Zenger, 2008; van de Ven, 2015; van de Ven, Zeelenberg, & Pieters, 2011). When a focal 
firm and its competitor operate in the same (or highly proximal) competitive domain(s), 
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the focal firm tends to see the competitor as a direct challenge to its organizational identity 
(Livengood & Reger, 2010) . Feeling challenged, the focal firm will likely assume a 
cognitive frame that positions the competitor as an opponent (van de Ven et al., 2011).  
The focal firm thus becomes predisposed to negative emotions towards the 
competitor; furthermore, historic competitive attacks can lead to negative emotional 
predisposition in the firms (Kilduff et al., 2010). If a competitor has initiated an attack in 
the past, the focal firm will likely hold a grudge against the offensive competitor. When 
the focal firm harbors resentments towards a competitor due to historic competitive 
attack(s), it is primed to assume an oppositional stand, and thus becomes predisposed to 
develop more negative emotions towards the competitor in subsequent engagement, 
including social comparison in firm capabilities.  
Upward social comparison can lead to the negative emotion of envy in a social actor 
(Nickerson & Zenger, 2008; van de Ven, 2015; van de Ven et al., 2011). When a focal 
actor perceives superior outcomes achieved by a social counterpart, the focal actor may 
sense inequality, or unfairness, which leads to the envious feelings (Nickerson & Zenger, 
2008). The perception of superior competitor capabilities formed in upward comparison 
between firms can cause the focal firm to feel envious towards the referent competitor, 
especially when the focal firm sees the competitor as a challenge to its domain identity 
(Livengood & Reger, 2010) and/or harbors resentments due to historic attacks from the 
competitor (Kilduff et al., 2010).  
54 
  
Envy can drive firm behaviors to deviate from the rational motivations, such as the 
goal of learning from the more competent firm, leading to added costs to the focal firm (i.e. 
social comparison costs (Nickerson & Zenger, 2008) on the firm level). When a focal firm 
feels envious towards the superior competitor, it becomes inclined to implement value-
appropriating actions to undercut the opponent. Not only will the focal firm miss the 
opportunity to develop firm capabilities by learning from the superior competitor, but it 
will also face retaliation for which the it is not capable to withstand.  
Extant research suggests that negative emotions can yield more salient influences 
on behavioral motivations than rationality-based thinking (Hodgkinson & Healey, 2011; 
Lerner et al., 2015; van de Ven et al., 2011). Therefore, if the focal firm develops envious 
feelings in response to the perception of superior competitor capabilities, the focal firm 
will likely act in contradiction to what is predicted by the rational logic. For example, the 
envious firm becomes inclined to elicit competitive attacks against a superior competitor, 
even if it does not possess the capabilities to win the war. Instead of establishing relational 
contacts to learn from the superior competitor, the envious focal firm tends to minimize 
association to avoid unfavorable comparison by external audience (e.g. customers, 
suppliers, and buyers) (Kim & Tsai, 2012). Therefore, the negative firm emotion of envy 
attributed to the firm perception of superior competitor capabilities can shift hybrid 
interactions on the firm-dyad level away from the relational mode and towards the rivalrous 
mode. 
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P5. The firm perception of superior capabilities in a competitor may arouse the 
negative emotional state of envy towards the competitor, shifting firm-dyad hybrid 
interactions to the rivalrous mode. 
Similarly, domain identity threats and/or historic accumulation of hostile 
sentiments can predispose the focal firm to develop negative emotions towards a 
competitor during downward social comparison. When the focal firm is primed with a 
negative emotional predisposition towards a competitor, it tends to focus on the deficiency 
when evaluating the competitor’s capabilities (Melwani et al., 2012). Thus, firm perception 
of inferior competitor capabilities formed in downward social comparison manifests in the 
focal firm’s mental depiction of the competitor’s incompetence.  
When the focal firm depicts the competitor to be incompetent, it will likely consider 
the competitor unworthy of an opponent. Concurrently, downward social comparison 
reinforces the self-concept of firm capabilities, leading the focal firm to feel superior to the 
referent competitor (Melwani et al., 2012). In this case, the focal firm’s perception of 
inferior competitor capabilities becomes a cognitive lever that exaggerates its mental 
depiction of incompetence of the referent competitor, and aggravates over-evaluation of its 
self-concept of firm competence (Picone, Dagnino, & Minà, 2014). Thus, when 
predisposed to negative emotions towards a competitor, the perception of inferior 
competitor capabilities formed in downward social comparison can provoke hubris in the 
focal firm (Hayward & Hambrick, 1997; Picone et al., 2014). 
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Research in psychology of social comparison and competition points out that over-
evaluation of self-concept (i.e. hubris) often prompts the social actor to develop a scornful 
and condescending attitude towards the inferior competitor (Melwani et al., 2012). In 
subsequent social interactions, such emotional aversion will likely result in severed social 
bonds and exacerbated competitive tension between two social actors, contributing to the 
development of rivalry (Kilduff et al., 2010). The sense of hubris (i.e. over-evaluation of 
the one’s self-concept) experienced by strategic decision makers (e.g. top executives, upper 
echelon team) can converge and permeate throughout the firm through emotional 
contagion, organizational culture and institutionalization, and/or reiteration mechanisms 
(Menges & Kilduff, 2015). 
Firm-level hubris attributed to the perception of an inferior competitor will likely 
lead to collective emotional aversion towards the competitor. For example, individuals 
within the focal firm may experience shared, firm-focused scornfulness and condescension 
towards the competitor that they consider incompetent and unworthy of the focal firm’s 
engagement. Stated differently, hubris stemming from the firm perception of competitor 
inferiority can trigger emotional aversion towards the competitor shared by individuals 
within the focal firm. When individuals within the firm experience emotional aversion 
towards the competitor, they act in ways that reinforces the firm-level depiction of 
incompetence about the competitor, which influence firm strategies regarding how to 
interact with the competitor.  
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Subject to the cognitive bias of hubris, the focal firm deviates from the rational 
logic that guides it to seek syncretic rents by forging mutually beneficial relations (Lado et 
al., 1997) and to maximize value creation that “raises all boats” (Chen & Miller, 2015). 
Instead, it deliberately avoids social comparison by external stakeholder audience (e.g. 
customers and their information providers, industry and market analysts, etc.) (Kim & Tsai, 
2012), and stops devoting resources to maintaining relational contacts. Furthermore, the 
focal firm may deliberately remove the inferior competitor from its value network, for 
example, by disseminating messages to key suppliers, buyers, horizontal firms (e.g. 
competitors and complementors) that emphasize the competitor’s incompetence 
(Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 2011). The relational contacts between the focal firm and the 
competitor thus wither away, and rivalrous animosity thrives unabatedly. 
P6. The firm perception of inferior capabilities in a competitor may arouse the 
negative emotional state of hubris, shifting firm-dyad hybrid interactions to the 
rivalrous mode. 
2.5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this study, I begin with the intellectual curiosity raised from the hybrid view of 
competitive dynamics: along a continuous spectrum of hybrid interactions between firms, 
where different degrees of competition and cooperation are balanced on the firm-dyad level 
(Chen & Miller, 2012; 2015), how do firms “transcend the divides and dichotomies 
between competition and cooperation”, and “under what conditions must the balance shift 
between competitive-cooperative, rivalrous, and relational modes” (Chen & Miller, 2015: 
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p771)? A crucial key to shed light on this scholarly inquiry lies in the sociocognitive 
aspects of firm competition and cooperation strategies. Using a sociocognitive theoretical 
lens, my analysis here aims to unpack the hybridism in competitive dynamics by clarifying 
how variations in firm-level social perceptions about competitor actions and capabilities 
can affect its strategic decisions on competitive and/or cooperative interactions with the 
competitors (Chen & Miller, 2012; 2015).  
The causality between firm perceptions and strategic decisions is captured in the 
central thesis in behavioral strategy and behavioral theory of the firm (Cyert & March, 
1963; Powell et al., 2011), which finds its intellectual root in Herbert Simon’s notion of 
“bounded rationality” (Simon, 1967). Bounded rationality summarizes the bias-ridden 
nature of the human decisions due to cognitive, situational, and emotional constraints 
(Lerner et al., 2015). Modern development in decision science (e.g. behavioral economics) 
extends from Herbert Simon’s seminal research on bounded rationality to critique the 
conceptualization about human rationality in neoclassical economics (e.g. maximizing 
objective utility functions) (Simon, 1986). Leveraging key insights from the modern 
decision science, a robust stream of strategy studies examine how strategic decisions are 
influenced by firm cognition and psychology (Barney & Felin, 2013; Eggers & Kaplan, 
2013b; Felin et al., 2015; Powell et al., 2011). 
However, theoretical progress in strategic management along the cognitive-
behavioral vein is hindered by a lack in conceptual focus on firm emotions (Ashkanasy, 
Humphrey, & Huy, 2017; Menges & Kilduff, 2015; Huy, 2012). Herbert Simon once stated 
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the prescient remark: “Hence, in order to have anything like a complete theory of human 
rationality, I have to understand what role emotion plays in it (1986: p29).” Without 
adequate understanding of how firm emotions contribute to the causality between firm 
perceptions and strategic decisions, the “bound” in “bounded rationality” that drives the 
formulation of firm strategies will remain in the dark. The gap in extant knowledge on the 
role of firm emotions in strategic decisions has created an impasse in the theoretical 
progress to unpack the competitive dynamics hybridism (Chen & Miller, 2015).  
Due to heightened attention and competitive tension, emotionality can yield 
efficacious influences on firm decisions regarding interfirm interactions between 
competitors (Hodgkinson & Healey, 2011; Huy, 2012; G. Kilduff et al., 2010; Livengood 
& Reger, 2010), especially when the firm strategizes how to balance competition and 
cooperation within the firm-dyad. Compared to relational contacts with non-rivalrous 
entities, when a firm pursues relational contacts with its rivals, the conflicts between 
emotionality and rationality often stand more salient, especially when negative emotions 
are aroused by competitive perceptions (Garcia et al., 2013; G. Kilduff et al., 2010). 
Therefore, it is important to consider firm emotions in order to shed light on the scholarly 
inquiry regarding the competition-cooperation balance in hybrid competitive dynamics. 
To unpack the competitive dynamic hybridism from a firm-level, sociocognitive 
perspective, I integrate insights from the organizational group emotions literature (Menges 
& Kilduff, 2015) into the competitive dynamics paradigm (Chen & Miller, 2015). The main 
goal in this study is to clarify the role of firm emotions in the firm-level cognitive-
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behavioral cascade in strategic decisions regarding competition and cooperation, which 
conveys the impacts of firm social perceptions to firm social behaviors in the context of 
interfirm interactions. By defining the perceptive antecedents and behavioral implications 
of firm emotions in social context of interfirm hybrid interactions, I develop testable 
propositions to explain the emotionality-driven mechanisms that underpin how firms 
“transcend the divides and dichotomies between competition and cooperation” (Chen & 
Miller, 2015: p771), and on the firm-dyad level, “under what conditions must the balance 
shift between competitive-cooperative, rivalrous, and relational modes” (Chen & Miller, 
2015: p771). 
I conceptualize firm emotions cogent to hybrid interactions by drawing insights 
from the foundational discipline of social psychology. Specifically, I integrate extant 
knowledge of social actor emotional responses in the context of competition. Social actors 
experience positive or negative social emotions as they observe a competitor’s actions and 
interpret the competitor’s motivation behind the observed actions (Kilduff et al., 2010; 
Livengood & Reger, 2010; Vuori & Huy, 2016). For example, the perception of good 
intentions from a competitor can lead to genial feelings (i.e. friendliness) in the social actor; 
in contrast, when perceiving malicious motives, the focal actor develops hostile emotions 
towards the competitor (Tajfel, 1982).  
Furthermore, competing actors tend to conduct social comparison in various 
attributes, for instance, their capabilities (Garcia et al., 2013). The valence of comparison-
induced social emotions can be either positive or negative, depending on the social actor’s 
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ex ante emotional disposition towards the competitor (Garcia et al., 2013). When 
comparing upwards with a competitor, the focal actor perceives superiority in the 
competitor capabilities, which may lead to the positive affective state of admiration or the 
negative sense of envy (van de Ven, 2015). During downward comparison, the focal actor 
perceives inferior competitor capabilities, which can result in either the positive feeling of 
compassion or the negative emotion of hubris associated with contempt towards the 
inferior competitor (Melwani et al., 2012).  
In my analysis, I leverage the insights from the social psychology of competition 
to conceptualize firm-level competitive emotions. My conceptualization clarifies how 
emotionality manifested on the firm level plays a role in the sociocognitive aspects of 
hybrid interaction strategies to balance the firm-dyad competition and cooperation. This 
study advances the sociocognitive perspective in strategic management by achieving 
theoretical contributions in three ways.  
First, the analysis contributes to competitive dynamics. I hone in on the hybrid view 
of competitive dynamics, which posits that interfirm relationships take form along a 
continuous spectrum of hybrid interactions (i.e. mixed competition and cooperation at 
different degrees) that encompasses the rivalrous, competitive-cooperative, and relational 
modes of interactions (Chen & Miller, 2012; 2015). I commence my analysis from a 
sociocognitive perspective to distinguish the firm-perceptive, emotive, and behavioral 
antecedents to the shifts between different interaction modes.  
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I expound the sociocognitive aspects of firm decisions on how to "transcend the 
divides and dichotomies between competition and cooperation" (Chen & Miller, 2015: 
p771), and answer the call to investigate "under what conditions must the balance shift 
between competitive-cooperative, rivalrous, and relational modes" (Chen & Miller, 2015: 
p771). By incorporating key insights from the organizational group emotions literature, I 
clarify how firm-level social emotions contribute to the causal connection between 
competitive perceptions and interfirm interaction modes, which may either align with or 
deviate from rationality-based accounts during relational contacts with rivals (Chen & 
Miller, 2015). In so doing, my analysis makes theoretical contributions to unpack the 
competitive dynamics hybridism. 
Second, I contribute to research in organizational group emotions. There is a lack 
in conceptualization on how aggregated emotionality becomes manifested at the firm level 
(Menges & Kilduff, 2015). Research suggests that emotions, especially emotional 
responses, can converge to the group level, including large groups such as all members of 
the same firm (Smith et al., 2007). The knowledge gap in conceptual resolution on how 
firm-level emotional responses manifest as the consequence of firm perceptions has 
substantially limited theoretical advances in organizational group emotions (Menges & 
Kilduff, 2015).  
Leveraging the research in social psychology of competition (e.g. Garcia et al., 
2013; Kilduff et al., 2010), I conceptualize the role of firm emotions when the focal firm 
strategizes hybrid interfirm interactions from the sociocognitive perspective. Finally, my 
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conceptual development builds into behavioral theory of the firm and behavioral strategy. 
The theoretical development in my analysis takes the premise of bounded rationality in 
human decision making (Simon, 1967; 1986), and zeros in on how emotional constraints 
result in the "bound" in "bounded rationality".  
Modern development in decision science form a behavioral perspective zeroes in 
on human emotions as a critical component in the cognitive-behavioral cascade of the 
decision-making process (Lerner et al., 2015). Current research in behavioral theory of the 
firm and behavioral strategy builds upon Herbert Simon’s thesis on bounded rationality, 
and often draws from the modern behavioral decision scholarship (Gavetti, Greve, 
Levinthal, & Ocasio, 2012). However, the full theoretical potential of behavioral theory of 
the firm and behavioral strategy is limited by a deficiency in the theoretical treatment on 
firm-level emotions (Ashkanasy, Humphrey, & Huy, 2017; Menges & Kilduff, 2015; Huy, 
2012). I conceptualize the collective firm-based emotional response elicited by firm social 
perceptions of competitor actions and capabilities.  
The conceptual analysis here enhances current theoretical understanding on the 
"bound" in "bounded rationality", namely, how emotionality alters the rationality-driven 
competition and cooperation strategy formulation in the firms engaging in hybrid 
interactions with their competitors. My theoretical framework teases out how firm-level 
social emotions that are aroused by the firm’s competitive perceptions can lead to 
competitive and cooperative behavioral decisions, which may align with or deviate from 
the rationality-driven predictions. In doing so, I put forth testable propositions that capture 
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the cognitive-behavioral cascade underpinning the formulation of competitive and 
cooperative strategies of the firm. 
In conclusion, my analysis clarifies how firm-level social emotions aroused by 
competitive perceptions (i.e. social perceptions of competitor actions and capabilities) 
influence firm decisions on the strategies regarding the competition-cooperation balance 
in hybrid competitive dynamics. I develop my concepts and propositions to tease out the 
interplay between competition and cooperation based on the behavioral assumption of firm 
strategy and incorporate firm-level emotionality into behavioral strategy and behavioral 
theory of the firm. My study elucidates the causal connections between firm-level social 
perceptions, social emotions, and firm behavioral decisions on interfirm interactions, thus 
advances the sociocognitive perspective of strategic management. 
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3 LEARNING AND COOPETITION: FIRM LEARNING 
MECHANISMS AND THE IMPACTS ON 
COOPETITION PURSUIT 
 
3.1 ABSTRACT 
Coopetition is a key strategy for innovation-driven firms to learn from their competitors. 
However, the inherent rivalrous undercurrents between competing firms may provoke 
learning races, which can render cooperative synergy into mutual destruction. Hence, how 
well a firm can effectively learn from its partners and guard against learning races is the 
linchpin of its decision to pursue coopetition. In this study, I probe the theoretical 
relationships between learning efficacies and coopetition pursuits of innovation-driven 
firms. I distinguish a firm’s efficacies in codified and tacit knowledge utilization, and I 
theorize how these learning efficacies may influence the firm’s decision to pursue 
coopetition. I find support for my hypotheses across multiple industries with high 
technological intensities in the United States using a longitudinal research design. 
 
3.2 INTRODUCTION 
How does firm learning influence coopetition? In technologically intensive industries, 
firms pursue value-driven coopetition (Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 2011). For example, 
firms cooperate to create value as they share complementary resources, yet simultaneously 
compete to capture value as they target the same buyers (Gnyawali & Madhavan, 2001). 
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The crux of value creation in coopetition lies in the learning opportunities afforded to the 
focal firm (Hamel, 1991; Hamel, Doz, & Prahalad, 1989). For example, a firm gains direct 
access to its competitor’s knowledge base through the alliance, thus receives the 
opportunity to develop critical competence (Gnyawali & Park, 2011; Hoang & Rothaermel, 
2010). Such learning opportunities are instrumental to technology-driven firms, because 
competitive advantages hinge upon the formidable development of innovation competence, 
and coopetition can effectively mitigate the learning curves (Gnyawali & Park, 2011). 
However, coopetition contains competitive tension that impedes firm learning 
efficiency (Gnyawali & Park, 2011; Yang, Zheng, & Zaheer, 2015). For example, 
competitors erect knowledge protection mechanisms to prevent potential opportunistic 
behaviors, which often reduce trust and goodwill between alliance partners (Gulati & 
Nickerson, 2008; Khanna, Gulati, & Nohria, 1998). Furthermore, familiarity between 
competitors may lead to animosity instead of trust, as rivals focus on each other more and 
more narrowly as a strategic partnership deepens. Exacerbated competitive tension often 
contributes to irrational behaviors, for example, firms start a “learning race” with their 
strategic partners (Yang et al., 2015). Therefore, firms face a "double-edged sword" when 
cooperating with direct competitors, in which strategic advantages and potential 
disadvantages are concurrently present.  
Extant scholarship suggests that firm learning directly impacts whether coopetition 
manifests as strategic advantages or disadvantages. However, theoretical clarity and 
empirical evidence is lacking to explain how variation in firm learning may lead to 
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heterogeneity in firm coopetition pursuits. In particular, there is a gap in the firm learning 
and coopetition literature in explaining how firms learn (i.e. learning modes) and how well 
firms learn (i.e. learning efficacies) may lead to different intensities of coopetition pursuits 
of the firms. In this study, I investigate the theoretical connections between firm learning 
modes, learning efficacies and coopetition pursuits. In so doing, I contribute to the 
literature of firm learning and coopetition research. My point of departure is the following 
question: How is coopetition pursuit influenced by firm learning efficacies developed from 
past experiences in different learning modes?  
First, I draw seminal insights from the firm learning literature to develop a 
conceptual framework of learning modes and learning efficacies. Specifically, I study two 
learning modes of technology-driven firms, namely, patent-based learning and alliance-
based learning, and two categories of learning efficacies of these firms, namely, absorptive 
capacities (Zahra & George, 2002) and alliance capabilities (Rothaermel & Deeds, 2006; 
Wang & Rajagopalan, 2015). I conceptualize the development of absorptive capacities 
from patent-based learning experiences of firms, and make the distinction between external 
knowledge assimilation (Lane, Koka, & Pathak, 2006) and internal knowledge 
recombination (Lenox & King, 2004; Tsai, 2001). I conceptualize the development of 
alliance capabilities from alliance-based learning experiences of firms, and make the 
distinction between joint exploration capabilities and joint exploitation capabilities 
(Stettner & Lavie, 2014; Wassmer, Li, & Madhok, 2016). My conceptual framework of 
learning modes and learning efficacies make contributions to the literature of firm learning. 
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Then, I develop hypotheses on the effects of firm learning efficacies on subsequent 
coopetition pursuits. I focus on the tension in coopetition between learning opportunities 
(i.e. value creation) (Gnyawali & Park, 2011; Hamel, 1991) and learning races (i.e. value 
destruction) (Yang et al., 2015), and make salient the different influences on firm 
coopetition pursuits from their learning efficacies in external knowledge assimilation, 
internal knowledge recombination, joint exploration capabilities, and joint exploitation 
capabilities. I test my hypotheses in a panel data of alliance records and patent citations of 
U.S. public firms in technology-driven industrial sectors from 1990 to 2007. My theoretical 
and empirical analysis yields contributions to research on coopetition and firm learning. 
3.3 THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
3.3.1 Coopetition and Firm Learning 
Coopetition concurrently presents value creation opportunities in learning with competitors 
and value destruction threats in learning races against competitors (Hamel et al., 1989). 
Stated differently, coopetition may manifest as a mechanism to enhance firm competitive 
advantage from effective inter-firm learning (Hamel, 1991), or as a trigger to the irrational, 
excessive investment in risky innovation and costly knowledge development (Irwin & 
Klenow, 1996). 
On one hand, firms often learn more efficiently from their competitors (Browning, 
Beyer, & Shetler, 1995; Irwin & Klenow, 1996; Lado, Boyd, & Hanlon, 1997). Competing 
firms accrue technological knowledge in overlapping domains, since they target value 
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capture opportunities in the same market segments. Overlaps in technological knowledge 
are conducive to inter-firm knowledge transfer, because knowledge overlaps facilitates 
cross-boundary integration and reduce value erosion of the knowledge elements during the 
transfer process across firm boundaries (Khanna et al., 1998; Mowery, Oxley, & 
Silverman, 1996). Inter-firm knowledge transfer contributes to syncretic rent creation, 
especially when inter-firm learning takes place between competitors (Lado et al., 1997). 
Prior research elucidates that enhanced syncretic rent creation and a smoothened firm 
learning curve positively contributes to firm coopetition pursuits (Irwin & Klenow, 1996; 
Lado et al., 1997). 
On the other hand, coopetition may trigger irrational learning races between firms 
(Lane & Lubatkin, 1998; Yang et al., 2015). When competing firms engage in tacit 
knowledge exchange and joint capability development, they gain direct access to the 
intimate information about their rivals’ core competencies (Grant & Baden-Fuller, 2004; 
Teece, 1992). Direct exposure to the details on a competitor’s core competency may lead 
to intensified senses of rivalry and competitiveness in the firm (Livengood & Reger, 2010). 
As a result, firms engaging in coopetition are prone to irrational learning races (Yang et 
al., 2015). Learning races can destroy value by disrupting the balance between exploration 
and exploitation (Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004). A firm racing in learning with its rivals tend 
to engage in excessive exploration and under-investment in exploitation, as a result, any 
potential value created is not properly captured by the firm (Lavie & Drori, 2011). 
Coopetition thus poses value destruction threats to the firms. 
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Extant research elucidates the significance of firm learning efficacies in influencing 
whether coopetition manifests as a syncretic rent opportunity or a learning race threat 
(Yang et al., 2015). However, the literature of firm learning and coopetition remains largely 
silent in the theoretical connections between firm learning modes, learning efficacies, and 
coopetition pursuits. In the following sections, I review the firm learning literature and the 
current coopetition research. I develop hypotheses on the effects of learning efficacies (i.e. 
absorptive capacities and alliance capabilities) on the firm’s future coopetition pursuits. In 
reviewing the firm learning literature, I distinguish the absorptive capacities of external 
knowledge assimilation and internal knowledge recombination when firms accumulate 
patent-based learning experiences, and I make discernable the alliance capabilities of joint 
exploration and joint exploitation when firms accumulate alliance-based learning 
experiences. Table 3.1 captures my conceptual framework that organizes the constructs 
regarding firm learning modes and learning efficacies. 
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Table 3.1 Theoretical Framework of Firm Learning Modes and Learning Efficacies 
 
Firm 
learning 
modes 
Knowledge sources & 
learning processes 
Firm 
learning 
efficacies 
Literature exemplars 
Patent-based 
learning 
Patent stocks of 
external entities, e.g. 
competitors, 
complementors, 
suppliers, buyers, 
external inventors Absorptive 
capacities 
External 
knowledge 
assimilation 
Almeida, 1996; 
Cohen & Levinthal, 
1990; Jaffe & 
Trajtenberg, 1996; 
Onal Vural, 
Dahlander, & 
George, 2013; 
Ziedonis, 2004 
Patent stocks of staff 
inventors, e.g. 
knowledge transfer 
between business units, 
R&D project teams, 
individual inventors 
Internal 
knowledge 
recombination 
Grigoriou & 
Rothaermel, 2016; 
Lane, Koka, & 
Pathak, 2006; Tsai, 
2001; Zahra & 
George, 2002 
Alliance-
based 
learning 
Experiences in forming, 
maintaining and 
developing exploratory 
alliances, e.g. R&D 
collaboration, joint 
knowledge acquisition, 
technology transfer and 
licensing agreements 
Alliance 
capabilities 
Joint 
exploration 
capabilities Dussauge, Garrette, 
& Mitchell, 2000; 
Lavie, Stettner, & 
Tushman, 2010; 
Rothaermel & 
Deeds, 2004, 2006; 
Stettner & Lavie, 
2014; Vandaie & 
Zaheer, 2014 
Experiences in forming, 
maintaining and 
developing exploitative 
alliances, e.g. 
commercialization 
collaboration 
(manufacturing, 
marketing), equipment 
supply and/or reseller 
alliance 
Joint 
exploitation 
capabilities 
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Subsequently, I make salient the theoretical connections between firm learning 
modes, learning efficacies, and their coopetition pursuits. I combine insights from the firm 
learning literature and current research on coopetition to develop a set of hypotheses about 
the effects of patent- and alliance-based learning on firm coopetition pursuits. Figure 3.1 
below outlines the conceptual model of the impact of firm learning on coopetition pursuit. 
 
Figure 3.1 Conceptual Model: Firm Learning Modes, Learning Efficacies, and 
Coopetition Pursuit 
 
Absorptive Capacities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Patent-based Firm 
Learning 
Coopetition 
Pursuit 
External 
Knowledge 
Assimilation 
Internal 
Knowledge 
Recombination 
Alliance Capabilities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Alliance-based Firm 
Learning 
Joint 
Exploration 
Joint 
Exploitation 
H1(a/b): + / - 
H2(a/b): + / 
- 
H3: + 
H4: + 
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3.3.2 Patent-Based Learning and Absorptive Capacities 
In technology-driven industries, the capabilities to generate technological inventions 
constitute a major aspect of the firm competence base (Trajtenberg, 1990). Patenting is a 
legal instrument to protect the underlying intellectual property right of technological 
invention. Firms rely on patent protection to capture economic returns from its 
technological investment (i.e. R&D expenditure). Therefore, technology-driven firms 
commonly file for patent protection for their technological inventions. Concurrently, 
patent-filing firms contribute to a public information domain that contains the codified 
knowledge of their technological innovations because patent documents are accessible to 
the general public through patent offices (Hall, Jaffe, & Trajtenberg, 2005). Technology-
driven firms often search in the codified knowledge domain defined by patent documents 
to acquire “raw materials” (i.e. technological knowledge elements) for innovation (Gruber, 
Harhoff, & Hoisl, 2012; Sorenson, Rivkin, & Fleming, 2006).  
Searching in and drawing from the codified knowledge domain (i.e. stocks of patent 
documents) stands as a vital learning mechanism for technology-driven firms (Agrawal & 
Henderson, 2002; Sorenson et al., 2006), namely, patent-based learning. Firm innovation 
often depends on both the external sources and the internal deposit of codified 
technological knowledge (Agrawal & Henderson, 2002; Jaffe, Trajtenberg, & Henderson, 
1993). Stated differently, firms engage in both outward-focused patent-based learning, 
absorbing knowledge from the patents invented by their competitors, partners, suppliers 
and customers, and inward-focused patent-based learning, re-absorbing knowledge from 
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the patents invented by their staff scientists and engineers. When firms learn from the 
external patent sources and the internal patent deposits, they develop different absorptive 
capacities for technological knowledge utilization, namely, external knowledge 
assimilation and internal knowledge recombination (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Zahra & 
George, 2002). 
A technology-driven firm can independently transfer the codified knowledge (i.e. 
patent documents) across the firm boundary from external entities, including its 
competitors, partners, suppliers and customers. Such a boundary-spanning knowledge 
transfer involves potential value erosion of the technological knowledge elements, because 
the focal firm often does not fully internalize the technological knowledge developed by 
external entities (Kogut & Zander, 1992; Mowery et al., 1996). As a technology-driven 
firm continuously engages in more patent-based, boundary-spanning knowledge transfer, 
it develops increasingly robust absorptive capacities for external knowledge assimilation. 
An increase in firm absorptive capacities for external knowledge assimilation can influence 
firm coopetition in two opposing directions, which I develop into a pair of competing 
hypotheses in the following text.  
On one hand, as firm absorptive capacities for external knowledge assimilation 
increase, the focal firm becomes more adept at acquiring competitor’s technological 
knowledge, which is a crucial component of the competencies of technology-driven firms 
(Leiponen & Helfat, 2010; Levine & Prietula, 2012; Roy & Sarkar, 2016). Facing high 
environmental turbulence and steep learning curves, technology-driven firms strive for 
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high efficiency in their knowledge acquisition to gain competitive advantage from 
innovation (Browning et al., 1995; Irwin & Klenow, 1996; Link, Teece, & Finan, 1996). 
Competitors’ technological knowledge constitutes a highly relevant information space 
from which firms can conduct local searches to obtain critical knowledge elements for 
effective innovation (Alexy, George, & Salter, 2013; Browning et al., 1995; Link et al., 
1996). Firms with high absorptive capacities for external knowledge assimilation can learn 
effectively from competitors than those firms with low such capacities. 
Furthermore, coopetition presents a significant mechanism for the participating 
firms to jointly generate and capture syncretic rents, which result from endogenous growth 
under competitive pressure as firms actively engage in innovation and organizational 
renewal (Lado et al., 1997). Firm innovation and organization renewal depends on firm 
agility and knowledge transfer across firm boundaries (Kogut & Zander, 1992; van Burg, 
Berends, & van Raaij, 2014). Firms with robust absorptive capacities for external 
knowledge assimilation tend to demonstrate high agility in adapting their organizational 
routines and structures to a fluid environment. Firms with robust absorptive capacities for 
external knowledge assimilation often incur low value loss during the process of cross-
boundary resource mobilization. In coopetition, participating firms can generate syncretic 
rents together and capture such rents more efficiently if they are more agile in continuous 
adaptation and more proficient in cross-boundary resource (e.g. knowledge) mobilization 
(Lado et al., 1997). Stated differently, firms with high absorptive capacities for external 
knowledge assimilation can learn effectively together with competitors than those firms 
with low such capacities. 
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In summary, firms with more robust external knowledge assimilation capacities 
will gravitate towards more coopetition pursuits compared to firms with low such 
capacities, because value creation is enhanced when firms can effectively learn from their 
competitors and learn together with their competitors during coopetition. 
Hypothesis 1(a). An increase in firm absorptive capacities for external knowledge 
assimilation will lead to an increase in firm coopetition pursuits. 
On the other hand, firms with high absorptive capacities for external knowledge 
assimilation are often perceived as high competitive threats that exacerbate learning race 
risks to potential coopetition partners (Alexy et al., 2013; Toh & Polidoro, 2013; Yang et 
al., 2015). In particular, coopetition inflicts a salient risk of value-destroying learning race 
between firms (Yang et al., 2015). Coopetition partners gain intimate knowledge about the 
core competencies of one another as the inter-firm relationship deepens (Alexy et al., 
2013). When such intimate knowledge is coupled with the competitive pressure between 
two firms, irrational competitiveness and rivalrous animosity tends to exacerbate in these 
firms (Browning et al., 1995; Lin, 1998). Consequently, firm innovation is driven by 
irrational competitive motives instead of rational value creation goals, and the learning race 
ensues, where competing firms innovate at such fast paces and high intensities that they 
cannot capture any value from their own innovation (Anand & Khanna, 2000; Khanna et 
al., 1998).  
When facing a potential opponent with high absorptive capacities for external 
knowledge assimilation, the focal firm often exercises caution in its coopetition decision 
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to avoid value destruction from learning races. Stated differently, technology-driven firms 
are less willing to pursue coopetition with opponents with greater external knowledge 
assimilation capacities than themselves, considering the elevated probability of eliciting 
and subsequently losing a learning race as coopetition unfolds (Bouncken & Kraus, 2013). 
Consequently, firms with high external knowledge assimilation capacities will encounter 
fewer potential coopetition opponents and thus experience sparse coopetition pursuits. 
Hypothesis 1(b). An increase in firm absorptive capacities for external knowledge 
assimilation will lead to a decrease in firm coopetition pursuits. 
Absorptive capacities depict how well a firm can utilize knowledge elements, 
which encompass both external knowledge and internal knowledge (Agrawal & 
Henderson, 2002; Kogut & Zander, 1992; Tsai, 2001). Firm innovation depends not only 
on the technological knowledge sources from competitors, partners, suppliers and 
customers (i.e. external entities), but also on the firm’s internal knowledge base, especially 
its core technologies, which the firm deliberately develop and accumulates over time 
(Agrawal & Henderson, 2002). The core of a firm’s internal technological knowledge is 
tightly coupled with the idiosyncrasies of its organizational culture, structure, routines and 
designs (Kogut & Zander, 1992). A given firm pursues a distinct (i.e. chosen to fit firm 
characteristics) and dynamic (i.e. continuously shifting) set of patent-based learning 
strategies, which in combination contribute to a unique experiential learning trajectory over 
time (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). For example, a technological firm strategizes its patent-
based searches according to the strengths and weaknesses of its innovation capacity, and 
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how the firm aspires to leverage technological opportunities and to eliminate disruptive 
threats in the external environment.  
Due to organizational specificity of the firm’s internal technological knowledge, 
the efficiency of firm learning while utilizing its internal knowledge is defined differently 
than external knowledge assimilation. In particular, firm learning from internal knowledge 
relies on the effectiveness of knowledge recombination via intra-organizational knowledge 
transfer between individual inventors, R&D teams, and business units (Carnabuci & 
Operti, 2013; Tsai, 2001). Generally speaking, knowledge transfer between distinct social 
entities often leads to potential knowledge recombination, from which innovation results 
from novel ways to bundle existing knowledge elements (Carnabuci & Operti, 2013; Kogut 
& Zander, 1992). However, not all technological knowledge element permutations can 
result in valuable innovation, especially when the existing knowledge elements 
demonstrate high tacitness to its organizational locus, which is a defining characteristic of 
firm internal technological knowledge (Tsoukas, 1996).  
To create valuable innovation from knowledge recombination, an inventor must 
accurately identify the compatibility between two or more technological knowledge 
elements and devise a novel permutation that leverages the compatibility. Intra-
organizational knowledge transfer is often conducted in effective communication, because 
individual inventors, R&D teams, and business units within the same firm tend to 
experience frequent and repeated social interactions, which are conducive to achieving 
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commonality in language, interaction patterns, implicit understanding and overarching 
philosophy (Tsai, 2001).  
The intensity of intra-organizational knowledge transfer is reflected in a firm’s 
patent-based learning utilizing its own patent stock, for instance, when two staff inventors 
engage in formal collaboration and/or informal social interactions within the firm, 
knowledge transfer occurs and forms the conduits for internal knowledge recombination 
(Bhaskarabhatla & Hegde, 2014; Carnabuci & Operti, 2013). Prior research elucidates that 
internal knowledge recombination, including formal collaboration and information 
interactions between inventors, R&D teams and business units, often leads to the invention 
of new patents that build upon the firm’s own patent stock (Carnabuci & Operti, 2013; 
Tsai, 2001).  
To sum up, the absorptive capacities of internal knowledge recombination define 
firm learning efficiency with respect to internal knowledge, which are developed by the 
firm via patent-based learning from its own patent stock. An increase in firm absorptive 
capacities for internal knowledge recombination can influence firm coopetition in two 
opposing directions, which I develop into a pair of competing hypotheses in the following 
text. 
With respect to a given technology-driven firm, more robust absorptive capacity 
for internal knowledge recombination is associated with higher proficiency of its 
innovative entities (e.g. staff inventors, R&D teams, innovation departments of business 
units, etc.) in identifying and exploiting the compatibility between distinct technological 
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knowledge elements (Carnabuci & Operti, 2013). A vital aspect of coopetition is for a 
technology-driven firm to learn from competitor’s technological knowledge, which often 
demonstrates potential compatibility with that of the focal firm, due to overlaps in 
competing firms’ target product markets and resource accumulation trajectories (Irwin & 
Klenow, 1996).  
Learning from competitors through coopetition will result in greater syncretic rents 
if the learner (i.e. focal firm) can effectively identify and exploit the potential compatibility 
between its competence base and the knowledge acquired from the competitors. In other 
words, firms with more robust absorptive capacities for internal knowledge recombination 
will likely capture greater syncretic rents from coopetition than firms lacking in such 
capacities, because their innovative entities are more proficient in identifying and 
exploiting knowledge compatibility (Browning et al., 1995; Irwin & Klenow, 1996). 
Consequently, firms with high absorptive capacities for internal knowledge recombination 
tend to purse more coopetition than firms with low such capacities 
Hypothesis 2(a). An increase in firm absorptive capacities for internal knowledge 
recombination will lead to an increase in firm coopetition pursuits. 
On the other hand, firms with robust absorptive capacities for internal knowledge 
recombination often depend heavily on inward-focused patent-based learning for 
technological innovation. In a firm with high internal knowledge recombination capacities, 
the innovative entities actively engage in intra-organizational knowledge transfer, and 
frequently exchange intimate information about their patent inventions through repeated 
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interactions (e.g. formal R&D collaboration and/or informal communication) (Tsai, 2001). 
The innovative entities develop a set of intra-organizational learning routines and common 
language to leverage each other’s technological expertise, which increase the heuristic 
tendency of these inventors (or inventor teams) to engage in more inward-focused learning 
from the firm’s patent stock (Tsai, 2001). Dependence on the firm’s own patent stock for 
innovation concurrently intensifies the organizational inertia that prevents initiation or 
deepening of outward-focused patent-based learning (i.e. search in and acquire knowledge 
from the patents of external entities).  
When firm innovation is dependent on its own patent stock, access to a competitor’s 
knowledge through coopetition yields limited value to the focal firm. Consequently, firms 
with high absorptive capacities for internal knowledge recombination will not gain much 
competitive advantage from syncretic rent potential (i.e. learning from a competitor) 
through coopetition (Lado et al., 1997; Leiponen & Helfat, 2010; Yang et al., 2015). 
Collaterally, firms with high knowledge independence (e.g. when firm innovation is highly 
dependent on its own patent stock) likely control a self-sufficient system of knowledge 
utilization. In other words, a firm with high knowledge independence can gain competitive 
advantage from exploiting intra-organizational knowledge elements. Therefore, firms with 
high absorptive capacities for internal knowledge recombination will not gain much 
competitive advantage from learning efficiency (i.e. learning with a competitor) through 
coopetition. As a result, firms with high absorptive capacities for internal knowledge 
recombination tend to purse less coopetition than firms with low such capacities 
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Hypothesis 2(b). An increase in firm absorptive capacities for internal knowledge 
recombination will lead to a decrease in firm coopetition pursuits. 
3.3.3 Alliance-Based Learning and Alliance Capabilities 
Strategic alliance (including joint venture) is a critical mode of inter-firm cooperation, 
where participating firms establish a formal agreement that outlines the partnership 
framework (D.C. Mowery et al., 1996; Phene & Tallman, 2014). In technology-driven 
industries, firms are often motivated to form strategic alliances to learn from their partners 
(Lado et al., 1997; Link et al., 1996). First, learning firms may collaborate with alliance 
partners to explore new opportunities and future directions for technological innovation 
(Link et al., 1996). In joint exploration, participating firms combine partners’ expertise 
with that of their own in identifying, predicting and setting technological trends, and jointly 
develop complementary resources and capabilities to capture value from such trends (Lee, 
Lee, & Lee, 2003; Stettner & Lavie, 2014). 
Second, learning firms may collaborate with alliance partners to exploit existing 
opportunities in the product market (Lee et al., 2003; Stettner & Lavie, 2014). In joint 
exploitation, participating firms utilize collaboration as access to their alliance partners’ 
knowledge to acquire complementary resources. Stated differently, strategic alliances in 
the format of joint exploration and joint exploitation provide firms with an important 
learning mechanism, namely, alliance-based learning, by which firms develop and acquire 
complementary resources.  
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Firms gain competitive advantage from alliance-based learning as they obtain more 
substantial complementary resources. However, the degree by which competitive 
advantage increases through alliance-based learning depends on a focal firm’s alliance 
capabilities (Rothaermel & Deeds, 2006; Vandaie & Zaheer, 2014). Specifically, firms 
display heterogeneity in their alliance capabilities to create and capture syncretic rents from 
exploratory and/or exploitative partnerships (Park & Zhou, 2005). Prior research elucidates 
that firms can develop alliance capabilities by accumulating alliance experiences in joint 
exploration and joint exploitation (Stettner & Lavie, 2014). As a firm pursues more joint 
exploration and/or joint exploitation, it gains greater efficacy in competitive advantage 
gains through subsequent alliances (Stettner & Lavie, 2014). Stated differently, 
accumulation of experiences in joint exploration and/or joint exploitation does not end in 
complementary resource development and acquisition, but also contributes to the 
improvement of a firm’s capabilities to create and capture syncretic rents from subsequent 
alliances. 
Coopetition is a special case of strategic alliances (and joint ventures), in which the 
strategic partners simultaneously compete in the same (or highly overlapped) product 
market domains (Gnyawali & Park, 2011). Due to product market similarity, firms often 
develop and acquire complementary resources and capabilities more effectively through 
coopetition than alliances between non-competing firms (Gnyawali, 2006). Prior research 
points out that coopetition presents substantial syncretic rents to participating firms (Lado 
et al., 1997). On the other hand, competitive pressure stands salient in coopetition, which 
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increases value destruction threats to participating firms (e.g. eliciting a learning race) 
(Khanna et al., 1998; Yang et al., 2015). 
In addition, competitive pressure inherent in coopetition poses challenge to govern 
the strategic partnership, for example, rivalry tends to trigger irrational behaviors that 
destabilize an inter-firm alliance (Livengood & Reger, 2010). Competitive pressure in 
coopetition diminishes the effective gain in competitive advantage if participating firms do 
not manage the coopetition properly. Specifically, alliance capabilities for joint exploration 
and joint exploitation are critical for effective coopetition management.  
Firm alliance capabilities for joint exploration manifest in a firm’s efficacy to 
create and capture public syncretic rents. Joint exploration requires firms to contribute 
technological expertise and proprietary knowledge for innovation, which delivers public 
syncretic rents to all participating firms (Lado et al., 1997). For example, when two firms 
collaborate on a joint innovation project, each firm contributes expert human resources 
(e.g. scientists, engineers, R&D managers) and shares the underlying know-hows of its key 
inventions (i.e. the uncodified knowledge component of the firm’s inventions). 
Since all participating firms expect to capture some portions of the value created in 
a joint innovation project, value creation constitutes public syncretic rents (Lado et al., 
1997). Joint exploration contains an inherent risk stemming from the potential 
opportunistic behaviors of the alliance partners (Alexy et al., 2013; Lee et al., 2003). For 
example, an opponent firm may opportunistically appropriate the technological expertise 
and proprietary knowledge contributed by the focal firm beyond the alliance agreement 
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terms (Alexy et al., 2013). In addition, an opponent firm may opportunistically appropriate 
all of the public syncretic rents presented in a joint innovation project (Hamel et al., 1989; 
Lado et al., 1997).  
The risks of opportunism in public syncretic rent creation and capture are 
exacerbated under competitive pressure in coopetition. Firms have robust absorptive 
capacities for the proprietary technological knowledge of a coopetition opponent due to 
high overlaps in technological knowledge domains (Mowery, Oxley, & Silverman, 1998), 
and they have the incentives to maximize value appropriation from innovation that 
concurrently contributes to the technological competencies of their rival. The more a 
technology-driven firm pursues joint exploration, the better it becomes at safeguarding 
against opportunism in public syncretic rent creation and capture.  
For example, a focal firm develops mechanisms to protect its core technological 
competencies, such as selective disclosure of knowledge (Alexy et al., 2013), from its 
experience of joint exploration. Consequently, the focal firm develop more robust alliance 
capabilities for joint exploration. From the perspective of the focal firm, an increase in its 
joint exploration capabilities leads to greater efficacy of gaining competitive advantage 
from coopetition. Therefore, a firm with robust alliance capabilities for joint exploration 
will likely pursue more coopetition than firms with weak such capabilities. 
Hypothesis 3. An increase in firm alliance capabilities for joint exploration will 
lead to an increase in firm coopetition pursuits. 
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Firm alliance capabilities for joint exploitation manifest in a firm’s efficacy to 
create and capture private syncretic rents. In a joint exploitation partnership, firms leverage 
each other’s existing complementary resources, typically in the commercialization 
processes (e.g. product manufacturing and marketing) (Lee et al., 2003; Stettner & Lavie, 
2014). In the immediate terms, firms engaging in joint exploitation can quickly exploit 
existing opportunities in the product market without the necessity to develop such 
complementary resources a priori (Rothaermel, 2001). 
Collaterally, these firms utilize the joint exploitation partnerships as learning 
opportunities to develop the complementary resources that they currently lack 
(Rothaermel, 2001). A focal firm gains direct access to tacit knowledge embedded in the 
existing complementary resources controlled by a partner via a strategic alliance for joint 
exploitation (Mowery, Oxley, & Silverman, 1996; Un & Asakawa, 2015). Tacit knowledge 
access provides the learning firm a mechanism to vicariously experience the inner 
workings of existing complementary resources controlled by the partner (Un & Asakawa, 
2015). The learning firm thus can imitate, customize and absorb these complementary 
resources to gain new competencies. Such a process of imperfect imitation contributes to 
the creation and capture of private syncretic rents through joint exploitation (Lado et al., 
1997). 
The efficacy of a firm to create and capture private syncretic rents from joint 
exploitation depends on its proficiency in vicarious learning and imperfect imitation 
(Bresman, 2013; Posen, Lee, & Yi, 2013). The more a firm pursues joint exploitation, the 
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more it engages in vicarious learning from alliance partners. Namely, the firm repeatedly 
imitates, customizes and absorbs various components of the complementary resources of 
its joint exploitation alliance partners, as it is directly exposed to the tacit aspects of these 
complementary resources (Bresman, 2013). Consequently, the firm develops stronger 
alliance capabilities for joint exploitation over time. 
Coopetition stands as a unique vicarious learning opportunity for technology-
driven firms to conduct imperfect imitation of competitor competencies. In industries 
where environmental turbulence is high and learning curves are steep (e.g. technology-
driven industries), imperfect imitation of competitors constitutes a salient mechanism to 
gain competitive advantage (Posen et al., 2013). Firms strategize to prevent external access 
to their tacit knowledge elements, such as uncodified technological know-hows, 
operational routines and organizational designs conducive to innovation, which are kept 
especially clandestine from direct competitors (Alexy et al., 2013). 
Coopetition thus constitutes an instrumental access channel into competitors’ tacit 
technological knowledge, from which a focal technology-driven firm may create and 
capture private syncretic rents through imperfect imitation (Hamel, 1991; Lado et al., 
1997). If a firm demonstrates high alliance capabilities for joint exploitation, it will benefit 
more from the private portion of syncretic rents presented in coopetition. Therefore, firms 
with more well-developed alliance capabilities for joint exploitation are expected to pursue 
coopetition more actively. 
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Hypothesis 4. An increase in firm alliance capabilities for joint exploitation will 
lead to an increase in firm coopetition pursuits. 
 
3.4 METHODOLOGY 
3.4.1 Empirical Setting 
To test the competing hypotheses on the effects of patent-based learning and alliance-based 
learning on firm coopetition pursuits, I construct a panel data from the longitudinal records 
of firms in the following technology-driven industrial sectors: pharmaceuticals (SIC 2833-
2836), computers and peripheral equipment (SIC 3571-3579), electronics and electronic 
components (SIC 3671-3679), aerospace and aircraft (SIC 3721-3769), 
telecommunications (4812-4813, 4822, 4899), and medical devices (3841-3845).  
The rationale for this empirical setting choice is two-fold. First, established research 
has demonstrated that firms in technology-driven industries prioritize firm learning as 
strategic pursuits. Firm learning is a cogent mechanism to improve the innovation 
performance of firms (Irwin & Klenow, 1996; Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004), which 
underscores firm competitive advantage in technology-driven industries (Hagedoorn, 
Carayannis, & Alexander, 2001). Second, stylized findings from prior studies on inter-firm 
interactions suggest that alliance decisions in technology-driven industries are driven by 
learning motivations (Hamel, 1991; Hamel et al., 1989; Mowery et al., 1996). Overall, 
technology-driven industries demonstrate high turbulence and steep learning curves 
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(Browning et al., 1995; Irwin & Klenow, 1996). Subject to these environmental conditions, 
competing firms in technology-driven industries often benefit from syncretic rents by 
coopetition (Lado et al., 1997). 
Therefore, the technology-driven industries provide an ideal empirical setting for 
testing the conceptual model of how firm learning efficacies impact coopetition pursuits. 
The sampled industries consistently demonstrate high technological intensities from 1990 
to 2009 according to National Science Foundation's historical surveys of industrial research 
and development on firms in the United States4. By including multiple technology-driven 
sectors and industries, the analysis can yield generalizable conclusions because the 
correlations will be limited to a less degree by the idiosyncratic nature of any given 
technological industry, compared to an analysis that focuses on a single industry. Stated 
differently, the panel data of multiple technology-driven industries increases the 
generalizability of empirical findings (Aguinis, Pierce, Bosco, & Muslin, 2007). 
3.4.2 Sample and Data Source 
I collect records of formal collaborations (including strategic alliances and joint ventures) 
and patent portfolio citations between publicly traded U.S. firms in the abovementioned 
industries. In addition, I complement the dataset with firm annual financial records for 
control variable construction. Firms in the United States conduct amongst the highest 
                                                 
4 The National Science Foundation (NSF) is a U.S. federal agency. The NSF conducts the “Business 
Research and Development and Innovation Survey (BRDIS)” annually, which reports the technological 
intensities of various industries amongst other information. BRDIS is available from the NSF statistics 
portal: http://www.nsf.gov/statistics. 
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amounts of innovation, including R&D investments, scientific research and technological 
invention5, therefore, they are appropriate subjects for the analysis here. In addition, the 
historical financial information of publicly traded firms in the United States is relatively 
complete and reliable (Li, Eden, Hitt, & Ireland, 2008), which is important for this study 
because financial records provide a mechanism to control the potential confounding effects 
due to firm heterogeneity in resource munificence and firm expenditure. 
Specifically, I collect strategic alliance and joint venture records from Thomson 
Reuter's SDC Platinum database, which report an array of alliance characteristics and 
participating firm characteristics, including alliance deal announcement dates, deal 
contents (e.g. R&D, manufacturing, and marketing agreements), participating firm 
identifiers, etc. I restrict my search in the strategic alliance and joint venture data segment 
of the SDC Platinum database with the "participant primary SIC code" filter using the 
abovementioned SIC codes. The SDC Platinum database represents the most 
comprehensive, multi-sectoral inter-firm collaboration records, and it yields particularly 
reliable information for most technology-driven industries (Schilling, 2009).  
However, the SDC data is by no means exhaustive, and prior studies with a focus 
on a single industry/sector have utilized Factiva (i.e. textual records of news articles, trade 
journals, company press releases, etc.) alliance announcements to complement the SDC 
data (D Lavie, 2007). Following a common practice in alliance research design that 
                                                 
5 According to OECD’s annual Science, Technology and Innovation (STI) Scoreboard reports on 
international comparison of firm innovation intensities. OECD conducts surveys and report firm innovation 
of the organization’s member countries. The STI Scoreboards are available from: http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/science-and-technology/oecd-science-technology-and-industry-scoreboard_20725345. 
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includes firm samples from multiple industries, I compare the deal announcement 
frequencies in Factiva and the deal counts in SDC Platinum on the industry level to ensure 
appropriate data coverage (Tafti, Mithas, & Krishnan, 2013). In all the sampled industries, 
the alliance announcement frequencies in Factiva and the alliance counts in SDC Platinum 
are highly correlated (p<0.001), therefore, the SDC data is reliable for the current analysis, 
albeit incomplete. 
I collect firm annual financial records from Standard & Poor's Compustat database 
using the same list of SIC codes (i.e. representing technology-driven industries). Finally, I 
collect firm patent filing and patent citation records from the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO). Matching firm-level data from SDC Platinum and Compustat 
to patent records posts a non-trivial challenge, since the USPTO data files do not provide 
a unique firm identifier. For example, the organization assignee numbers constructed by 
USPTO do not accurately reflect unique corporate identities, and there are copious 
variations in the organization name records, including misspellings and acronyms (Hall, 
Jaffe, & Trajtenberg, 2001). Therefore, I leverage the results of corporate-level patent 
assignee name matching conducted by two research groups: Hall et al., (2009) (i.e. 
commonly known as the NBER patent data), and a collaborative project conducted by 
Kogan, Papanikolaou, Seru, & Stoffman (2017).  
The NBER patent data is the most comprehensive name-matching effort of 
corporate patent assignees in North America, particularly, the researchers achieve dynamic 
corporate identifier matching to USPTO assignee records, accounting for historical 
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corporate name changes (e.g. due to re-branding and re-structuring). The NBER patent data 
file is particularly valuable for the study here, since corporate patent assignees are matched 
to the firm universe in the Compustat North American annual fundamental database (Hall 
et al., 2009). However, even with the most recent extension of the NBER patent data 
(Bessen, 2009), it only covers corporate patent assignee, patent application and patent 
citation records up until 2006. Kogan et al. (2017) conducted independent research that 
builds upon the NBER patent data and covers corporate-level patent records until 2011. 
3.4.3 Data Structure and Variable Description 
I construct a panel dataset for the final analysis after triangulating and combining the 
abovementioned data sources to leverage the longitudinal information. Since the research 
question focuses on firm-level characteristics, I construct a firm-year level panel data with 
details outlined below. The time frame for the empirical analysis spans from 1990 to 2008. 
The rationale for this observational time frame is as follow. First, the SDC Platinum does 
not provide reliable alliance deal coverage prior to 19856. Second, the frequencies of inter-
firm alliances, especially technological alliances, demonstrated conspicuous variations in 
the 1990s and the early 2000s (Schilling, 2015). Therefore, the chosen observational period 
captures the changes in inter-firm collaboration and coopetition propensities, which are 
directly pertinent to the hypothesis testing purpose of this study. To reduce the confounding 
effects due to simultaneity, I implement a 1-year lag in the independent variables (i.e. the 
                                                 
6 Thompson Reuters SDC Platinum “Contents and Features”: 
http://financial.thomsonreuters.com/en/products/data-analytics/market-data/sdc-platinum-financial-
securities.html. Accessed on September 27, 2016. 
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predictors in year t are used to predict the outcomes in year t+1). Therefore, firms with less 
than 2 years' financial records or patent application records are eliminated from the final 
sample. 
To reduce sample selection bias, I include all firm records in the chosen technology-
driven industries from SDC Platinum, Compustat NBER patent data and the patent data 
from Kogan et al. (2017). The final firm sample emerges from combining firm-year level 
records from all four sources (i.e. publicly traded U.S. firms in the selected industries with 
at least two years of records in each of Compustat, SDC Platinum, NBER patent data and 
Kogan et al. (2017). First, I pool the SDC Platinum alliance observations to the firm-year 
level, and match it to the annual financial data retrieved from Compustat North America 
using 6-digit CUSIP as the firm identifier (i.e. a unique identifier at the corporate level).  
Second, I pool the patent citation records to the firm-year level using both chosen 
patent databases. By collapsing patent-level citation records to the firm-year level, I 
construct a dataset of firm patent portfolios (i.e. the collection of all the patents that a given 
firm applies in a year), in which inter-firm patent portfolio citations are the observations. 
Finally, I combine the firm-year level datasets into a panel data structure with a 1-year time 
lag in the independent variables (i.e. independent variable observations range from 1990-
2007, and dependent variable observations range from 1991-2008). 
The dependent variable is firm coopetition pursuit, which is the annual count of 
strategic alliances of each focal firm with other firms in the same industry (i.e. defined in 
the 4-digit SIC codes). I use patent backward citation counts as a proxy for absorptive 
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capacities. Specifically, external knowledge assimilation is operationalized as a count 
variable that captures the total backward citations in each focal firm’s patents applied in 
each year made to the patents of external organizations. Similarly, internal knowledge 
recombination is operationalized as a count variable that captures the total backward 
citations in each focal firm’s patents applied in each year made to its own accumulated 
patent stock.  
I use alliance experiences as a proxy for alliance capabilities. Specifically, joint 
exploration is operationalized as a firm-year count of exploratory alliances, and joint 
exploitation is operationalized as a firm-year count of exploitative alliances. Specifically, 
an exploratory alliance is a deal that contains inter-firm agreements that reflect exploration 
(e.g. exploration, R&D, licensing, cross-licensing, exclusive licensing, cross-technology 
transfer, technology transfer, royalty payment terms), and an exploitative alliance is a deal 
that contains inter-firm agreements that reflect exploitation (e.g. manufacturing, marketing, 
funding, supply, original equipment manufacturing and value-added reseller). Following 
common practice in empirical research in firm alliances, I include the following firm-year 
level control variables to reduce endogeneity stemming from heterogeneity in firm 
resources and operation capabilities: firm size (i.e. employee number in logarithmic scale), 
total cash, firm intangible asset, R&D expense, advertisement expense (Lavie & Drori, 
2011).  
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3.4.4 Econometric Model Specification 
The dependent variable measures the count of coopetition relationships that a given firm 
pursue in an observation year. Econometrics scholars have established that when the 
dependent variable is a count measure, the data variance distribution often violates the 
normality assumption necessary for the implementation of the ordinary least square (OLS) 
regression model (Greene, 2003). Therefore, I fit my data to a generalized linear model 
(GLM) in the empirical analysis (Greene, 2003). In the literature, the Poisson specifications 
are commonly implemented in panel regression analysis with a count dependent variable 
(Whittington, Owen-Smith, & Powell, 2009).  
In addition, an alpha parameter in the Poisson model specifications needs to be 
adjusted if the dependent variable demonstrates over dispersion, leading to the negative 
binomial specifications (Wooldridge, 2002). The summary statistics of my sample data 
unequivocally present over dispersion of the dependent count variable (i.e. for the 
dependent variable, std. dev. = 1.32, mean = 0.81). Therefore, I adopt the panel negative 
binomial regression model in testing the hypotheses in the following analysis. The negative 
binomial model is specified as follow: 
𝑝(𝑦) = 𝑃(𝑌 = 𝑦) =  
Γ(y+
1
α
)
Γ(y+1)Γ(
1
α
)
(
1
1+𝛼𝜇
)1/𝛼(
𝑎𝜇
1+𝛼𝜇
)𝑦 , 
Equation 3.1 
where µ (µ>0) represents the mean of the dependent variable (i.e. y), and α (α>0) represents 
the heterogeneity parameter (Greene, 2003). 
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Following the established practice in the literature, I implement the panel regression 
model with firm fixed effects to control for the endogeneity due to unobserved 
heterogeneity of the firms (Stettner & Lavie, 2014). Furthermore, I implement a 1-year lag 
in the independent variables and the control variables to control for the endogeneity due to 
simultaneity (Stettner & Lavie, 2014). The regression model is specified as follow: 
𝑙𝑛(𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜_𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑠𝑢𝑖𝑡)𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝛽2𝐶𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡−1 , 
Equation 3.2 
where 𝑋𝑖𝑡 denotes the independent variable vector, 𝐶𝑖𝑡 denotes the control variable vector, 
𝛼𝑖 denotes the time-invariant, firm-specific intercepts (i.e. firm fixed effects), and 𝜇𝑖𝑡 
denotes the random error term (i.e. time-variant, firm-specific errors); 𝛽𝑗 denotes a series 
of parameter coefficients to be estimated in the regression analysis (Greene, 2003).  
 
3.5 RESULTS 
Table 3.2 and Table 3.3 below reports the descriptive statistics and the Pearson correlation 
coefficients of dependent, independent and control variables. All independent variables and 
control variables show variance inflation factors (VIF) below the suggested cut-off value 
of 5 (i.e. ranging from 1.06 to 4.18), with a mean VIF of the full model being 2.43. Low 
VIFs indicate that multicollinearity is unlikely a concern in the estimation model (Angrist 
& Pischke, 2009).
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Table 3.2 Summary Statistics of Controls, Independent Variables, and Dependent 
Variables 
 
Variables Observations Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
1. Coopetition 
Pursuit 
1515 0.807 1.317 0.000 9.000 
2. External 
Knowledge 
Assimilation 
1515 0.000 1.000 -0.352 12.881 
3. Internal 
Knowledge 
Recombination 
1515 0.000 1.000 -0.878 4.196 
4. Joint Exploration 1515 0.000 1.000 -0.697 8.347 
5. Joint Exploitation 1515 0.000 1.000 -0.686 9.214 
6. Firm Size 1515 0.898 2.405 -5.116 5.734 
7. Cash 1515 4.414 2.352 -3.772 9.446 
8. Intangible Assets 1515 3.133 3.106 -5.809 11.768 
9. R&D Expenses 1515 4.305 2.062 -3.170 9.408 
10. Advertisement 
Expenses 
1515 1.626 2.964 -6.908 8.161 
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Table 3.3 Pearson Correlation Coefficients 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Coopetition 
Pursuit 
1.000                   
2. External 
Knowledge 
Assimilation 
0.058 1.000                 
3. Internal 
Knowledge 
Recombination 
0.040 0.056 1.000               
4. Joint 
Exploration 
0.390 0.110 0.098 1.000             
5. Joint 
Exploitation 
0.325 0.183 0.059 0.702 1.000           
6. Firm Size 0.252 0.322 0.043 0.206 0.255 1.000         
7. Cash 0.232 0.372 0.072 0.189 0.192 0.802 1.000       
8. Intangible 
Assets 
0.178 0.168 0.058 0.011 0.003 0.628 0.574 1.000     
9. R&D 
Expenses 
0.301 0.383 0.164 0.294 0.257 0.795 0.822 0.567 1.000   
10. 
Advertisement 
Expenses 
0.272 0.259 0.038 0.210 0.224 0.523 0.519 0.436 0.490 1.000 
Note: Correlations larger than |.066| are significant at p < .05, and those larger than |.088| 
are significant at p < .01. 
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Table 3.4 reports the standardized correlation coefficients of the estimated fixed 
effects panel negative binomial regression models. Model 1 establishes a baseline model 
with only the control variables. In Model 2 through Model 5, I test Hypothesis 1 to 
Hypothesis 4 by adding each of the four independent variables one at a time. Model 2 is 
fitted to test the first pair of competing hypothesis, namely, Hypotheses 1(a) and 1(b). 
Model 2 elucidates a negative effect of firm absorptive capacities for external knowledge 
assimilation on firm coopetition pursuits, which is statistically significant (β = -0.104, p = 
0.033). Therefore, Model 2 provides support for Hypothesis 1(b). Model 3 is fitted to test 
the second pair of competing hypothesis, namely, Hypotheses 2(a) and 2(b). Model 3 
illustrates a negative effect of firm absorptive capacities for internal knowledge 
recombination on firm coopetition pursuits, which is statistically significant (β = -0.145, p 
= 0.015). Model 3 yields support for Hypothesis 2(b). 
I fit Model 4 to test Hypothesis 3, which predicts a positive effect of firm alliance 
capabilities for joint exploration on firm coopetition pursuit. Model 4 yields support for 
Hypothesis 3 with high statistical significance (β = 0.126, p < 0.001). Subsequently, I fit 
Model 5 to test Hypothesis 4, which predicts a positive effect of firm alliance capabilities 
for joint exploitation on firm coopetition pursuit. Model 5 supports Hypothesis 4 with high 
statistical significance (β = 0.089, p = 0.003). Finally, Model 6 is the full model with all 
independent variables and control variables estimated concurrently. In the full model, the 
coefficient estimates in two of the four independent variables remain statistically 
significant, namely, internal knowledge recombination (β = -0.150, p = 0.01) and joint 
exploration (β = 0.103, p = 0.006).  
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Table 3.4 Panel Negative Binomial Regression with Firm-Fixed Effects 
 
Dependent 
Variable 
Firm coopetition pursuits 
Models 
Model 1 
(Baseline) 
Model 2 
(H1) 
Model 3 
(H2) 
Model 4 
(H3) 
Model 5 
(H4) 
Model 6 
(Full) 
Independent 
Variables 
      
Codified 
knowledge 
assimilation 
 -0.104**    -0.0728 
 (0.033)    (0.136) 
Codified 
knowledge 
renewal 
  -0.145**   -0.150** 
  (0.015)   (0.012) 
Tacit 
knowledge 
exploration 
   0.126***  0.103*** 
   (0.000)  (0.006) 
Tacit 
knowledge 
exploitation 
    0.0891*** 0.0267 
    (0.003) (0.468) 
Controls  
Firm Size 
0.221*** 0.234*** 0.212** 0.199** 0.193** 0.196** 
(0.009) (0.006) (0.013) (0.020) (0.023) (0.023) 
Cash 
-0.0389 -0.0347 -0.0424 -0.0222 -0.0269 -0.0232 
(0.389) (0.440) (0.346) (0.625) (0.553) (0.607) 
Intangible 
Assets 
-0.0180 -0.00859 -0.0187 -0.00449 -0.0127 0.0000758 
(0.444) (0.721) (0.426) (0.848) (0.587) (0.997) 
R&D 
Expenses 
-0.195*** -0.191*** -0.170** -0.186*** -0.170** -0.153** 
(0.005) (0.006) (0.016) (0.008) (0.016) (0.032) 
Advertisement 
Expenses 
-0.00599 0.00465 -0.00906 0.00632 0.00131 0.0100 
(0.867) (0.897) (0.799) (0.857) (0.971) (0.777) 
Constant 
2.718*** 2.662*** 2.690*** 2.609*** 2.550*** 2.536*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 1084 1084 1084 1084 1084 1084 
All independent variables are lagged by 1 year in respect to the dependent variables; p-
values are shown in parentheses; * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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In summary, the empirical analysis yields support for the negative effects of firm 
absorptive capacities in both external knowledge assimilation and internal knowledge 
recombination on subsequent coopetition pursuits. Specifically, Hypothesis 1(b) and 
Hypothesis 2(b) are supported, whereas their competitive hypotheses, Hypothesis 1(a) and 
Hypothesis 2(a) are not supported. Furthermore, the positive effects of firm alliance 
capabilities in both joint exploration and joint exploitation on subsequent coopetition 
pursuits (i.e. Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 4) are supported by the empirical analysis. 
 
3.6 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
3.6.1 Theoretical Contribution 
Coopetition continues to gain practical significance to managers of firms, especially in 
technology-driven industries, where environmental turbulences are high and learning 
curves are steep (Chen, Katila, McDonald, & Eisenhardt, 2010). However, coopetition 
remains an under-researched topic in the strategic management scholarship. Specifically, 
salient research suggests firm learning as a critical antecedents to coopetition pursuits of 
the firms (Browning et al., 1995; Chen & Miller, 2015; Chen & Miller, 2012; Gnyawali & 
Park, 2011; Hamel et al., 1989). However, sparse insights exist to elucidate the theoretical 
connections between coopetition as a strategic decision, firm learning modes (i.e. how 
firms learn), and firm learning efficacies (i.e. how well firms learn).  
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Current research on firm learning emphasizes learning efficacies, for instance, 
absorptive capacities (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990) and alliance capabilities (Wang & 
Rajagopalan, 2015), which firms develop from the accumulation of experiences in various 
learning modes, including patent- and alliance-based learning (Ranjay Gulati, Lavie, & 
Singh, 2009; Henderson, Jaffe, & Trajtenberg, 2005; Hoang & Rothaermel, 2010; Isaksson, 
Simeth, & Seifert, 2016; Jaffe, Fogarty, & Banks, 1998; Jain, 2013).  
The literature of firm learning, albeit robust, is lacking in the conceptual connection 
between different learning modes and learning efficacies. When a firm conducts patent 
searches to acquire knowledge elements when conducting innovation, it learns from not 
only the patent stocks of external entities, but also the firm’s own patent stock accumulated 
from their past innovation (Almeida, 1996; Fleming & Sorenson, 2001; Verhoeven, 
Bakker, & Veugelers, 2016). How patent-based learning experience contributes to a firm’s 
development in absorptive capacities remains theoretical vague in the current firm learning 
literature.  
Furthermore, it is well established that firms pursue cooperative strategies (e.g. 
strategic alliances and joint ventures) to learn from alliance partners (Mowery et al., 1996; 
Vandaie & Zaheer, 2014). More saliently, coopetition offers a highly efficient learning 
opportunity for firms to create and capture syncretic rents together with competitors 
(Hamel, 1991; Hamel et al., 1989; Lado et al., 1997). However, how well a firm can 
leverage cooperation, including coopetition, as a learning opportunity directly hinges on 
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its alliance capabilities to maintain, coordinate and steer the inter-firm relationships (Wang 
& Rajagopalan, 2015).  
Scholars investigating alliance capabilities suggest that firms develop alliance 
capabilities from past experiences in forging inter-firm partnerships (Rothaermel & Deeds, 
2006; Vandaie & Zaheer, 2014). Specifically, firms engage in exploration and exploitation 
through strategic alliances (i.e. joint exploration and joint exploitation) (Lavie, Stettner, & 
Tushman, 2010; Stettner & Lavie, 2014), and they develop different alliance capabilities 
from these experiences. Conceptual distinction between joint exploration and joint 
exploitation capabilities is lacking in the current firm learning literature.  
This study targets the abovementioned knowledge lacunae and seeks answers to the 
following research question: How is coopetition pursuit influenced by firm learning 
efficacies developed from past experiences in different learning modes? As a point of 
departure, I synthesize a theoretical framework to organize key constructs from the firm 
learning literature, and make salient the conceptual relationships between different learning 
modes and learning efficacies of the firms. I then investigate the impacts of distinct learning 
efficacies on a firm’s subsequent coopetition pursuits. My analysis contributes to the firm 
learning literature and research on coopetition in four manners.  
First, I bridge the theoretical connection between two types of firm learning modes, 
namely, patent-based learning and alliance-based learning, and two types of firm learning 
efficacies, namely, absorptive capacities and alliance capabilities. Second, I make salient 
the conceptual distinction between firm absorptive capacities of external knowledge 
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assimilation and internal knowledge recombination, which firms develop from past 
experiences in learning from external and internal patent stocks, respectively.  
Third, I differentiate the alliance capabilities in joint exploration and joint 
exploitation, zeroing in on the differences in how firms leverage tacit knowledge gained 
from past exploratory and exploitative alliance experiences to gain efficacies in creating 
syncretic rents and learning from partners, especially under competitive tension. Finally, I 
investigate the impacts of firm learning efficacies (i.e. external knowledge assimilation 
capacities, internal knowledge recombination capacities, joint exploration capabilities and 
joint exploitation capabilities) on subsequent coopetition pursuits of the firms. 
My empirical analysis disentangles the positive and the negative effects of firm 
learning efficacies on subsequent coopetition decisions, of which the distinction makes 
both theoretical and empirical contributions to coopetition research in the strategic 
management literature. Specifically, I test my hypotheses on the influences of firm learning 
efficacies on coopetition pursuits in a longitudinal panel data with a broad coverage of 
multiple technology-driven sectors in the U.S. from 1990 to 2007.  
With regard to firm absorptive capacities in external knowledge assimilation and 
internal knowledge recombination (i.e. learning efficacies developed from experiences in 
external and internal patent-based learning modes, respectively), I developed two pairs of 
competing hypotheses, since high absorptive capacities simultaneously increase the focal 
firm’s syncretic rent through coopetition (Lado et al., 1997) and amplify potential 
coopetition partners’ tendency to avoid a learning race (Yang et al., 2015).  
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Stated differently, increase in firm absorptive capacities in external knowledge 
assimilation and internal knowledge recombination may lead to positive (H1(a) and H2(a)) 
or negative effects (H1(b) and H2(b)) on the firm’s subsequent coopetition pursuits. My 
empirical investigation supports the negative effect hypotheses regarding the impact of 
patent-based learning on firm coopetition pursuits (i.e. H1(b) and H2(b)), whereas the 
competing, positive effect hypotheses (i.e. H1(a) and H2(a)) are not supported in this study.  
Furthermore, I hypothesize positive effects of joint exploration capabilities and 
joint exploitation capabilities on firm coopetition pursuits (i.e. H3 and H4), following the 
logic in extant research on inter-firm learning and alliance capabilities. I found strong 
empirical evidence to support the positive impacts of alliance-based learning on firm 
coopetition pursuits (i.e. H3 and H4).  
3.6.2 Limitation and Future Research 
However, my analysis is not without limitations. First, my conceptualization and empirical 
analysis focuses on the learning modes and learning efficacies that are salient to coopetition 
pursuits of technology-driven firms, because coopetition is most manifest in high-
technology sectors where environmental turbulences are high and learning curves are steep. 
Therefore, I zero in patent- and alliance-based learning modes, from which firms develop 
absorptive capacities in utilizing external and internal knowledge, and alliance capabilities 
in gaining competitive advantage from exploratory and exploitative collaboration.  
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Firms may pursue other modes of learning and develop additional learning 
efficacies. For example, firms often engage in vicarious learning from formal and informal 
interactions with external entities (Bresman, 2013). Additionally, learning-by-doing 
constitutes a critical mechanism of firm learning to improve the efficiency of operational 
routines, especially for manufacturing procurement, and logistics processes (Jain, 2013). 
Future research may continue to investigate how firms develop learning efficacies from 
their experiences in vicarious learning and learning-by-doing, and how these learning 
experiences may impact future coopetition pursuits.  
Second, my empirical analysis relies on a panel data that covers a broad scope of 
technology-driven industries. A broad industrial scope increases the generalizability of my 
findings, yet limits the precision of the predictions (Bitektine & Miller, 2015; Turner, 
Cardinal, & Burton, 2017). Therefore, the magnitudes of effects from various learning 
efficacies on firm coopetition pursuits may differ from what I report here when each 
industry is examined in separation. Future research may continue to hone in the industry-
level contextual factors, and uncover the contingencies that moderate the strengths of 
impacts from learning efficacies on firm coopetition pursuits, for example, technological 
intensity, competition pressure, market dynamics (Gnyawali & Madhavan, 2001; Ritala & 
Sainio, 2014).  
Finally, I conduct my conceptualization and empirical investigation on the firm 
level, targeting the antecedents to firm decision making regarding coopetition. Factors on 
the levels of firm dyads and inter-firm relation (i.e. relation-specific factors) yield salient 
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influences on the dynamic evolution of coopetition relationships. Future research may 
focus on how coopetition relationships develop over time, subject to various relation-
specific factors, for instance, knowledge proximity, resource overlaps, managerial 
perception, rivalry, trust and familiarity (Dahlander & McFarland, 2013; Gulati & 
Nickerson, 2008; Jiang, Bao, Xie, & Gao, 2016; Sears & Hoetker, 2014).  
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4 INNOVATING FROM COOPETITION: DOES 
HORIZONTAL INTEGRATION ENHANCE 
INNOVATION VALUE? CONTINGENCY EFFECTS OF 
ALLIANCE AND KNOWLEDGE NETWORK 
EMBEDDEDNESS 
 
4.1 ABSTRACT 
Extant research suggests the “double-edged sword” nature of coopetition in technology-
driven industries. Specifically, coopetition may enhance value creation in firm 
technological innovation by providing complementary resources and learning 
opportunities. However, close interactions with competitors may spur competitive attacks, 
such as knowledge misappropriation, technological imitation, and learning races, leading 
to value destruction in firm innovation. The contextual conditions under which coopetition 
may enhance value creation or exacerbate value destruction remain unclear, begging the 
question: Under what conditions will the firms benefit from coopetition, or be harmed by 
it? In this study, I seek answers to this question as I unpack the contingency factors 
stemming from pluralistic network embeddedness of technology-driven firms, which are 
simultaneously plugged in a firm-level collaboration network and a firm-level knowledge 
network. I zero in on the moderation effects of network betweenness, centrality, and 
structural hole spanning on the baseline impacts of coopetition on firm innovation 
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performance. My contingency model contributes to growing research in the topics of 
coopetition strategy and network pluralism. 
4.2 INTRODUCTION 
How does collaboration network and knowledge network embeddedness influence firm 
coopetition and innovation? Collaboration with competitors has been conceptualized as a 
double-edged sword, especially in technology-driven industries. On the one hand, 
coopetition underscores a critical mechanism to overcome the learning curves and develop 
innovation capacities (Dussauge, Garrette, & Mitchell, 2000; Hamel, Doz, & Prahalad, 
1989). Firms competing in the same industry often have overlapping competencies that 
facilitate cross-boundary resource assimilation and knowledge absorption (Gnyawali & 
Park, 2011; Lado, Boyd, & Hanlon, 1997). Therefore, resource acquisition from 
competitors in the same industry can lead to enhancement in the focal firm's subsequent 
technological innovation. In other words, coopetition provides value creation opportunities 
to augment firm technological innovation. 
On the other hand, competing firms face limitations when leveraging 
complementary resources. For example, rivalry between firms in the same industry leads 
to negative sentiments (e.g. aggressiveness and distrust) that destabilize inter-firm 
relationships and erodes value (Chen & Miller, 2015; Livengood & Reger, 2010; Sirmon, 
Gove, & Hitt, 2008). Firms who pursue coopetition come into close contact with their 
competitors, for example, they engage in frequent interactions, share organizational 
knowledge, and contribute complementary resources to a collaborative project (Khanna, 
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Gulati, & Nohria, 1998b). Such intimate inter-firm interactions between competitors may 
stabilize inter-firm relationships, however, close proximity between competitors can also 
breed rivalry as firms perceive threats and challenges directly and tangibly (Chen & Miller, 
2015; Livengood & Reger, 2010). Rivalry between coopetition opponents can promote 
competitive attacks (e.g. proprietary knowledge misappropriation, technological imitation) 
and learning races against partners, which will erode potential value gains from 
coopetition, and even destroy firm innovation competencies (Andrevski, Brass, & Ferrier, 
2016; Yang, Zheng, & Zaheer, 2015). In other words, coopetition spurs value destruction 
threats to diminish firm technological innovation. 
Extant studies on inter-firm strategies and firm innovation illustrate both 
augmenting and diminishing effects of coopetition on firm innovation (Bouncken & Kraus, 
2013; Frankort, 2016; Gnyawali, Madhavan, He, & Bengtsson, 2016; Toh & Polidoro, 
2013). Such contradicting results beg the question: Under what conditions will the 
coopetition pursuit of a focal firm augment or diminish firm innovation performance? A 
gap exists in the current literature where theoretical insights are sparse in the contextual 
factors that moderate the impacts of coopetition on firm innovation, limiting the value of 
practical guidance for managers on the strategies of collaboration with competitors (Park, 
Srivastava, & Gnyawali, 2014).  
In a parallel research stream, seminal work on organizational networks illustrates 
network embeddedness as a critical environmental factor that influences the effect of inter-
firm strategies, including cooperation with competitors, on innovation performance 
111 
  
(Ahuja, 2000a; Gulati, 1998; Lee, Song, & Yang, 2016; Singh, Kryscynski, Li, & Gopal, 
2015; Wal, Alexy, Block, & Sandner, 2016). For example, an inter-organizational 
collaboration network manifests when firms pursue strategic alliances, joint ventures, or 
other formal collaboration (Schilling, 2015; Schilling & Phelps, 2007). Organizational 
network scholars demonstrate the significant impacts of collaboration network positions 
on technological innovation of the firms (Ahuja, 2000b; Burt, 1987; Schilling & Phelps, 
2007; Singh et al., 2015). In addition, recent conceptualization brings growing attention to 
the effect of knowledge network embeddedness on firm innovation (Phelps, Heidl, & 
Wadhwa, 2012). Distinct from collaboration network where inter-firm ties represent 
formal, social interactions between firms, a knowledge network captures the 
interdependencies between firm knowledge bases, for instance, knowledge network 
embeddedness of the firm can reflect knowledge influences, and technological overlaps 
with other firms in the same or a similar innovation space (Phelps et al., 2012). 
The majority of organizational network research focuses on the isolated impact of 
network embeddedness on innovation in a given relational context, for example, alliance-
based collaboration network (e.g. Schilling & Phelps, 2007; Singh et al., 2015). The 
network pluralism view calls for further investigations on how firm performances vary 
depending on their positions in different types of networks (Shipilov et al., 2014). Most 
conspicuously, technology-driven firms often pursue partnerships (e.g. joint R&D) with 
other firms, and independently search for information in the public domain of knowledge 
(e.g. published patents) to develop innovation competence (Guan & Liu, 2016; 
Ranganathan & Rosenkopf, 2014).  
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While inter-firm partnerships plug a focal firm in a collaboration network, 
independent knowledge absorption leads to embeddedness in a firm-level knowledge 
network. Specifically, if a focal firm absorbs codified knowledge from an external firm’s 
patent stock, and integrates such information into its own knowledge base, then these two 
firms are tied in a knowledge network on the firm level. Figure 4.1 below illustrates the 
pluralistic embeddedness of firms in the inter-organization collaboration network and 
knowledge network. Since a firm may demonstrate different patterns in its inter-firm 
partnership and knowledge search pursuits, the firm can experience varied influences from 
these two types of networks.   
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Figure 4.1 Pluralistic Network Embeddedness Illustration: Firm-Level Collaboration 
and Knowledge Networks 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Firm C 
Knowledge Base 
 
Firm B 
 
Legends 
             Patent-level tie (i.e. technological class co-assignment) 
             Firm-level knowledge network tie (i.e. aggregated from patent-level tie) 
             Firm-level collaboration network tie (e.g. strategic alliances, joint ventures) 
Notes 
1. Firm A and Firm B are tied in both the firm-level collaboration network and 
the firm-level knowledge network 
2. Firm A and Firm C are tied in only the firm-level knowledge network 
3. Firm A and Firm D are tied in only the firm-level collaboration network 
4. Firm B and Firm D are tied in neither the firm-level collaboration network 
nor the firm-level knowledge network 
5. Firm B and Firm C are tied in both the firm-level collaboration network and 
the firm-level knowledge network 
6. Firm C and Firm D are tied only in the firm-level knowledge network 
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Technology-driven firms often seek coopetition to gain knowledge access and the 
opportunity to develop innovation competency (Gnyawali & Park, 2011; Hamel et al., 
1989), hence firm coopetition pursuit is often coupled with the concurrent embeddedness 
in the firm-level collaboration network and knowledge network. Therefore, when 
investigating the contextual factors that influence the strategic impact of coopetition on 
firm innovation, it is critical to examine both types of firm-level network embeddedness. 
Due to a dearth of network pluralism conceptualization in coopetition research, the 
knowledge gap remains unbridged with regard to the contextual moderators that alter the 
impacts of coopetition on firm innovation. 
To fill the knowledge gap, I develop a contingency model to unpack the interactions 
between coopetition and pluralistic network embeddedness. Specifically, I conceptualize 
the moderation effects of centrality and structural hole spanning of firm positions in two 
types of firm-level networks, collaboration network and knowledge network. I test my 
hypotheses in a panel data set constructed from the longitudinal records of public 
technology-driven firms in the US in 1990 - 2008.  
The study makes the following contributions to extant management literature. First, 
adopting the theoretical lens of organization network embeddedness, I clarify the 
environmental conditions under which coopetition can be beneficial or detrimental to firm 
innovation. In doing so, the resulted insights bring us closer to resolving the debate on the 
strategic impact of coopetition on technology-driven firms (e.g. Gnyawali, Madhavan, He, 
& Bengtsson, 2014; Park et al., 2014). Second, I contribute to burgeoning research on 
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network pluralism, answering the call for scholarly attention to the phenomenon in which 
firms experience different network-based constraints, when they maintain different types 
of ties with external entities (e.g. Guan & Liu, 2016; Shipilov et al., 2014).  
Honing in on technology-driven firms, I synthesize the salient insights from inter-
firm collaboration network and knowledge network research (e.g. Phelps et al., 2012; 
Ranganathan & Rosenkopf, 2014; Schilling & Phelps, 2007; Wang, Rodan, Fruin, & Xu, 
2014), and apply them in the context where learning opportunity and competitive tension 
intertwine to influence firm strategy formulation (i.e. coopetition pursuit). Finally, my 
analysis provides conceptual rationale and empirical supports for the implementation of 
network positioning and knowledge search strategies for firms aiming to gain innovation 
competency from their competitors (Hamel et al., 1989). 
 
4.3 THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
4.3.1 Coopetition and Firm Innovation 
In technology-driven industries, firm innovation constitutes a critical dimension of 
competitive advantage. Firms leverage internal resources, capabilities, and external 
relationships with competitors and complementors to gain competencies, including 
innovation performances (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Hitt, Dacin, Levitas, Arregle, & Borza, 
2000; Lado et al., 1997; Srivastava & Gnyawali, 2011). Cooperation between competitors, 
or coopetition, is an important inter-firm strategy by which technology-driven firms gain 
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innovative competence (Chen & Miller, 2015; Hamel et al., 1989; Lado et al., 1997). Firms 
competing in the same industry likely demonstrate similarities in their general resources 
and capabilities, because competitors offer similar products and services in the downstream 
market and rely on a common set of general strategic factors in the upstream market (Chen 
& Miller, 2015; Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Grimpe & Hussinger, 2013). 
For example, competitors in technology-driven industries make similar 
technological investments, recruit experts with similar technological and scientific 
backgrounds, and conduct similar knowledge application processes during product 
innovation (Browning, Beyer, & Shetler, 1995; Mowery, Oxley, & Silverman, 1998; Sears 
& Hoetker, 2014). On the other hand, technology-driven industries often display high 
diversity in the details of technological specifications in their products, and a high degree 
of variations in customer preferences (Davis, Eisenhardt, & Bingham, 2009). Therefore, 
on the nuanced level of technological product specificities, firms become specialized in 
distinct knowledge domains and cater to disparate demand niches (Haeussler, Patzelt, & 
Zahra, 2012). 
Stated differently, inter-firm similarities in general strategic factors and distinctions 
in specialized knowledge domains provide high complementarities in the resources and 
capabilities between competitors in technology-driven industries. Therefore, competitors 
can effectively create and capture syncretic rents by sharing, integrating, and recombining 
their complementary resources and capabilities (Lado et al., 1997). For example, when 
competitors collaborate to conduct innovation, they may overcome the steep learning 
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curves in technological investment more efficiently, yielding enhancement to subsequent 
innovation performances (Hamel et al., 1989; Irwin & Klenow, 1996; Jain, 2013).  
However, the effectiveness of coopetition in enhancing firm innovation is limited 
by competitive tension (Ang, 2008; Wu, 2012). Extant literature elucidates the inherent 
danger of learning races between competing firms in the technology-driven industries 
(Yang et al., 2015). A learning race occurs when the trajectories of firm technological 
development become highly visible amongst competitors (Yang et al., 2015). When firms 
engage in coopetition, they gain intimate access to the tacit knowledge associated with their 
opponents’ technological development process (Alexy, George, & Salter, 2013; Mowery, 
Oxley, & Silverman, 1996). Therefore, coopetition increases the visibility of technological 
development trajectories of competing firms, leading to augmented threats of learning 
races between firms. Extant literature establishes the negative impacts of learning races on 
subsequent firm innovation performances (Yang et al., 2015).  
Furthermore, direct knowledge access to competitors’ technological investments 
increase competitive tension (Pahnke, Katila, & Eisenhardt, 2015). For example, 
incumbents aspire to maintain technological dominance in the industry, while entrants 
attempt to dethrone the leaders in the competitive field. When an incumbent gains direct 
knowledge access to the technological investments of the entrants through coopetition, the 
incumbent may misappropriate the knowledge access and elicit direct attacks on the 
entrants to preempt potential technological disruption (Ansari & Krop, 2012; Hill & 
Rothaermel, 2003; Tripsas, 1997). Therefore, coopetition may elicit competitive attacks on 
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potential disruptors of the technological status quo, yielding an overall negative effect on 
firm innovation performance (Park & Russo, 1996). It remains debatable under what 
conditions firms gain enhancements or suffer diminutions in their innovation performances 
when they pursue coopetition with other firms in the same industry, a knowledge gap I 
target to fill in the following analysis. 
Baseline. Coopetition pursuit can yield beneficial or detrimental impacts on firm 
innovation performance. 
4.3.2 Collaboration Network and Coopetition 
Innovation is vital for technology-driven firms. Operating in a fast-paced environment, a 
technology-driven firm must continuously learn and renew its innovation competency to 
remain competitive (Sosa, 2011; Tripsas, 1997). Coopetition represents a critical strategy 
to access valuable knowledge from competitors in the same industry (Hamel, 1991; Hamel 
et al., 1989). In addition, firms often pursue collaboration with complementary firms to 
jointly create added value, including partnerships with suppliers, buyers, and horizontal 
complementors in related technological industries (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Grimpe & 
Hussinger, 2013; Makri, Hitt, & Lane, 2010). The position of a focal technology-driven 
firm in a firm-level collaboration network can exert non-trivial effects upon the direct 
impacts of coopetition pursuit on firm innovation. 
In a collaboration network, inter-firm ties represent formal partnerships, for 
example, strategic alliances, joint ventures, participation in technological setting 
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committees, and R&D consortia (Schilling, 2015). Collaboration network ties function as 
the conduits for resource flows between the nodes (i.e. firms), such as complementary 
assets, social capital, and information (Gnyawali & Madhavan, 2001; Khanna, Gulati, & 
Nohria, 1998a). For example, strategic alliances provide a focal firm with access to the 
firm resources, business relations, and tacit knowledge of its partners (Kogut & Zander, 
1993; Mowery et al., 1996). Therefore, a firm’s connectivity in the collaboration network 
is instrumental to its abilities to acquire and direct external resources, which can alter how 
coopetition influences the innovation performance of technology-driven firms (Gnyawali 
& Madhavan, 2001; Srivastava & Gnyawali, 2011).  
When considering the contextual effects of network connectivity, two approaches 
are commonly applied to investigate firm network positions, namely, the whole-network 
approach that examines the ties amongst all firms embedded in the same network, and the 
ego-network approach that zeros in on the local community of the focal firm (Kilduff & 
Brass, 2010). I tease out the contingency effects of whole-network betweenness centrality 
and ego-network structural hole spanning, which capture a firm’s collaboration network 
connectivity and thus reflect how the focal firm may be influenced by the opportunities 
and threats associated with coopetition. 
Whole-network betweenness. Betweenness centrality captures the probability of a 
focal network node standing in the shortest paths linking two distal entities in the whole 
network (Freeman, 1977, 1978). Conceptually, whole-network betweenness indicates a 
focal firm’s role in relaying total network resource flows, including those circulating 
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amongst the firm’s direct collaboration partners, and the resources indirectly accessed from 
distal collaboration network participants (Freeman, 1978). When the focal firm occupies a 
collaboration network position with high betweenness, it is likely to gain power in 
determining what resources are mobilized in the whole network, and how these resource 
flows are directed (Freeman, 1977, 1978). For example, a firm occupying a whole-network 
bridging position may selectively reveal knowledge from one entity to another (Alexy et 
al., 2013), or act as the gatekeeper for knowledge and complementary asset influx from 
distal technological domains (Gilsing, Nooteboom, Vanhaverbeke, Duysters, & van den 
Oord, 2008; Schilling & Fang, 2014). 
Therefore, a firm with high whole-network betweenness in a collaboration network 
can exert more power over a larger set of network entities, compared to the firms with low 
whole-network betweenness scores (Freeman, 1978). Therefore, the focal firm is less likely 
to experience attacks from competitors who participate in the same network due to a 
deterrent effect from the firm’s elevated power (Chen, 1996; Gnyawali & Madhavan, 
2001). Furthermore, when a firm gains control over network resource flows, it is more 
likely to become the technological leader in the industry, because the focal firm can 
determine the industry-level technological trajectories by manipulating information and 
asset mobilization in the inter-firm collaboration network (Gilsing et al., 2008; Schilling & 
Phelps, 2007; Stephenson & Zelen, 1989). Since challenging the technological leader in a 
given industry often incurs great costs and may lead to firm demise (e.g. Aghion & Howitt, 
1992; Tripsas, 1997), competitors are less likely to elicit competitive attacks on firms with 
high collaboration network connectivity. 
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Potential competitive attacks, for example, learning race, information 
misappropriation, and unwarranted imitation, underpin a main constraint for the 
effectiveness of coopetition as a strategy to enhance firm innovation (Chen & Miller, 2015; 
Lado et al., 1997). When a firm occupies a collaboration network position with high whole-
network betweenness, it is protected from the potential detrimental impact of competitive 
attacks, and thus more likely to gain innovation competence from coopetition pursuit. I 
thus hypothesize a positive moderation effect of whole-network betweenness in an inter-
firm collaboration network on the relationship between coopetition pursuit and innovation 
performance of technology-driven firms. 
Hypothesis 1. Collaboration network betweenness positively moderates the 
baseline effect of firm coopetition pursuit on innovation performance, such that a 
focal firm with higher betweenness is more likely to benefit from coopetition and 
less likely to be harmed. 
 Ego-network structural hole spanning. As argued above, the connectivity of a 
focal firm in the whole network increases the potential benefits and decreases the potential 
detriments from coopetition on firm innovation (i.e. the baseline effect). This begs the 
question: how does local network connectivity of the firm alter this baseline effect? Prior 
studies demonstrate that a given node may display different degrees of connectivity in the 
local network (i.e. ego network) and in the whole network (e.g. see Kilduff & Brass, 2010 
for a comprehensive review). Compared to a firm that bridges distal network constituents 
and gains control of the total network flows (i.e. a firm with high whole-network 
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betweenness), a firm who is well-connected to its direct partners in the local collaboration 
network may experience different network dynamics. A structural hole refers to an ego 
network position that insulates the network flows between either side of the hole (Burt, 
1992). When a firm spans a structural hole in its local collaboration network, it may serve 
as the resource broker and coordinator amongst these disconnected partners (Burt, 2004). 
A structural hole spanning firm in a local collaboration network is likely to 
experience elevated coordination costs in order to maintain a stable local community 
(Bizzi, 2013; Shipilov & Li, 2008). For example, when a conflict of interests emerges 
between two collaborators of a focal firm, it must strategize to reestablish a social balance 
between these firms. Since it is more likely for disjointed firms to disagree (e.g. when two 
firms do not maintain a direct partnership, there is less constraint for them to act in 
coherence), the structural hole spanning firms often experience a higher frequency of such 
conflicts in a given local collaboration community. In other words, a position that spans a 
large number of ego network structural holes entails high coordination costs for the focal 
firm, because it becomes increasingly more difficult to achieve private and public values 
in a given local collaboration network as the number of disjointed partners increases (Bizzi, 
2013; Tatarynowicz, Sytch, & Gulati, 2015; Wang, 2016). 
Arguably, the local network coordinator may gain benefits by strategically 
brokering network flows to achieve private value gain (Schilling & Fang, 2014; Wal et al., 
2016). However, exploiting network resources in its own advantage injects more instability 
in the focal firm’s ego network, especially when such actions are visible to the firm’s direct 
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partners (Bizzi, 2013; Xiao & Tsui, 2007). When a firm strategically manipulates network 
resource flows, such as by relaying knowledge leakage from one direct partner to another 
(Pahnke, McDonald, Wang, & Hallen, 2015), it may benefit from such maneuvers in the 
short-run. Over time, the disadvantageous partners may elicit competitive attacks, and send 
negative signals to other network constituents. Consequently, the private value obtained by 
the focal firm will wear away in the long-run. 
When firms engage in coopetition, a major constraint derives from the necessity to 
coordinate inter-firm power imbalance and manage competitive tension (Chen & Miller, 
2012, 2015; Gnyawali & Madhavan, 2001). A structural hole spanning firm bears high 
coordination costs in its local collaboration network, which leaves it with reduced 
capacities to maintain a power balance and keep competitive tension at bay amongst 
competitors from its coopetition pursuits. As a result, the potential benefits from 
coopetition will diminish, and the potential detriments, such as those stemming from 
competitive attacks, will be more tangible.  
Hypothesis 2. Collaboration network structural hole spanning negatively 
moderates the baseline effect of firm coopetition pursuit on innovation 
performance, such that a focal firm who spans more local structural holes is less 
likely to benefit from coopetition and more likely to be harmed. 
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4.3.3 Knowledge Network and Coopetition 
In technology-driven industries, firms search in the public knowledge domain to acquire 
knowledge elements for product innovation (Fleming & Sorenson, 2001; Guan & Liu, 
2016; Henderson, Jaffe, & Trajtenberg, 2005). For example, firms conduct searches in 
scientific publications, trade journals, market reports, and technological patents to absorb 
knowledge from these sources. As firms innovate and create novel knowledge, they 
concurrently make contributions to the public knowledge domain. For instance, when firms 
file for patents to protect intellectual property rights, they are legally required to disclose 
the proprietary knowledge of the technological inventions. If the patents are issued, then 
the information in the patent documents (e.g. patent description, technological claims, and 
drawings) is integrated into public knowledge domain. 
For technology-driven firms, patents invented by external entities (e.g. firms, 
universities, and individuals) constitute a major knowledge source for their technological 
innovation (Fleming & Sorenson, 2001, 2004). Therefore, it is common for technology-
driven firms to utilize the published patents invented by other firms and integrate relevant 
knowledge elements in its own innovation process. A focal firm may absorb codified 
knowledge independently by conducting searches in the public knowledge domain, since 
the patents invented by other firms become public information once they are published 
(Fleming & Sorenson, 2004; Guan & Liu, 2016). 
Technology-driven firms often conduct innovation based on the existing inventions 
in proximal technological domains (Henderson et al., 2005). For example, firms may utilize 
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the aggregated knowledge of prior technological inventions in the industry to inform their 
technological investments, so that their innovation is aligned with the industrial 
technological trends (Bhaskarabhatla & Hegde, 2014; Fleming & Sorenson, 2004; 
Sorenson, Rivkin, & Fleming, 2006). Alternatively, firms pursue imperfect imitation of the 
existing inventions by their competitors as a mechanism of incremental innovation (Posen, 
Lee, & Yi, 2013). Such openness of knowledge exchange in firm innovation leads to 
interdependencies between firm knowledge bases (Bhaskarabhatla & Hegde, 2014).  
On the one hand, the knowledge base of a focal firm exerts influences on the 
technological innovation of other firms who draw knowledge elements from the focal firm 
knowledge bases. On the other hand, when the focal firm acquires knowledge elements 
from the knowledge bases of other firms, and assimilates these external knowledge 
elements in subsequent inventions, the technological overlaps between these firms increase 
as a result. A knowledge network depicts the inter-connectivity amongst firm knowledge 
bases, and thus reflects the interdependencies of firm knowledge bases (Guan & Liu, 2016; 
Wang et al., 2014). When firms draw knowledge elements inward from the knowledge 
bases of other firms, and when they contribute knowledge elements outward, these firms 
become embedded in a knowledge network (Phelps et al., 2012). Specifically, when a focal 
firm utilizes the knowledge elements generated by another firm in its product innovation, 
these two firms form a knowledge network tie; when a focal firm’s knowledge elements 
are incorporated into another firm’s product innovation, these two firms form a knowledge 
network tie (Guan & Liu, 2016; Wang et al., 2014).  
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Extant studies demonstrate that the structural characteristics of firm positions in a 
knowledge network reflect their knowledge influences and technological overlaps with 
other knowledge network constituents (Phelps et al., 2012). A key mechanism to benefit 
from coopetition lies in knowledge access from competitors, and the flip side is knowledge 
leakage that gives rise to potential harms (Hamel, 1991; Hamel et al., 1989). Therefore, it 
is important to consider the knowledge influence of a focal firm, and its technological 
overlaps with external entities when examining the impacts of coopetition on firm 
innovation.  
Knowledge network centrality. The centrality of a firm in the knowledge network 
captures its knowledge influence. Knowledge network ties conduct knowledge influences 
cascading from a centrally positioned firm to a peripheral firm (Ranganathan & Rosenkopf, 
2014; Wang et al., 2014). A centrally positioned firm (i.e. high knowledge network 
centrality) with robust knowledge network ties is able to exert high knowledge influences 
on a large number of network constituents, both directly and indirectly (e.g. Battke, 
Schmidt, Stollenwerk, & Hoffmann, 2016; Ranganathan & Rosenkopf, 2014; Wang et al., 
2014). 
When a focal firm’s knowledge base serves as the source of codified knowledge 
from which other technology-driven firms draw information during their innovation 
processes, the focal firm exerts direct knowledge influences on these innovation followers. 
As the innovation followers integrate elements from the focal firm’s knowledge base and 
innovate, they often create inventions that trace along the focal firm’s innovation footsteps, 
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culminating to the industry- or sector-wide technological trajectories (Dosi, 1982; Mani & 
Nandkumar, 2016; Teece, 2008). Concurrently, the innovation followers contribute to the 
public knowledge domain, spreading the knowledge influence from the focal firm to even 
more technology-driven firms, and thus reinforcing the technological trajectories initially 
shaped by the focal firm’s innovation (e.g. Mani & Nandkumar, 2016).  
Worded differently, a firm with high centrality in the knowledge network controls 
a prominent and influential knowledge base that can impact the innovation directions and 
outcomes of a large number of external firms in a proximal innovation space (e.g. operating 
in the same or related industries). Effectively, the more centrally a firm is positioned in the 
knowledge network, the more power it wields over how industry-wide technological 
standards are established, maintained, or modified (e.g. Ranganathan & Rosenkopf, 2014). 
Incumbent firms in the same industry often gain competitive advantage by reinforcing and 
adhering to extant technological standards (i.e. the status quo), they are thus motivated to 
guard against competitive attacks that may challenge and undermine the status quo (Adner 
& Kapoor, 2015; Jiang et al., 2011).  
Potential competitive attacks from those who are familiar with the focal firm’s core 
competence underpin major threats from coopetition, and post hefty limitations on learning 
opportunities from competitors during coopetition (Chen & Miller, 2015). When pursuing 
coopetition, a focal firm with high knowledge influence is effectively protected by its 
technological followers whose innovations trace along the same technological trajectories 
from the detrimental effects of competitive attacks, because it is in the technological 
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followers’ interests to eliminate threats to the extant technological standards (Leiponen, 
2008; Ranganathan & Rosenkopf, 2014). In addition, the firm with high knowledge 
influence gains an advantage in learning from the coopetition partners, because the focal 
firm can exercise control over the industry-wide technological standards, which reduces 
the uncertainty in any exploratory activities such as firm learning (Leiponen, 2008). 
Therefore, a firm with high knowledge network centrality can better select and absorb a 
coopetition partner’s novel knowledge that will reinforce its innovation competence and 
the industry status quo. Thus, knowledge network centrality can enhance the potential 
benefits and mitigate the potential detriments from coopetition for technology-driven 
firms. 
Hypothesis 3. Knowledge network centrality positively moderates the baseline 
effect of firm coopetition pursuit on innovation performance, such that a focal firm 
with higher centrality is more likely to benefit from coopetition and less likely to be 
harmed. 
Knowledge network structural hole spanning. In a firm-level knowledge network, 
the ties between two firms represent the connections between their knowledge bases 
(Phelps et al., 2012). When two firms have knowledge bases that are highly overlapped in 
multiple technological domains, they will have a strong tie in the firm-level knowledge 
network (Guan & Liu, 2016; Wang et al., 2014). In the local knowledge network of a focal 
firm (i.e. the ego network), the direct alters represent knowledge bases that are in the 
proximal technological domains relative to the focal firm’s core innovation competence. 
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To the contrary, a disconnection in the local knowledge network (i.e. a knowledge network 
structural hole) reflects a cross-domain knowledge gap (Burt, 2004). When a firm spans 
knowledge network structural holes, it bridges the cross-domain knowledge gaps as its 
knowledge base demonstrate technological overlaps with a multitude of disjointed external 
firm knowledge bases (e.g. Guan & Liu, 2016). 
When a technology-driven firm spans structural holes in the knowledge network, it 
is likely to gain experience in combining and utilizing external knowledge elements (i.e. 
boundary-spanning knowledge recombination) in its innovation process (Burt, 2004). As a 
firm accumulates more experiences in boundary-spanning knowledge recombination, it 
will gain higher knowledge absorptive capacities, so that the focal firm becomes 
increasingly capable in absorbing and assimilating external knowledge (Reagans, Mcevily, 
Reagan, & Mcevily, 2003). 
In other words, a firm that spans more structural holes in the knowledge network 
can develop higher absorptive capacities, which lend strengths to the focal firm to benefit 
from the learning opportunities in coopetition (Lane & Lubatkin, 1998; Ritala & 
Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 2013). Coopetition provides innovation-enhancing knowledge 
access to technology-driven firms that can effectively absorb and assimilate competitors’ 
technological competencies (Irwin & Klenow, 1996; Roy & Sarkar, 2016). Competitors in 
the same technological industry can achieve higher R&D efficiency in collaboration if they 
can effectively integrate the knowledge elements in their opponents’ technological 
competence bases (Zahra & George, 2002).  
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Therefore, if a technology-driven firm is capable of absorbing the knowledge 
elements in its competitors’ technological competence bases, then the focal firm will likely 
gain high economic returns to its innovation as it benefits from the innovation-enhancing 
effects of coopetition (Grindley, Mowery & Silverman, 1994; Hamel et al., 1989). When a 
focal firm spans multiple knowledge network structural holes, it develops substantial 
absorptive capacities in assimilating and recombining disjointed external knowledge (Burt, 
2004; Lane, Koka, & Pathak, 2006). As a result, structural hole spanning in the knowledge 
network augments the effects of innovation-enhancing knowledge access from coopetition, 
thus increasing the potential positive impacts of coopetition on the economic values of firm 
innovation. 
Furthermore, high absorptive capacities effectively protect the focal firm from 
potential learning race threats in coopetition. When two firms demonstrate asymmetric 
learning capabilities in a partnership, the firm with higher learning capabilities has more 
competitive advantages (Yang et al., 2015). In coopetition, when the focal firm develops 
high absorptive capacities to integrate external knowledge, it is more likely to come out on 
top if the coopetition partner elicits a learning race (Lane & Lubatkin, 1998; Yang et al., 
2015). Therefore, a firm in the knowledge network position that spans structural holes will 
potentially experience less negative effects from coopetition. 
Hypothesis 4. Knowledge network structural hole spanning positively moderates 
the baseline effect of firm coopetition pursuit on innovation performance, such that 
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a focal firm that spans more knowledge network structural holes is more likely to 
benefit from coopetition and less likely to be harmed. 
In the following section, I test the moderation effect hypotheses in several 
technology-driven industries in the US. My dataset encompasses six industries with high 
technological intensities, as identified by the National Science Foundation. Taken together, 
the moderation effects constitute a contingency model of coopetition, collaboration 
network, knowledge network, and firm innovation. Figure 4.2 provides an illustration for 
the contingency model developed thus far. 
 
Figure 4.2 Contingency Model of Collaboration and Knowledge Network 
Embeddedness, Coopetition Pursuit, and Firm Innovation 
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4.4 METHODOLOGY 
4.4.1 Empirical Setting 
I test my hypotheses in a panel data set constructed from the longitudinal records of public 
firms in six technology-driven industrial sectors in the US that are identified by the 
National Science Foundation as featuring high technological intensities, namely, 
pharmaceuticals (SIC 2833-2836), computers and peripheral equipment (SIC 3571-3579), 
electronics and electronic components (SIC 3671-3679), aerospace and aircraft (SIC 3721-
3769), telecommunications (SIC 4812-4813, 4822, 4899), and medical devices (SIC 3841-
3845). Industries with high technological intensities demonstrate a fast pace of innovation 
progress and steep learning curves (Jain, 2013), therefore, firms will likely rely on inter-
firm relations with competitors for innovation.  
In addition, prior studies report that firm structural attributes in a collaboration network 
and a knowledge network significantly impact technology-driven firms (Wang et al., 
2014). Thus, industries with high technological intensities constitute a fitting empirical 
setting to unpack the interactions between coopetition and the structural attributes of 
collaboration and knowledge network on firm innovation. The quantitative analysis 
encompasses multiple technology-driven industrial sectors to increase the generalizability 
of my findings. I choose an observation period of 1990 - 2008 to ensure reliable 
longitudinal data from 1990, and to avoid the confounding effects from a major exogenous 
shock in 2008 (i.e. subprime mortgage financial crisis), so that the validity of the empirical 
analysis is reinforced. 
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4.4.2 Data and Sample 
I combine several data sources to construct the panel data set in this study. First, I collect 
merger and acquisition (M&A) records, strategic alliances, and joint ventures from 
Thomson Reuter’s SDC Platinum database, which represents the industry standard for 
corporate relation records (Schilling, 2009). Second, I combine, compare, and corroborate 
the NBER patent data (Bessen, 2009; Hall, Jaffe, & Trajtenberg, 2001) and firm-level 
patent records of public US firms created and published by Kogan et al. (2015). Third, I 
extract firm annual financial records of the focal firms in my sample (i.e. US public firms) 
from Standard & Poor’s COMPUSTAT database. 
I merge and pool the records to the firm-year level. The final panel data set includes 
362 unique firms, after list-wise deletion of entries with incomplete records spanning an 
observation period of at least two years (i.e. complete records for at least two years are 
required to implement the lagged data structure), and 1217 firm-year observations (i.e. an 
unbalanced panel since certain firms entered and exited the industries over the overall 
observational period 1990 – 2008). 
4.4.3 Variable Description 
Firm innovation economic value. My theoretical development elucidates the economic 
value of firm technological inventions as the metric for innovation performance. 
Specifically, the dependent variable captures the economic impacts of patent issues that are 
private to the innovating firms in subsequent econometrics analysis. I operationalize firm 
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innovation economic value using the aggregated economic values of the patents invented 
by a focal firm in a given patent application year (Kogan, Papanikolaou, Seru, & Stoffman, 
2015). Specifically, Kogan et al. (2015) construct a patent-level measure for the economic 
values of innovation using firm stock price disturbances manifested uniquely as the result 
patent issuance: 
 
Equation 4.1 
ξ is the economic value of patent j, constructed from multiplying firm stock return after 
patent issuance and the market capitalization M of the patent assignee on the day before 
patent issuance is announced; the patent-level metric is then aggregated to the firm-year 
level, and adjusted to by firm sizes, where Bft denotes book assets of firm f in year t, and 
θft denotes the aggregated and size-adjusted firm innovation economic value (i.e. the 
dependent variable used in the econometrics analysis here): 
 
Equation 4.2 
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Equation 4.3 
 
Coopetition pursuit. The independent variable coopetition pursuit is 
operationalized by the annual count of merger & acquisition (M&A), in which the acquirers 
and the targets operate in the same industry, defined by their primary 4-digit Standard 
Industry Codes (i.e. SIC). The 4-digit SIC represents the most granular level of the 
industrial classification scheme. The SIC classification reflects the product and service 
characteristics, and it has been found to be highly relevant for technology-driven sectors 
(Katila, Rosenberger, & Eisenhardt, 2008; Lavie, 2007). Since my empirical context 
encompasses industries with high technological intensities, SIC classification at the 4-digit 
level provides an accurate, longitudinal proxy for product-based competition between 
firms.  
In technology-driven industries, horizontal cooperation between firms in the same 
industry often lead to full integration (e.g. M&A) (Makri et al., 2010; Sears & Hoetker, 
2014). Therefore, M&A within the same industry constitutes a conservative proxy for 
coopetition (i.e. cooperation between competitors that result in full integration). One may 
consider an alternative proxy for coopetition pursuit, which is strategic alliances between 
competitors. Since the collaboration network in my analysis is constructed from strategic 
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alliance records, I use M&A records as the proxy for coopetition pursuit to reduce 
endogeneity and common method bias issues in the analysis. 
Collaboration network construction and variables. The collaboration network of 
firms is constructed from the alliance records in the SDC Platinum database. Extant studies 
suggest the average longevity of inter-firm alliances and joint ventures in the US 
technology-driven industries to be 5 years (Dovev Lavie & Drori, 2011; Schilling, 2015; 
Schilling & Phelps, 2007), therefore, I pool all alliances and joint ventures recorded 
annually in SDC Platinum in the observation period using a 5-year moving window to 
construct the collaboration network. Specifically, I follow the common operationalization 
of network construction: if two firms have at least 1 alliance or joint venture record(s) from 
years t-4 to t, then these firms have a collaboration network tie in year t, and the tie strength 
is reflected in the number of records within the time window.  
I use the construct collaboration network betweenness to describe how well a firm 
can connect other partners, such that it can receive and control the network flows (e.g. 
information, knowledge, and resources) between multiple, distal collaboration network 
actors. I use Freeman's betweenness centrality score to operationalize collaboration 
network betweenness to capture network hub occupancy of the firms (Freeman, 1977; 
Gilsing et al., 2008). Freeman betweenness measures the probability of a given node 
occurring on a geodesic (i.e. the shortest path between two other network nodes) in the 
whole network (Freeman, 1977, 1978): 
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Equation 4.4 
where σst is the total number of geodesics connecting nodes s and t, and σst(v) is the 
number of those geodesics that intersect with node v. 
In my conceptual development, collaboration structural hole spanning reflects a 
firm’s role in spanning the gaps between multiple collaboration partners that are otherwise 
disconnected. Burt's constraint measure is essentially a metric that captures how much 
social capital a given firm invests in the other network entities who are invested in the 
partners of the focal firm (Burt, 1992). Burt’s constraint is commonly used as the proxy for 
structural holes in organizational network studies that investigate the impact of boundary-
spanning network positions (Ahuja, 2000a; Burt, 1992; Wal et al., 2016). Therefore, I 
operationalize collaboration structural hole spanning by subtracting Burt's constraint 
measure from a constant,1, congruent with the common practice in the organizational 
network literature (Burt, 2004): 
 
Equation 4.5 
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where cij denotes the dyadic constraint between node i and node j. The dyadic constraints 
of i are summed to give the following: 
 
Equation 4.6 
 
and the structural hole spanning of firm i, Si, is given in: 
Si = 1 – Ci 
Equation 4.7 
 
Knowledge network construction and variables. The knowledge network is 
constructed from firm patent stock records from the USPTO. Specifically, I invest the 
overlaps in firm knowledge bases, therefore, I operationalize knowledge network ties as 
co-classification between patents from two firms in the same technological classes within 
the same patent application year (Guan & Liu, 2016; Wang et al., 2014). Since the 
knowledge bases of technology-driven firms are dynamic with a high pace of changes in 
the technological trajectories (Dovev Lavie, 2006), I analyze knowledge network 
embeddedness in a yearly basis. Specifically, I operationalize inter-firm knowledge 
network following the convention in the existing literature by counting the numbers of 
patent co-classifications in the same USPTO technological classes in a given patent 
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application year (Guan & Liu, 2016). Due to varied time lags between patent filing and 
issue, I chose patent application years to closely approximate the time at which knowledge 
elements are generated to account for the potential noise caused by expedited or delayed 
patenting processes (Henderson et al., 2005).  
I use eigenvector centrality to reflect the knowledge network centrality of firms to 
capture knowledge influences. Eigenvector centrality accounts for the number of ties in a 
network and the influences of the connected actors (Bonacich, 1987, 2007). Thus, 
eigenvector centrality provides a more accurate measure of the influences of a network 
node than alternative measures, such as degree centrality (Bonacich, 2007). In a given 
network graph G := (V, E) with a number of nodes |V|, define the adjacency matrix of 
network nodes as A = (av,t); then the eigenvector centrality score of node v is defined as: 
 
Equation 4.8 
where M(v) is the set of neighbors of node v, and λ is a constant. Eigenvector is given in 
the following equation: 
 
Equation 4.9 
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Technological overlaps are reflected in the knowledge structural hole spanning. 
Similar to the operationalization of collaboration structural hole spanning, I calculate 
Burt’s constraint measures of firm knowledge bases in the knowledge network and subtract 
the scores from a constant 1 to construct the independent variable knowledge structural 
hole spanning. This operationalization is congruent with existing practice in the knowledge 
network literature (C. Wang et al., 2014). This measure captures the extent to which a 
knowledge network position spans across disconnected technological competence bases of 
different innovating firms (i.e. technological overlaps between the focal firm and other 
innovation firms), which reflect the focal firm’s cross-boundary knowledge recombination 
potential. 
4.4.4 Econometric Model Specification 
I fit my data to a linear ordinary least square (OLS) model to test the hypotheses. The model 
is specified as a panel data model on the firm-year level with firm- and time-variant errors. 
To reduce simultaneity issues, a 1-year time lag is implemented in the independent 
variables. Specifically, the observations of firm predictors in year t-1 are correlated with 
those of firm outcomes in year t. Year fixed effects are included to reduce time-specific 
endogeneity issues. The econometrics model is specified in the equation below. 
𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑉𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁_𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 +  𝛽2𝐶𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝑗 + 𝑣𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 
Equation 4.10 
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A vector Cijt-1 of control variables is included in the regression model, namely, firm 
size (i.e. employee number, total asset), resource thickness (i.e. cash, intangible asset), and 
financial health (i.e. capital expenditure, R&D expense, operation expense, advertising 
expense) to reduce firm-specific endogeneity issues. These variables may cause potential 
confounding effects on firm innovation performance, as elucidated by studies in the 
existing literature (Bhaskarabhatla & Hegde, 2014). The vector Xijt-1 represents the key 
independent variables and the interaction terms. 𝛽0 is a constant that represents the 
intercept of the regression model. 𝛽1 is a vector of coefficients that reflect the correlations 
between predictors, interaction terms and the outcomes. 𝛽2 is a vector of coefficients that 
reflect the correlations between the control variables and the outcomes. 𝛼𝑗 represents the 
industry fixed effects, 𝑣𝑡 represents the year-fixed effects, and 𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 represents the firm- 
and time-variant errors. All coefficient parameters are estimated with robust standard errors 
that are clustered at the firm level to account for heteroscedasticity and correlated 
disturbance terms at the firm level (Greene, 2003; White, 1980). 
 
4.5 RESULTS 
Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 below show the summary statistics and Pearson correlation 
coefficients. With the exclusion of the control variables, no independent variable 
demonstrates a variance inflation factor (VIF) greater than 2 (i.e. ranging from 1.06 to 1.83, 
and the full model shows a mean VIF of 6.42. The VIFs of the key independent variables 
and the mean VIF of the full model are well below the recommended threshold VIF (i.e. 
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10), multicollinearity in the data set is unlikely a concern in my analysis (Greene, 2003). 
The pairwise correlation coefficients of the independent variables are well below 0.5, 
which further show that analysis of the data set is unlikely to be plagued by 
multicollinearity.  
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Table 4.1 Summary Statistics of Controls, Independent, and Dependent Variables 
 
 
 
 
Variable Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
1. Innovation 
performance 1217 6.570E-10 1.00 -0.31 18.28 
2. Total asset 1217 7.283 2.21 1.89 12.53 
3. Capital expenditure 1217 4.303 2.29 0.00 9.92 
4. Cash 1217 5.005 2.05 0.00 9.68 
5. Firm size 1217 1.913 1.52 0.01 5.74 
6. Intangible asset 1217 4.352 2.93 0.00 11.82 
7. Advertisement 
expense 1217 2.442 2.09 0.00 8.16 
8. Operation expense 1217 6.686 2.15 0.99 11.30 
9. R&D expense 1217 4.722 1.91 0.22 9.41 
10. Coopetition 
pursuit 1217 1.430E-08 1.00 -0.92 7.04 
11. Collaboration 
network betweenness 
centrality 1217 1.820E-09 1.00 -0.45 6.40 
12. Collaboration 
network structural 
hole 1217 1.200E-08 1.00 -2.04 1.11 
13. Knowledge 
network eigenvector 
centrality 1217 1.520E-10 1.00 -0.34 8.46 
14. Knowledge 
network structural 
hole 1217 1.060E-09 1.00 -7.99 1.85 
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Table 4.2 Pearson Correlation Coefficients 
Note: Correlations larger than |.066| are significant at p < .05, and those larger than |.088| are significant at p < .01. 
 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1. Innovation 
performance 1.000                           
2. Total asset 0.361 1.000                         
3. Capital 
expenditure 0.370 0.947 1.000                       
4. Cash 0.360 0.886 0.818 1.000                     
5. Firm size 0.376 0.909 0.896 0.780 1.000                   
6. Intangible asset 0.213 0.756 0.658 0.620 0.675 1.000                 
7. Advertisement 
expense 0.437 0.595 0.599 0.584 0.541 0.418 1.000               
8. Operation expense 0.362 0.964 0.921 0.857 0.935 0.710 0.575 1.000             
9. R&D expense 0.430 0.833 0.762 0.819 0.753 0.616 0.551 0.822 1.000           
10. Coopetition 
pursuit 0.190 0.249 0.249 0.221 0.211 0.194 0.205 0.219 0.207 1.000         
11. Collaboration 
network betweenness 
centrality 0.511 0.399 0.399 0.384 0.423 0.225 0.464 0.399 0.480 0.167 1.000       
12. Collaboration 
network structural 
hole 0.239 0.414 0.410 0.373 0.385 0.203 0.307 0.407 0.435 0.102 0.433 1.000     
13. Knowledge 
network eigenvector 
centrality 0.347 0.285 0.355 0.330 0.270 0.031 0.251 0.271 0.330 0.124 0.249 0.212 1.000   
14. Knowledge 
network structural 
hole 0.066 0.052 0.021 0.006 0.042 0.099 -0.003 0.008 0.080 -0.019 0.100 0.087 -0.088 1.000 
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The results of the panel regression models are reported in Table 4.3. In Model 1, 
only the control variables are included in the regression to establish the starting model. In 
Model 2 through Model 5, coopetition pursuit is added to demonstrate the baseline effect, 
and each of the collaboration network and knowledge network variables and the interaction 
terms are added stepwise to test Hypotheses 1 – 4. In Models 2 – 5, the coefficient estimates 
of coopetition pursuit are statistically insignificant (p > 0.1). The null result for the baseline 
effect is as expected in my conceptual model, based on the theoretical and empirical 
insights from the existing literature, namely, coopetition pursuits may yield positive or 
negative effects on firm innovation. My analytical goal is to tease out the contingency 
effects of collaboration and knowledge network embeddedness in Models 2 – 5. 
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Table 4.3 Panel OLS Regression with Lagged IV, Industry- and Year-Fixed Effects, 
Firm-Level Clustered Robust SE 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Dependent 
variable 
Firm Innovation Economic Value 
Independent 
variables 
     
Coopetition pursuit  -0.0128 -0.00686 -0.0118 -0.0153 
  (0.0337) (0.0313) (0.0249) (0.0253) 
Collaboration 
network 
betweenness 
 0.183** 0.179** 0.190*** 0.189*** 
 (0.0712) (0.0729) (0.0697) (0.0697) 
Coopetition X 
collaboration 
network 
betweenness 
 0.233** 0.260** 0.178*** 0.176*** 
 (0.109) (0.115) (0.0652) (0.0639) 
Collaboration 
structural holes 
  -0.00882 -0.0216 -0.0205 
  (0.0225) (0.0214) (0.0209) 
Coopetition X 
collaboration 
structural holes 
  -0.0803** -0.0848*** -0.0839*** 
  (0.0345) (0.0285) (0.0288) 
Knowledge 
network 
eigenvector 
centrality 
   0.0395 0.0385 
   (0.0528) (0.0520) 
Coopetition X 
knowledge network 
eigenvector 
centrality 
   0.198*** 0.201*** 
   (0.0631) (0.0628) 
Knowledge 
network structural 
holes 
    0.0254 
    (0.0193) 
Coopetition X 
knowledge network 
structural holes 
    0.0397 
    (0.0439) 
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Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses; 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
  
Control variables      
Total asset -0.0687 -0.117* -0.118* -0.0720 -0.0768 
 (0.0599) (0.0641) (0.0622) (0.0540) (0.0541) 
Capital expenditure 0.0759* 0.0999** 0.0973** 0.0367 0.0408 
 (0.0456) (0.0441) (0.0430) (0.0321) (0.0318) 
Cash 0.00434 0.0120 0.0149 0.00335 0.00539 
 (0.0419) (0.0312) (0.0316) (0.0330) (0.0341) 
Firm size 0.183** 0.0771 0.0882* 0.0848 0.0854 
 (0.0726) (0.0552) (0.0530) (0.0534) (0.0536) 
Intangible asset -0.0189 -0.0144 -0.0138 -0.0146 -0.0160 
 (0.0146) (0.0148) (0.0149) (0.0158) (0.0154) 
Advertisement 
expense 
0.177*** 0.120*** 0.118*** 0.117*** 0.117*** 
 (0.0622) (0.0386) (0.0387) (0.0380) (0.0379) 
Operation expense -0.134 -0.0583 -0.0619 -0.0187 -0.0204 
 (0.108) (0.0530) (0.0527) (0.0423) (0.0419) 
R&D expense 0.169*** 0.130*** 0.130*** 0.106*** 0.106*** 
 (0.0504) (0.0338) (0.0326) (0.0298) (0.0299) 
148 
  
In Model 2, the interaction term of coopetition pursuit and collaboration network 
betweenness shows a significant, positive effect on firm innovation economic value (β = 
0.233, p < 0.05), providing supports for Hypothesis 1. In Model 3, the interaction term of 
coopetition pursuit and collaboration network structural hole measure shows a significant, 
negative effect on firm innovation economic value (β = -0.0803, p < 0.05), providing 
supports for Hypothesis 2. Also shown in Model 3, the interaction effect between 
collaboration network betweenness and coopetition pursuit (β = 0.260, p < 0.05) on firm 
innovation economic value remain stable, further supporting Hypothesis 1. 
In Model 4, the interaction effect between knowledge network centrality and 
coopetition pursuit are added to test Hypothesis 3. The interaction term of coopetition 
pursuit and knowledge network centrality shows a significant, positive effect on firm 
innovation economic value (β = 0.198, p < 0.001), providing strong supports for 
Hypothesis 3. Also shown in Model 4, the interaction effect between collaboration network 
betweenness and coopetition pursuit (β = 0.178, p < 0.001), and the interaction effect 
between collaboration network structural hole spanning and coopetition pursuit (β = -
0.0848, p < 0.001) remain stable in direction, magnitude, and statistical significance, which 
lend further supports for Hypotheses 1 and 2.  
In Model 5, the interaction effect between knowledge network structural hole 
spanning and coopetition pursuit are added to test Hypothesis 4. No significant effect is 
demonstrated in the interaction term between knowledge network structural hole spanning 
and coopetition pursuit (p ≥ 0.1). Hence, Hypothesis 4 is not supported in the empirical 
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analysis here. Model 5 represents the full model with all contingency effects hypothesized 
above. In the full model, the interaction effects of collaboration network betweenness (β = 
0.176, p < 0.01), collaboration network structural hole spanning (β = -0.0839, p < 0.01), 
and knowledge network centrality (β = 0.201, p < 0.01) on the baseline correlation between 
coopetition pursuit and innovation performance remain stable in directions, magnitudes, 
and statistical significance. Therefore, Hypotheses 1 – 3 are supported by the full model. 
 
4.6 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
4.6.1 Theoretical Contribution 
In this study, I sought answers to the research question: How does collaboration network 
and knowledge network embeddedness influence firm coopetition and innovation? I zero 
in on the unresolved controversy over potential value creation and value destruction in firm 
technological innovation as a result of coopetition pursuit. Specifically, I construct a 
contingency model using seminal insights in multiple network embeddedness (i.e. network 
pluralism) to clarify the structural conditions that augment value creation and mitigate 
value destruction effects of coopetition pursuits on the economic value of firm innovation. 
The contingency model illustrates the moderation effects of firm network position 
attributes on innovation outcome, namely, collaboration network betweenness, 
collaboration structural hole spanning, knowledge network centrality, and knowledge 
structural hole spanning.  
150 
  
The analysis makes several contributions to the existing literature of coopetition 
and innovation, and network pluralism research. First, the study contributes to the 
coopetition and firm innovation literature. Prior research in firm coopetition and innovation 
seldom emphasizes network contextual factors, and in particular glosses over the impacts 
of firm network positions on the relationship between firm coopetition pursuit and the 
economic value of firm innovation. Exemplary studies establish the significance of firm 
network embeddedness on innovation strategies and performances (Ahuja, 2000a; Burt, 
1987; Singh et al., 2015) which suggest the lack of conceptualization of network 
embeddedness as contextual conditions may have clouded existing knowledge on the 
influence of coopetition on innovation with a controversy over the direct impact of 
coopetition on firm innovation. The contingency model clarifies the network structural 
conditions that regulate value creation and value destruction effects of coopetition on 
innovation, hence providing insights into the controversy whether coopetition impacts firm 
innovation economic value positively or negatively (Gnyawali & Park, 2011; Park, 
Srivastava, & Gnyawali, 2014).  
Second, I synthesize seminal insights from two parallel streams of research in  the 
organizational network literature, namely, collaboration network and knowledge network, 
and contribute to the network pluralism literature by depicting the direct and moderation 
effects of network positions on coopetition and innovation in doubly embedded firms 
(Shipilov et al., 2014). I posit that collaboration network betweenness centrality augments 
the positive impact and mitigates the negative effect of coopetition pursuit on innovation 
(i.e. a positive moderation effect). The moderation effect of collaboration network 
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betweenness is supported empirically. On the other hand, collaboration structural hole 
spanning is expected to dampen the positive impact and exacerbate the negative impact of 
coopetition pursuit on innovation (i.e. a negative moderation effect). The moderation effect 
of collaboration structural hole spanning is supported empirically.  
Furthermore, I hone in on the moderation effects caused by firm structural 
embeddedness in a firm-level knowledge network, which captures the interdependencies 
between firm knowledge bases (Phelps et al., 2012). I hypothesize that knowledge network 
centrality mitigates the negative impact and augments the positive impact of coopetition 
pursuit on innovation (i.e. a positive moderation effect). The moderation effect of 
knowledge network centrality is supported empirically. Finally, I argue that knowledge 
structural hole spanning enhances the positive impact and diminishes the negative impact 
of coopetition pursuit on innovation (i.e. a positive moderation effect). The moderation 
effect of knowledge structural hole spanning is not supported empirically. 
My contingency model contributes to research in network pluralism (Shipilov et 
al., 2014) by integrating insights from organization network research and knowledge 
network research. I juxtapose, compare, and contrast two firm-level networks, namely, a 
collaboration network resulting from formal partnership (e.g. strategic alliances and joint 
ventures), and a knowledge network resulting from overlaps in codified knowledge bases 
of different firms (e.g. patent portfolio technological class co-assignments). In doing so, I 
demonstrate the conceptual distinctions between firm embeddedness in these two types of 
networks, and how different positions in the collaboration network and the knowledge 
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network may influence the relationship between firm strategies (e.g. coopetition pursuit) 
and firm performances (e.g. economic values of innovation) in distinguishable ways. 
4.6.2 Limitation and Future Research 
The analysis here is limited in a number of respects that can spur future research. 
First, I have just begun to explore the direct and indirect influences of inter-firm 
collaboration network and firm-level knowledge network in juxtaposition. Technology-
driven firms are often embedded in both of these inter-organizational networks 
simultaneously, and their behaviors and performances are subject to inter-firm relational 
interdependence (i.e. reflected in inter-firm collaboration network embeddedness) and 
knowledge interdependence (i.e. reflected in inter-firm knowledge network 
embeddedness). In this study, I investigate how relational and knowledge 
interdependencies moderate the impacts of coopetition on innovation in parallel, and how 
these network-based factors directly contribute to innovation value. However, I have yet 
to examine how relational and knowledge interdependencies may interact concurrently in 
determining the effectiveness and efficiency in value creation. Future research may be 
conducted to explicate the interplay between collaboration network embeddedness and 
knowledge network embeddedness on the firm level.  
Second, I use within-industry M&A pursuits as a proxy for coopetition. My 
operationalization approach is designed to reduce endogeneity issues since my 
collaboration network is constructed from strategic alliance and joint venture records. 
However, within-industry M&A pursuits is a highly conservative proxy for coopetition, 
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namely, an M&A tends to manifest after repeated interactions between the merger partners 
(e.g. acquirer and target), and it entails fully integration between two competitors’ 
technological competencies (Makri et al., 2010). Technology-driven firms also pursue 
coopetition without full integration, which is excluded in my independent variable 
operationalization. Future research can distinguish coopetition pursuits that involves full 
and partial knowledge integration and expound any similar or different impact on firm 
innovation value creation. 
Third, I use patent stock technological classes to construct firm-level knowledge 
network. While co-classification in patent stocks of the firms reflect technological overlaps 
accurately (Wang et al., 2014), this operationalization only approximates inter-firm 
knowledge influence. For example, patent citations may more closely reflect knowledge 
flows between the firms (Henderson et al., 2005; Sorenson et al., 2006). Future research 
can utilize citations on the firm patent stock level to construct firm knowledge network to 
investigate inter-firm knowledge influences. In addition, future research may leverage text 
mining techniques to investigate patent documents in full. For example, inter-firm 
knowledge ties can be operationalized as keyword co-occurrence (Tseng, Lin, & Lin, 
2007), bibliometric coupling (Hummon & Dereian, 1989), or similar technological 
footprints (Aharonson & Schilling, 2016). Future research on firm learning, knowledge 
and innovation may leverage these newly developed techniques to operationalize inter-firm 
knowledge networks in more details and higher resolution.   
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4.6.3 Managerial Implications 
This study contributes to managerial practice in technology-driven industries in several 
aspects. Firms in technology-driven industries are subject to high environmental turbulence 
and competitive threats, therefore, technology firms rely on innovation to gain and sustain 
competitive advantage (Levine & Prietula, 2012; Roberts & Eisenhardt, 2003; Thornhill, 
2006). Coopetition is a key strategy for innovation-driven firms to create value and 
improve their innovation efficiency (Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 2011; Chen & Miller, 
2015; Lado et al., 1997). However, partnering with competitors requires effective 
mechanisms to prevent value destruction from exacerbating competitive tension. The 
contingency model suggests collaboration network positions and knowledge network 
positions that can enhance the value creation effect of coopetition and mitigate its value 
destruction effect on firm innovation.  
Corporate and business-level managers in technological firms may leverage the 
insights here when strategizing inter-firm relations. Firms that occupy a well-connected 
position that bridge other collaboration partners tend to achieve greater value creation both 
directly and indirectly through coopetition. On the other hand, firms that span across the 
boundaries of disconnected collaboration partners gain less profound value creation by 
pursuing coopetition, suggesting that firms in a close community network benefit more 
from coopetition than firms in an open network configuration. Corporate and business unit 
decision makers may strategically forge inter-firm partnerships to increase the firm’s 
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network bridging ties and position the firm in a close-knit collaboration network, when 
seeking innovation efficiency enhancement and value creation through coopetition.  
In addition, managers may consider the contingency effects attributed to the 
overlaps between firm knowledge bases when strategizing coopetition. I identify a 
significant, augmenting effect of knowledge network centrality on value creation via 
coopetition. Therefore, corporate and business unit decision makers may strategically 
pursue two modes of knowledge absorption in parallel, namely, independently absorbing 
codified knowledge from the technological leaders in the industry by patent-based searches 
and pursuing coopetition to access competitors’ tacit knowledge. This approach can 
amplify the efficiency of competence development and further enhance the innovation 
value of the firm. 
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5 CONCLUSION 
Coopetition is a crucial firm strategy to gain competitiveness by forging win-win 
relationships with competitors. A central theme in the coopetition strategy is to leverage 
complementarity between competing firms, which enhances organization learning 
efficiency and firm innovation effectiveness. In the modern knowledge economy, 
competitive advantage hinges on incessant growth and renewal of firm competencies 
through learning and innovation. Hence, coopetition continues to garner interests from 
strategic management scholars and practitioners. 
However, coopetition is a double-edged sword that may either bring in benefits or 
inflict harms to the focal firm. For example, partnering with competitors can facilitate 
competency specialization and reduce cognitive burden on decision makers by providing a 
clear trajectory for firm capability development. On the other hand, coopetition may 
exacerbate the “Icarus paradox”7: prior success from coopetition augments managerial 
attention to partnership, limiting the scope of firm competency development and escalating 
firm commitment. When competitive conditions change, the focal firm may not be able to 
adapt. 
Given the tension and tradeoff associated with coopetition, strategic formulation 
and ramification can be distinct. My dissertation research investigates the motivation and 
hindrance involved in the firm decision to balance competition and cooperation and to 
                                                 
7 The Icarus paradox refers to the loss of competitiveness attributed to prior success, such as excessive 
commitment to specialization, routinization, relational shackles (see Miller, 1990 for a detailed account). 
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pursue coopetition, and the benefits and harms attributed to coopetition. To achieve this 
goal, I conceptualize how firms balance competition and cooperation from a socio-
cognitive perspective; I then empirically study how firm learning influences coopetition, 
and how coopetition influences firm innovation. I select the empirical context of 
technologically intensive industries, where firms have high incentives to synergize with 
their competitors through cooperative innovation (Bouncken & Kraus, 2013; Teece, 1992). 
In Chapter 2, theoretical development elucidates that a balance between 
competition and cooperation emerges from the interplay between emotionality and 
rationality on the firm level in the inter-firm interaction context. The causal connections 
between firm perceptions of the actions and motivations of their competitors, firm 
emotional responses, and firm action proclivities explain the shifts in inter-firm interaction 
modes in competitive dynamics hybridism with different degrees of competition and 
cooperation. These insights inform managers about the confounding effects of emotion-
driven action proclivities. Inferring from the findings here, managers should acknowledge 
the impact of firm-level emotions elicited by competitive perception, and recalibrate their 
strategic focus on value-based interdependence with competitors when strategizing inter-
firm relations. 
In Chapter 3, I apply the theoretical lens of organization learning to explain the 
effects of firm learning experiences on their strategic decisions regarding coopetition. The 
results suggest a motivating effect of past strategic alliances and a hindering effect of firm 
patent searches on its coopetition pursuit, depicting path dependency in organization 
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learning and relationship building. These results inform strategic managers about the 
connection between learning experiences, firm capabilities, and the tradeoff in coopetition. 
The insights from this chapter provide guidance to strategize collaboration with 
competitors by evaluating the match between firm learning proficiency and the competency 
development opportunity through coopetition. 
In Chapter 4, I apply the theoretical lens of network pluralism to tease out the 
contingency effects of alliance network and knowledge network embeddedness on the 
relation between coopetition and innovation. The results suggest augmenting effects of 
alliance and knowledge network centrality and a dampening effect of alliance network 
structural hole on the impact of horizontal integration on firm innovation performance. 
Focusing on the coopetition tensions and tradeoffs, I clarify logic behind these network-
based contingency effects. This investigation demonstrates the differential impacts of firm 
positions in multiple networks to inform managerial decision regarding leveraging 
coopetition to improve innovation. Specifically, when strategizing coopetition, innovation-
driven firm managers should consider not only the interfirm social power interdependence, 
but also the influence of the focal firm’s knowledge base in the technological domain. 
 In combination, the investigation on the balancing, learning, and innovating aspects 
of coopetition leads to new insights on how firms can strategize coopetition to gain 
competitiveness, while avoiding the caveats associated with this approach. Although the 
empirical work in this dissertation is grounded in the technology-driven sectors, managerial 
guidance is applicable to a wide range of firms in the modern knowledge economy, in 
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which organization learning and innovation constitute the linchpin of firm competitive 
advantage.  
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